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Abstract
This research applies and extends the standard industrial organization models of re-
peated interaction between firms by incorporating group identity to evaluate the ability of
group identity, thereby summarizing the theories of observed collusion. The model is used
to outline circumstances under which collusion is easier to happen in a single market, and
it will break down.
A general overview of literature based on laboratory experiments is presented to study
the effects of social identity and study oligopoly markets. We construct lab experiments
to test the effects of a single factor on collusion, i.e. whether the two players share the
same group identity. University students were enrolled as research subjects in the labo-
ratory experiments to test the validity of behaviour predictions. All experiments serve to
answers two questions: a) How far is the market outcome away from the Standard Nash
equilibrium? b) How good is the Nash prediction?
Study 1 investigates the effects of group identity on randomly rematches one-shot Cournot
interactions. Study 2 describes the results of finitely repeated Cournot interactions that be-
haviour is more collusive when the players were from the same group than those from
different groups or nogroup players. Study 3 concentrates on the indefinitely repeated in-
teractions, finding that outgroup favouritism could be reflected in average quantity choices
and collusion. Therefore, we determine that the effect of group identity on collusion is
greater in repeated Cournot interactions than one-shot Cournot interactions, and that the
repeated interaction devices enhance the difference between the players without group
identity and players with primed group identity. The inspecting of individual behaviour
indicated that the output adjustment is significantly correlated with the previous period’s
two-sides profit changes comparisons. In the group matchings (ingroup matchings and
outgroup matchings), group identity further strengthens the role of enhancement for col-
lusion.
Group identity can influence significantly the player’s quantity choices. In this study
we reassess the representation of group identity by applying group contingent other-regarding
preferences. First, the influence of group identity varies unsympathetically across different
devices of repeated Cournot interactions, so it cannot be explained through a well-behaved
preference function. Second, this study suggests that group identity plays a key role in the
preference over strategies of norms. Simulation results generated from a norm model es-
timated at the subject level provided insight into the repeated interactions and the group
identity that motivate the collusion.
Keywords: Social Identity, Intergroup relations, Cournot interactions, Collusion, Lab ex-
periments.
iv
Contents
I LITERATURE REVIEW 5
1 Group Identity 6
1.1 Priming Group Identity and Factors Affecting Saliency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 Group Assignment Effects on Behaviours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Group Identity Models: Preference-based Model and Beliefs-based Model . . . . 12
2 Cournot Quantity Competition 14
2.1 Stage Game: One-shot Interactions with the Different Co-player . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Repeated Games: Multi-period Repetition with the Same Co-player . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.1 Finitely Repeated Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.2 Indefinitely Repeated Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3 Group Identity Incorporates with Cournot Interactions 18
II THEORY and EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 19
4 Theoretical Work 19
4.1 One-shot Interactions: Nash Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2 Finitely Repeated Interactions: Perfect Nash Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.3 Indefinitely Repeated Interactions: Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium . . . . . 28
4.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5 Experimental Design 30
5.1 Part One-Manipulation of Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.1.1 Step One (Randomly Group Assignment) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.1.2 Step Two (Team Building Task) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.2 Part Two-Cournot Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.2.1 One-shot Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.2.2 Ten Periods Repeated Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.2.3 Indefinitely Periods Repeated Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
v
5.3 Payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.4 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6 Hypothesis 37
6.1 Hypotheses I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.2 Hypotheses II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.3 Hypotheses III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.4 Hypotheses IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.5 Hypotheses V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.6 Hypotheses VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
III RESULTS 41
7 Study I: One-shot Interactions 44
7.1 The Impact of Group Identity on Quantity Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.2 Regression Analysis of Quantity Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8 Study II: Finitely Repeated Interactions 51
8.1 The Impact of Group Identity on Quantity Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
8.2 Regression Analysis of Quantity Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.3 The Impact of Group Identity on Collusion and JPM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8.4 Collusion Duration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
9 Study III: Indefinitely Repeated Interactions 61
9.1 The Impact of Group Identity on Quantity Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
9.2 Regression Analysis of Quantity Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
9.3 The Impact of Group Identity on Collusion and JPM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
9.4 Collusion Duration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
10 NormsAssociatedwithGroup Identity in Repeated (Finitely and Indefinitely) Cournot
Duopoly Interactions 72
10.1 The Algorithm: Quantity Choices Adjustment Norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
10.1.1 Quantity Choice Adjustments to Relative Profit Changed Comparisons
and Group Matchings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
vi
10.1.2 Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
IV CONCLUSION and DISCUSSION 83
V APPENDIX 90
A Group Identity Effects on Different Games 90
B Experiment Instructions and Interface 92
B.1 Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
B.1.1 Instructions (One-shot Games) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
B.1.2 Instructions (Finitely Repeated Games) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
B.1.3 Instructions (Indefinitely Repeated Games) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
B.2 Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
B.2.1 Interface: Part One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
B.2.2 Interface: Part Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
C Theoretic Models 108
D Treatments 115
E Poster-experimental Survey, Demographics and Summary Statistics of Players 116
F Regression with the Sense of Belongingness to Own Group 118
F.0.1 One-Shot Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
F.0.2 Finitely Repeated Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
F.0.3 Indefinitely Repeated games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
G Measures of Collusion (Harrington Jr, Gonzalez, & Kujal, 2016) 120
List of Figures
1 OPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 The pure-strategy Nash Equilibria of the Cournot interactions . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3 Payoff matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4 One-shot interactions: Quantity choices distributions over different treatment . . 45
5 One-shot interactions: The average of quantity choices by treatment . . . . . . . . 47
6 One-shot interactions: Rate of choice of collusion over periods by treatment . . . 50
7 Finitely repeated interactions: Average quantity choices over supergames and
periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
8 Finitely repeated interactions: Rate of choice of collusion over supergames and
periods by treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
9 Indefinitely repeated interactions: Average quantity choices over supergames
and periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
10 Indefinitely repeated interactions: Rate of choice of collusion over supergames
and periods by treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
11 Finitely repeated interactions: Average and 95% confidence intervals of quantity
choice adjustment over five material profits’ changes and by treatment . . . . . . 75
12 Indefinitely repeated interactions: Average and 95% confidence intervals of quan-
tity choice adjustment over five material profits’ changes and by treatment . . . . 76
13 Finitely repeated interactions’ simulation: Quantity choice changes over indi-
vidual and by treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
14 Indefinitely repeated interactions’ simulation: Quantity choice changes over in-
dividual and by treatment: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
B1 Payoff matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
B2 Payoff matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
B3 Payoff matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
B4 Part one: Paintings study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
B5 Part one: Paintings self-study (Beginning page) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
B6 Part one: Two additional paintings comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
B7 Part one: Within group discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B8 Part one: Problem-solving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B9 Part one: Individual payoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
B10 Part one: Questionnaire (Group assigned treatments) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
B11 Part two: The beginning of the part two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
B12 Part two: Instruction of part two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
B13 Part two: Decision task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
B14 Part two: Decision task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
viii
B15 Part two: The beginning of the next period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
B16 Part two: The waiting page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
B17 Part two: Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
B18 The total material payoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
C19 Best response to collusive opponent with group identity parameter . . . . . . . . 109
C20 Utility changing with group contingent other-regarding preference parameters . 110
C21 Deviation utility gains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
C22 Finitely repeated interactions: Threshold deviation period . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
C23 Indefinitely repeated interactions: Critical discount factor dc over group identity 113
C24 Friedman index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
E25 One-shot interactions: Distribution of university programs participants study . . 117
E26 Finitely repeated interactions: Distribution of university programs participants
study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
E27 Indefinitely repeated interactions: Distribution of university programs partici-
pants study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
List of Tables
1 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2 Parameters of the Cournot interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3 Self-reported the sense of belongingness to own/othergroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4 One-shot interactions: Individual average quantity choice by treatment . . . . . 46
5 One-shot interactions: Treatment effects on the individual quantity choices . . . 49
6 Finitely repeated interactions: Individual quantity choices by treatment . . . . . 54
7 Finitely repeated interactions OLS regressions: Treatment effects on individual
quantity choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8 Logit finitely repeated interactions: The probability individual to Collude (qi =
6) (Percentage change in the log odds ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
9 Logit finitely repeated interactions: The probability of JPM (qi,t = qj,t = 6) (Per-
centage change in the log odds ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
10 Finitely repeated interactions: The observations of JPM duration . . . . . . . . . 61
11 Indefinitely repeated interactions: Individual average quantity choices by treat-
ment and supergames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
ix
12 Indefinitely repeated interactions OLS regression: Treatment effect on individ-
ual quantity choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
13 Logit indefinitely repeated interactions: The probability individual to Collude
(qi = 6) (Percentage change in the log odds ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
14 Logit indefinitely repeated interactions: The probability of JPM (qi,t = qj,t = 6)
(Percentage change in the log odds ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
15 Indefinitely repeated interactions: The observations of JPM duration . . . . . . . 71
16 Relative profits changed comparisons categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
17 Change in individual quantity Dqi,t with respect to the lagged change in joint
profits (Dpi,t 1, Dpj,t 1 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
18 Simulation norms: Dqgi for finitely and indefinitely interactions by treatment . . . 79
A1 The pro-social behaviours and social preferences in the individual game theory
games (Camerer & Fehr, 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
D2 Treatments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
E3 One-shot interactions: Demographic observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
E4 Finitely repeated interactions: Demographic observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
E5 Indefinitely repeated interactions: Demographic observations . . . . . . . . . . . 116
F6 OLS Regression: Treatment effects on individual quantity choices by treatment
with the sense of the belongingness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
F7 OLS Regression: Treatment effects on individual quantity choices by treatment
with the sense of belongingness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
F8 OLS Regression: Treatment Effects on Individual Quantity Choices by Treat-
ment with the sense of the belongingness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
G9 Collusion measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
G10 Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
x
INTRODUCTION
The core objective of all three projects is to predict the behaviour of duopolists under differ-
ent market environments with different group assignments and Cournot interaction devices.
According to Ledvina and Sircar (2012), the most prominent observations of game theory in
industry organization are those concerning oligopolies’ collusion. The causes of implicit col-
lusion transversion are discussed, and the identity relationships of these three different group
are induced. We are going to provide clear causality about the relationship by performing
controlled laboratory studies.
Economists recognised that group identity plays a significant role in influencing colourful driv-
ing behaviour in critical actions. The prospects for various game theories have been argued
on and on because people’ preference must be taken into account when it comes to summaris-
ing the descriptive theories of observable behaviour. Experimental and field data suggest that
group identity is generally conducted with a pro-social attitude towards the member of one’s
own group. To incorporate such non-pecuniary concerns into economic theory, economists
proposed models of “social preference”, which assume that in addition to maximizing utility,
people also care about the kindness of their actions and other’s actions. The weight of other-
regarding based on the differential self-interested motives of ingroup and outgroup members
might be shaped by different group identity. In a norm industrial situation, there will likely to
multiple firms in organizations, firms of organization hope to get higher profits through collu-
sion. Thus, most of the economists who have given their careers to studying the various effect
on the likelihood of collusion. In the field data, many unobserved variables could modify the
collusion, we assume group identity is one of them.
Our work shows that group identity does matter, yet it exerts its influence not in this pre-
dictable way from the standard game model in incorporating social preferences. One-shot
predictions are intuitive, and ingroup identity leads to greater collusion than outgroup iden-
tity. Under finitely repeated interactions, these predictions can become counterintuitive. Out-
group identity leads to greater incidence and longer-sustained collusion. These predictions
were tested in a series of laboratory experiments with induced group identity, and econom-
ically insignificant differences in one-shot interactions were discovered. Under indefinitely
repeated interactions, ingroup identity leads to significantly higher collusion. Moreover, this
feature increases within and across supergames. The results indicate that this behaviour is
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driven by duopolies’ use of adjustment norms with group assignments. Furthermore, group
identity affects implicit collusion by modifying the access to behavioural norms incongruent
with the best response motivations of Nash equilibrium, but not through the shaping of social
preferences. Not much difference was found in one-shot interactions, and this is the baseline to
examine the social preference caused by different group identity. But we re-do interactions in
repetition Cournot, and observe the predicted opposite direction. The repetition interactions
lie upon outgroup bias is more effective in theory which meets the condition of Nash equilib-
rium (trigger grim). We observed the raising of ingroup matchings cooperation in supergames
over periods.
Part I contains the qualitative literature review of lab experiments, whichmeasure the psychol-
ogy social group identity and the collusion in Cournot interactions. Part II traces the whole
procedures of the experimental design and the details of the technique. The results of the ex-
periments are elaborated in Part III with the Baseline experiment which answers the questions
about how past transactions shape group identity preferences. Conclusions and discussions
are presented in Part IV, along with the plan and suggestions for future researches.
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Motivation: OPEC story
Our study is of practical research significance for organizations and institutions, such as the Orga-
nization of the Petroleum Exporting Counties (OPEC), an international organization of oil supply.
OPEC is a cartel consisting of 12-14 countries, and it has been operating since the 1960s. The output
quantity of OPEC exerts an adverse impact on the crude oil price. The role of OPEC in the adjust-
ment of global crude supplies is a vital one. OPEC is, in essence, a quantity decision cartel to carry
out oil production quotas system to ensure maximum oil revenue (The OPEC gave up quotas oil
policy system after 2011, and re-adopted quotas after January, 2017.). The crude oil exportation of a
member country of OPEC is a quantity decision game. OPEC could be regarded as a textbook cartel
model, in spite of its controversy. As a matter of fact, we can often find the indication of interaction
with cooperation throughout the history of OPEC, because the member has always over-fulfilled its
quota. The “Prisoner Dilemma” theory disappeared in operation of OPEC. Besides, if OPEC agreed
with a cut-output policy with non-OPEC countries (Russia), the OPEC members would obey the
agreement. The question is, what factor would result in the break of the output degree?
The impetus for this research comes from the facts that deviations of OPEC members are based on
the “freezing production” agreement. The quantity interactions are analysed and determined based
on static/dynamic games model with complete information theory under non-cooperation games.
From the perspective of economics, there are also some tricky problems to keep the integrity of a
cartel, such as supervision, administration and implementation. All these problems would under-
mine the efficiency and validity of the production quota system. We further explain this problem
by using the concept of sociology and psychology instead. Results of both experimental and non-
experimental kinds of researches confirm the pervasiveness of evaluative biases in the judgment of
groupmembers in the event of salient ingroup/outgroup distinctions (membership identity to own
group). Under this circumstance, we are concerned about how group identity impacts the whole
process of quantity interaction with the inner members of OPEC. Notably, ethnicity and language
were probably the most important characteristics of distinct social groups, and group norm is al-
ways a key element of the specific culture of one group. For example, Habyarimana, Humphreys,
Posner, and Weinstein (2007) observed that co-ethnics play the part of cooperative equilibrium for
the public good, whereas non-co-ethnics do not. In order to assess the importance of group iden-
tity and potential conflicts among the OPEC members, we could construct one primary measure of
ethnic diversity (Alesina & Ferrara, 2005; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005). The index is fragmen-
tation (FRAG), which indicates the probability of two randomly selected individuals belonging to
different sub-ethnic categories. The index of fractionation, Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) examined
3
the effect of democracy, and fragmentation could exert a negative effect on economic development.
FRAC = 1 
N
Â
i=1
p2i (1)
where pi is the proportion of people affiliated to religion i in the OPEC. A higher religious diver-
sity is associated with group identity and crude oil production. The frequency of deviations and
stabilization reflects the signs of softening the punishment mechanism. In other words, the dif-
ferent group identity among OPEC members plays a detrimental role in collusion. The Figure 1
shows that the index of religious fragmentation, which is depicted on the left y–axis, implies lower
group identity. The actual OPEC crude production and quota are shown on the right y-axis. The
output agreement started in 1998 to 2011, and then the quota system was abandoned. A new price
system started from 2012, and the quota system became effective again in 2016. Moreover, even
some non-OPEC countries agreed to cut down output after January 2017 by 600,000 bbl/day. For
example, Russia promised to decrease its production by 300,000bbl/day, and the agreement was
implemented six months later. Conversely, Kuwait and Algeria over-fulfilled production cut quota.
Figure 1: OPEC
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We aggregate the religious population sources of OPEC members based on national sources: The World Fack-
book.
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Part I
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
The nature essentials of humanity, such as kindness, love, compassion, forgivingness, and con-
tributing to the welfare, are constricted by parochialism and transitional economic assump-
tions. Due to the defects and limitations in the transitional self-interest economist models,
the most anti/pro-social behaviours were not explained in a solid manner. Although many
theoretical models provide reasonable explanations to the in/outgroup bias observations, the
model of group identity is in agreement with practical situation. Thus, our examination of an
oligopolistic market is hindered by the lack of a basic underlying model with which the social
identity can be used to carry out the analysis.
In a specific community, the sense of belongingness of the members who share a common
group identity could be enhanced, which may justify why people are prone to allocate more
resources to their community. Such a parochial sense within the group, of courses, is not
uncommon to observe in education activities and enterprises management. In the research of
school education, each class or each study group could be regarded as a small group, in which
the sense of belongingness and the collective feeling of honour can be used to stimulate healthy
competition and to invest in education/training. These incentive pathways in the enterprises
can spur the staff’s enthusiasm and individual initiative, thereby improving efficiency and
performance. In the enterprise, the leaders of the team are always entitled to allocate the
vast majority of benefits and resources. During that process, the outgroup favouritism could
be used to adjust and balance the allocation of resources, which makes the lower-benefited
employees to accept and identify the inequality allocations. The outgroup favouritism can
effectively alleviate intergroup contradictions and conflicts, especially, for major and minor
groups, rich and poor groups.
Turner and Tajfel (1986) are the first ones that brought forward the theory of social identity.1
1The social identity theory of group study has involved many disciplines, such as anthropologists (Murphy,
1957), sociologists (Sumner, 2013) and political scientists (Miller, Gurin, Gurin, & Malanchuk, 1981) have explored
group issues for decades.
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2 Compared with sociologists and social psychologists, the recognition of group member-
ship can lead to potentially determinant motives are relatively late behaviour in economics. A
growing number of literature in economics studies the effects of group identity on individual
behaviour (Charness, Rigotti, & Rustichini, 2007; R. Chen & Chen, 2011; Y. Chen & Li, 2009;
Goette, Huffman, & Meier, 2006; Goette, Huffman, Meier, & Sutter, 2010; Sutter, 2009).Byrne
(1969) observed that people tend to like those who share similar attitudes and beliefs. By com-
parison, people dislike those with a different attitude and beliefs. Psychologists view group
identity as a potentially detrimental factor of behaviour (Brewer, 1999; Johnston, Abdelal, Her-
rera, & McDemott, 2009).
In this section, we will go into further details about the effects of group identity on different
economic behaviours. To advance a theory of decision making associated with the identity
recognition, we also identify the concept of economic environment in a broad range. Social
nature suggests that when people are making decisions, they tend to bring benefits to the
members of the same group. This is in contrast with dominant rational choice models. Both
lab and field experiments performed by economists have reviewed the question of how group
identity affects human behaviours.
1 Group Identity
The concept of “Identity” indicates numerous connotations and it has a fairly long historical
period of development in the research of sociology. “Identity” is associated with the partic-
ular role or major category, and it reveals the relationship among individuals in the society.
The definition of social identity is dependent on one’s opinion of oneself and others, includ-
ing the realm of personal attribute and common features such as gender and race. Turner
and Tajfel (1986) distinguished individual identity from group identity. The former usually
means self-description of individual characteristics, whereas the latter depicts the common
self-description of the members of a particular social category as a whole (e.g., organisation
membership, religious affiliation, gender, and age cohort). The development of group identity
profoundly effects, the research on the concept of group identity spans many fields of science,
philosophy, sociology, and psychology. Because the development of group identity is of pro-
2The intergroup bias includes: ingroup favouritism, outgroup derogation, ingroup derogation, outgroup
favouritism, it is easy to see in real life, from the viewpoint of development, the intergroup bias models have
more excellent and more space for growth.
6
found effect, researches on the concept of group identity span many fields, including but not
limited to science, philosophy, sociology, and psychology.
The formation of group identity experience involves three steps: social-categorisation, social
comparison, and positive distinctiveness. Tajfel and Turner were the pioneers of studying the
social identity of the minimal group paradigm, in which all participants were anonymously
and randomly assigned into non-overlapping groups. They created “the tiny mass world”
to facilitate the observation of the experimenters: (1) All subjects are randomly divided into
non-overlapping groups, there are no interactions among subjects. (2) Group membership is
anonymous. (3) Subjects’ decisions do not affect their own payoffs. The above three condi-
tions emphasise the importance of assigning subjects into different straightforward and mean-
ingless categories, and the group orientation consciousness and actions of the participants
were aroused.3 Group identity can incentivize non-selfish preferences, Segal and Sobel (2007)
provided an axiomatic foundation that can reflect individual preferences for reciprocity, in-
equity aversion, altruism as well as spitefulness. It was assumed that in addition to conven-
tional preferences toward outcomes, the player in a strategic environment would also show
preference toward strategy profiles. The interactions between ethnocentrism groups could
be attributed to the difference in social identity, including intra-group behaviour (ingroup
favouritism) and inter-group behaviour (outgroup derogation).4 To ensure the simplicity and
clarify of group bias, the “derogation” is by default the derogation against outgroup, and “out-
group favouritism” means the derogation against ingroup members (Brewer, 1999).
1.1 Priming Group Identity and Factors Affecting Saliency
Most people favour their shared group identity, regardless of how the groups were formed in
the first place. Lab experiment results showed that the certain group identity of participants
could be highlighted by labelling. Two main techniques are involved in the group identity
experimental methodologies to induce group identity, including primed artificial group iden-
tity (Y. Chen & Li, 2009; Klor & Shayo, 2010; Li, Dogan, & Haruvy, 2011) and the enhanced
naturally-existing group identity (Benjamin, Choi, & Fisher, 2010; Benjamin, Choi, & Strick-
land, 2007; Bernhard, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2006; Goette et al., 2006; Goette, Huffman, Meier, &
3The bias assessed by traditional self-report including attribution of group cognition (stereotyping), group atti-
tude (prejudice), and individual behaviour toward ingroup and outgroup targets (derogation) is explicit measures
(Mackie & Smith, 1998; Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 1991; Wilder & Simon, 2001).
4Lane (2016) summarised 77 experiments, 25 out of 77 showed ingroup favouritism, 46 out of 77 did not find
any ingroup favouritism or outgroup derogation, and the rest experiments found outgroup favouritism.
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Sutter, 2012; McLeish & Oxoby, 2011). Solow and Kirkwood (2002) use both two techniques to
study the effects of group identity.
To study the basic characteristics of the artificial group identity, the participants were ran-
domly assigned to receive a few pairs of stimulants (e.g., pieces of information, paintings,
team-building task), and then theywere encouraged to chat with people anonymously through
non-face-to-face methods. A limitation of the above basic features ensures that there is no ef-
fect of group identity, other than the “labelling effect”. In comparison, the “naturally-existing
group identity” (such as ethnicity, nationality, religion, gender and social/geographical affil-
iation) gives people more than one “label” in real life.5 For naturally created and arbitrar-
ily induced group identity, the vast majority of economic studies demonstrated that ingroup
favouritism was significantly consolidated and outgroup derogation was also improved (Fer-
shtman & Gneezy, 2001; Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000). Group bias was
stronger in terms of artificially primed identity than those of naturally identity.6 The study
which focused on the artificial group identity is easy to control and observe, compared with
that of priming method which was used to adjust the different group identity (Bargh, Chen, &
Burrows, 1996).
The bias varies with different modulatory factors, such as identity, role in games, and interac-
tive environments. It is largely dependent upon the type of economic games. The audience,
feedback, decision-making contexts, and payoff commonality interaction environments will
inevitably cause different degrees of group identity saliency (Charness et al., 2007).7 Eckel and
Grossman (2005) conducted experiments consisting of six treatments, which are characterised
by various degrees of group identification. It was found that “the enhanced identity leads
higher levels of cooperation.” For example, group discrimination in the third-party punishers
was more apparent than the decision makers. Moreover, group size showed no effect on the
various behaviours in the dilemma games, although large groups tend to invest more than in
the individual that small groups in the public games (Brewer & Kramer, 1986).
5For example, the gender is the weakest group bias, even, there is opposite gender favouritism. Ingroup
favouritism ismore noticeable among participants in the U.S. participants than in China (Buchan, Croson, &Dawes,
2002).
6Two reasons why the level of bias between artificial groups is higher than various types of natural groups: 1)
the experimental priming of an artificial identity confers experimenter demand effect; 2) the bias among natural
identity groups is not to engage in socially unacceptable behaviour (politically incorrect).
7Other factors such as intergroup competition, similarity, and status differentials, could also enhance the inter-
group distinctions.
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1.2 Group Assignment Effects on Behaviours
Akerlof and Kranton (2002), who bridged the gap between sociology and economy, modified
the standard economic models by taking social identity into the account of behaviours. Ak-
erlof and Kranton (2005) and Ball, Eckel, Grossman, and Zame (2001) addressed the significant
effects of group identity on market settings.8 Individuals with disparate group identity pos-
sess various behaviours deviated from the theory of traditional standard hypotheses (Bolton
& Qckenfels, 2000; Y. Chen & Li, 2009; Fehr, Gachter, & Kirchsteigeri, 1997; Fehr & Schmidt,
1999; Rabin, 1993).
Due to the limitation of self-interest in traditional economics, the amount of pro-social be-
haviours in individual game theory experiments is hard to explain merely by traditional eco-
nomics theories. Recently, the thriving of behavioural and experimental economics observed
the vast scale of behaviour that is derived in part from the groups. The results were not con-
sistent with the assumptions of economists. The following studies and tests have validated
this conclusion that group identity has penetrated into the economics fields of individual be-
haviour. For example, “minimal group” has been formed due to the preferences of subjects for
the painters of Klee and Kandinsky. Group identity has exerted substantial effects on the be-
haviour of the allocators, who have been striving to maximise the profits for their own group,
as well as the payoff of ingroup and outgroup.
It is well known that people tend to behave more prosocially when they interact with the
members of their own group. Yet they might become less generous, less trusting, and less
cooperative towards those who have a different group identity.9 In real economic activities,
the interactions of work-fellows, partners of firms, and managers of companies are repeated
and can be fixed within the contract time. Two empirical studies demonstrated the effects
of group identity on individual/group behaviour by Brewer and Kramer (1986) and Dawes,
Van de Kragt, and Orbell (1988). Brewer and Kramer (1986) examined the choice behaviour
in a public-good problem and determined a greater extent of self-restraint in the common-
resource dilemma. The results of the public-goods problem are complex, and group identity
promotes more contributions. In addition, in the second study, Dawes et al. (1988) stated that
8Socioeconomic phenomena, such as, gender discrimination and household division of labor (Akerlof & Kran-
ton, 2000), trust (Basu, 2006; Buchan et al., 2002), public goods provision (Croson, Marks, & Snyder, 2008; Eckel
& Grossman, 2005; Solow & Kirkwood, 2002), preferences over re distributive tax regimes (Klor & Shayo, 2010),
cooperation (McLeish & Oxoby, 2011; Ruffle & Sosis, 2006)
9Bolton and Qckenfels (2000); Fehr and Ga¨chter (2002b); Fehr and Schmidt (1999); Rabin (1993)
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the effect of group identity can only be discovered when each and every member of the group
promised to cooperate. In a number of economic experiments on group identity (Basu, 2010;
Be´nabou & Tirole, 2011; Fang & Loury, 2005); a higher willingness of the participants to adopt
pro-social actions was observed (Goette et al., 2006; Yamagishi et al., 2013). On the contrary, the
participants who belonged to different groups showed a certain extent of antisocial behaviour
(Brewer, 1999, 2000; Levin & Sidanius, 1999; Mackie & Smith, 1998). This study discussed the
social preference primed by group identity, which stimulated the different behaviour to occur
under different game environments. In the next paragraphs, wemeasured the social preference
based on previous literature and case study in labs. The Table A1 provided an analysis bases on
the test of social preference for pro-social behaviours in the different games. More specifically,
social preference is further divided into three sectors, including altruism (unconditional social
preference), reciprocity and difference aversion (conditional social preference). Among these,
two social preferences were significantly correlated with each other. For example, the decision
of investors in the trust games can be influenced by reciprocity, and the returning action is
determined by the combination of altruism preference and reciprocity. As a result, the different
preference can be derived from the actions in the public goods.
Outgroup favouritism The theory of social identity has been criticised for its negligence
of accounting adequately of the phenomenon of outgroup favouritism (Hewstone & Ward,
1985; Jost & Banaji, 1994). While this is often true, people have also shown other reactions to
in/outgroups, particularly in the context of power and status. Studies on the natural existing
group identity induce the outgroup favouritism, such as race (Fazio & Hilden, 2001), gender
(Dasgupta & Rivera, 2004), and age (Mellott & Greenwald, 1999). Outgroup favouritism was
revealed in the case of low-status groups, especially when people’s attitudes and beliefs are
assessed using indirect measures rather than self-report measures (Boldry & Kashy, 1999; Jost
& Banaji, 1994; Moorman & Blakely, 1995; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). These studies indicated
that implicit prejudice and stereotypes have been influencing people’s judgments, decisions
and behaviours. As a social category, women are less powerful and they have a lower social
status than men (Goodwin & Fiske, 2001). Consequently, women are inclined to attribute the
more positive feeling to the members of an outgroup than men (Batalha, Akrami, & Ekeham-
mar, 2007). At present, most of the studies on group identity are concentrated on significant
ingroup favouritism, outgroup favouritism, especially economics behaviour is little studied.
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Rabbie, Schot, and Visser (1989) hypothesised that “the greater the perceived outcome inter-
dependence on the outgroup, the more outgroup favouritism will occur.” In addition, Pan
and Houser (2013) found that these interactions could influence group identity, and argued
that the cooperative production process could often lead cooperation with the outside group
(outgroup favouritism).
Punishment The punishment associated with group identity is of particular importance in
the group’s efficiency because it could enhance pro-social norm enforcement with groups (Fehr
& Gachter, 2000; Fuster & Meier, 2010). It motivates individuals to cherish and uphold the
value of group identity by punishing the violators. Akerlof and Kranton (2000); Be´nabou and
Tirole (2011) explained that the violations of the specific norms are tantamount to the under-
mining of the identity of the group. In the random assignment to groups, identity has been
shown to motivate the differential punishment to ingroup and outgroup members. To date,
work on second-party and third-party provided mixed support for this idea. In terms of the
second-party punishment situations. Shinada, Yamagishi, and Ohmura (2004) found that in-
group members were punished severer than outgroup members in a gift-giving game when
they violated certain rules. McLeish and Oxoby (2011) observed that the minimum accept-
able offers of ingroup players are higher than outgroup players in the ultimatum games, and
that the ingroup players were more likely to reject offers. Kubota, Li, Bar-David, Banaji, and
Phelps (2013); Valenzuela and Srivastava (2012) found that ingroup members were more tol-
erant toward the marginally unfair offers in the ultimatum games. Group identity exerted
enormous influences in cooperative behaviours and punishments of the defector (Y. Chen &
Li, 2009; Goette et al., 2006; Goette, Huffman, & Meier, 2012) in the prisoner dilemma games.
Punishment of defection was observed even though the punisher was in the position of the
third-party observer, rather than a victim of defection (Fehr & Ga¨chter, 2002b; Hoff & Pandey,
2006). Harris, Herrmann, andKontoleon (2012) solved the problem about the close relationship
between social norms (group norms) and punishment via one-shot dictator games with third-
party punisher. Bernhard, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2006); Bernhard, Fischbacher, and Fehr (2006)
summarised that if the third-party punisher and the victim were from the same group, the
punisher was inclined to adopt severer punishment, compared with outgroup victim. In other
words, the punisher’s behaviour is affected by the victim’s identity, and the third-party pun-
ishers had greater group discrimination than second-party players. The players favoured their
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shared group identity, yet they had not shown resentment toward outgroupmembers (Tajfel &
Turner, 1979).10 If the third-party punisher and the violator came from the same group, the vi-
olator had a better chance of being forgiven. In light of this, the punisher’s behaviour was also
affected by the violator’s identity. Any ingroup member who did not respect group norms
should be punished severely by other members within the same group (McLeish & Oxoby,
2007). Harris et al. (2012) found that the threat of ingroup punishment could slightly increase
ingroup favouritism behaviour, and that outgroup punishment might enforce the “egalitarian
sharing norms”. Furthermore, spiteful punishment was often executed by an outside mem-
ber of their own college fraternities in a prisoner’s dilemma game (Kollock, 1998). Most of
the previous studies showed that ingroup individuals preferred to punish ingroup members
costly who violate group norms. Fehr and Gachter (2000); Fehr and Ga¨chter (2002a); McCabe,
Rigdon, and Smith (2003) found that the costly punishment could bring forward cooperation,
although such punishment showed no such effect in the experiments of McLeish and Oxoby
(2007).
1.3 Group Identity Models: Preference-based Model and Beliefs-based Model
Finding out the internal mechanism of group identity’s effects on individual behaviour has
been a research topic which requires the answers to hard questions. There are mainly two
mechanisms to explain the effect of group identity on behaviour. Its effect may be exerted
to change their social preferences directly and to stimulate the general pattern of outgroup
derogation. This is achieved via the beliefs and expectations of group members. The former
mechanism has attractedmuch attention and has been tested in a large number of experiments.
Preference-based Model The influence of group identity on social preference can be sub-
divided into three close preferences, including other-regarding preferences, pro-social prefer-
ences, and interdependent preference. The core of social preference indicates that economists
care about their own material payoffs and others’ material payoff. This is also an important
part of economists’ utility. In terms of social preference models which are extended to the util-
ity functions with different social preferences, the basic analytical tools are characterised by
game theory. Group identity is one important incentive (“intrinsic motivation”) to pro-social
10The within-group interactions might determine the punishment differences between nature existing social
groups and artificial groups, the historical interaction might be the key influence on nature and strength of group
effects.
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behaviours. Y. Chen and Li (2009) observed the effects of group identity on social preference
through “minimal group paradigm”, which was incorporated in the group identity with Char-
ness and Rabin (2002)’s social preference model with utility functions. The optimal behaviour
selection with identity parameter can be expressed by the following equation:
x⇤(s) = (1 w(s))xo +w(s)xc (2)
, where xo indicates that account identity is dismissed when players try to make decisions; xc
presents the ideal action of players with certain identity; w(s) represents the weight of sensi-
tivity to certain identity group; “s” indicates the degree of sense of belongingness to a certain
identity. This utility function also allows the disutility from deviations for societal prescrip-
tions. Charness and Rabin’s model, also known as a two-person preferences-based model,
indicates that an individual’s utility is determined by a weighted average of monetary profits.
Incorporating “social preferences” into the utility function was developed on the basis of this
evidence, and had been tested in many experiments (Bolton &Qckenfels, 2000; Charness & Ra-
bin, 2002; Cox & Sadiraj, 2012; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004; Engelmann & Strobel, 2004;
Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993).11 Using the tool of game theory analysis, various group
identity theory models have brought about the rationality hypothesis to adjust the classical
economic hypotheses. During that process, social parameters are injected and new equilibri-
ums are constructive to explain the paradoxes in experimental economic behaviours.
Beliefs-based Model The alternative theory postulates that group identity can modify the
players’ belief that the opponent of the same group can be used as cooperative players. The
players are engaged in the game, and all of them make their decisions based on their knowl-
edge about the attitudes of the opponents. That is to say, the group identity could influence
the expectations and beliefs, leading to an alteration in individual behaviours. Ockenfels and
Werner (2014) found that the proposals transferred significantly more to ingroup recipients
who had shared the knowledge about the proposal. In the minimal group paradigm, individ-
ual may change his or her behaviour bymanipulating beliefs concerning the opponent’s expec-
tations. Bicchieri (2005); Gintis (2009) stated that individuals with an underlying preference for
conditional cooperation should be able to ensure that their opponents are willing to cooperate.
In that way, the group membership may be regarded as a signal that promotes individuals to
11A social prisoner’s dilemma challenged this mechanism (Guala, Mittone, Ploner, et al., 2013).
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adopt coordinative behaviours. Yamagishi et al. (2013) and Gu¨th, Ploner, and Regner (2009),
who have proved that the mutual beliefs can determinate the individual behaviour in the dic-
tator games with the specific group identity. In Rabin’s model (1993), the weight of a rival’s
monetary profits placed by the firm is dependent on the interpretation of the rival’s intentions.
Following Schelling (1980), who calls “a behavioural propensity [...] strategic if it influences
others by affecting their expectations.” The expectation of group reciprocity seems to serve as
a heuristic purpose that shapes strategic decisions (Brewer, 1979; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000).
The expectation of reciprocity appears to be so great that it sometimes manifests itself even in
the situations in which reciprocity is not logically possible.
2 Cournot Quantity Competition
It is no surprise in finding that Cournot’s variation models are most popular in the litera-
ture about oligopoly. Many theories have been developed within this framework, along with
the exploration of supergames of the Cournot model in the latest game theoretical literature.
Herein, we focus on standard homogeneous Cournot duopoly interactions.
The growing body of experimental work which explores factors, such as leniency programs
(Apesteguia, Dufwenberg, & Selten, 2007; Bigoni, Fridolfsson, Le Coq, & Spagnolo, 2012; Hin-
loopen & Soetevent, 2008), demand uncertainty (Aoyagi & Fre´chette, 2009; List & Price, 2005;
Rojas, 2012), and market structure (Davis & Holt, 1998; Isaac & Plott, 1981), can considerably
impact the stability of cooperation in the marketplace Holt (1995). Friedman (1971); Holt
(1993); Holt and Davis (1990); Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2004); Potters and Suetens
(2009); those experiments are associated with questions, such as the collusion found in the
respective experimenters and the higher expectation of game theory. The different devices of
Cournot quantity setting games are constantly applied in the industrial organisation. These
simplified and brief models are tested by economists (Hoggatt, 1959; Sauermann & Selten,
1959), and their passion for the attractive environment of economic experiments remains insa-
tiable. As a matter of fact, theWalrasian, the Cournot Nash equilibrium, and collusive quantity
choices are the three benchmarks in oligopoly games. Here, we stress upon the characteris-
tics of collusion in three different Cournot interaction frameworks, including one-shot games,
finitely repeated games, and indefinitely repeated games. The aim of this section is to sum-
marize the theory of implicit collusion within the framework of different Cournot interaction
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games, and to survey the comprehensive literature which showed that group identity factor
tends to make collusion easier or more difficult to sustain.
2.1 Stage Game: One-shot Interactions with the Different Co-player
As pioneers in Cournot oligopolies, Fouraker and Siegel (1963) stated the early results to test
the hypotheses on collusion in experiments. After that, Holt (1993); Huck et al. (2004); Stenborg
(2004) conducted further experiments to enrich the results. Selten, Mitzkewitz, and Uhlich
(1997) simulated outcomes in a duopoly market by providing full information of supply and
demand parameters to the players, so that they can embed their strategies to beat other players
in duopoly games. In the basic Cournot interaction, firms will take their expectations of an op-
ponent’s output decisions into account, yet they will act independently. The choice variable is
output, the total market outputs determine the market-clearing price. No firm can improve its
profit by unilaterally changing its strategy. When subjects are randomly re-matched with dif-
ferent subjects, the obtaining of tacit collusion through rewards and punishments seems rather
difficult.12 According to the theoretical prediction, the cooperation rate will be zero in the one-
shot plays (Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, & Wilson, 1982). As a result, the random matching in the
Cournot Nash Equilibrium constitutes a reasonable prediction, because this system is consis-
tent with theory. The convergence to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is demonstrated (Fouraker
& Siegel, 1963; Holt, 1985), given that the few attempts to collude had virtually ended up in
failure. The participants’ behaviour in a one-shot game remains constant over periods (Huck,
Muller, & Normann, 2001). In the dynamic one-shot games, the mental stability properties of a
Cournot Nash equilibrium could be regarded as actual refinement behaviour (Cox & Walker,
1998). Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1996) observed that the rate of cooperation in the
initial matchings is about 43%, higher than the rate of the later matchings (20%). Therefore, the
experience of the one-shot repetition can not facilitate the collusion.
2.2 Repeated Games: Multi-period Repetition with the Same Co-player
Static formulation of Cournot interaction has been criticised due to ignorance of its participants
and the absence of dynamic adjustment. Literature has focused on the dynamic behaviour of
the firms in an oligopoly market. A dynamic model considers the firms from a multi-period
12In each sequence of one shot games, participants were randomly rematched into new pairings in each period,
and participants will not meet again. No player knew the history behaviour of the current opponent.
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planning horizon. The dynamic model is characterised by the effort of the firms to maximise
the value of whole interaction procedures. Experimental markets are typically collusive if
aggregate outcomes are less competitive than that in the static equilibrium (Holt, 1995). Here,
we review some of the factors that may affect the incidence of tacit collusion with repeated
interaction (fixed matching). Benson and Faminow (1988) who organised the duopoly price-
choice markets with product differentiation and incomplete information, determining that the
experienced subjects aremore likely to cooperate. In general, themultiple-period experimental
results showed that the average quantity choice always appears on both sides of the Cournot
and that the outcomes might be competitive (Holt & Villamil, 1986).
2.2.1 Finitely Repeated Interactions
It is commonly known that all the players can interact with one another within a certain pe-
riod. Now, a systematic review of repeated games has been conducted with perfect infor-
mation. Subjects repeatedly interact with one another in fixed pairs, yet the communication
between them is not allowed. The subjects have complete information about the market (their
possible profits and costs). After each period, they receive feedback about the aggregate out-
put, their own profits, the outputs and profits of the individual firms. In this game theory,
the Nash Cournot equilibrium will be adopted by all rational participants in each stage.13 The
“backward induction” makes sure that the collusion cannot be sustained in finitely repeated
games. Data of lab experiments suggest that the participants’ quantity choice in multi-period
duopoly always deviates systematically from a static Nash Equilibrium (F. T. Dolbear et al.,
1968). In contrast to the one-shot findings repeated Cournot setting with fixed pairs of par-
ticipants, the contradictive collusive outcome can appear (Holt, 1985). Fouraker and Siegel
(1963); Hauk and Nagel (2001); Kreps et al. (1982); Selten and Stoecker (1986) observed that
when people play finitely repeated interactions of prisoner’s dilemma game, they often coop-
erate in the early periods. Nevertheless, this cooperation can break down by the end of the
interactions (Andreoni & Miller, 2002; Selten & Stoecker, 1986). Most of the recent studies on
the experimental Cournot markets summarized that the outcomes end up being close to Nash
Equilibrium with the previous perfect information. If the same finitely repeated interactions
13Each firm will always choose the one period non-cooperation strategy in the last period and ignores, ignoring
all the history choices. Actually, the history behaviour has nothing effects on the current behaviour, and there is no
punish effect existence. The non-collusion strategy is the unique Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the finitely
repeated games.
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are played by different opponents, the total market quantities will decrease over these finitely
repeated interactions (Huck et al., 2001). The cooperation rate in these finitely repeated games
generally declines (Cooper et al., 1996). The reputation building and altruism are the two lead-
ing theories to explain the collusion (Andreoni & Miller, 1993; Cooper et al., 1996).
2.2.2 Indefinitely Repeated Interactions
This subsectionwill review the indefinitely repeated games based on Friedman (1971) dynamic
model. According to the definition, the indefinitely repeated stage games have no (predictable)
last stage. However, the probability of indefinitely repeated interactions continuity is common
knowledge for all participants. Tirole (1988) stated that there are several equilibria in the indef-
initely repeated games. The maintenance of collusion must meet two conditions. First, firms
must have the incentive to reach a collusion. Second, firms aremore likely to keep the collusion
strategy as long as the deviation is less than the loss of the discounted profits in the following
non-collusion phase. Each firm may choose the collusion strategy when all firms choose to
continue doing so. However, once a firm’s best response strategy is flawed, the punishment
will be triggered, that is, the credible non-cooperation punishment strategy of the stage games
will be adopted forever. Base on the conclusion drawn through plenty of experiments, the
collusion between the two companies is possible to some extent. However, it is very difficult
to achieve perfect collusion, that is, the total output is closer to the Cournot Nash equilibrium
output than to the monopoly output. Huck et al. (2001); Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (1999)
found that players are eager to achieve the JPM achievement. In experimental praxis, an indef-
inite number of periods are not required to make cooperation possible (usually a few periods
are sufficient). Feinberg and Husted (1993) reported how discount factors contribute to the
collusion strategy in quantity choices duopoly. Under different random terminations, prob-
abilities implement the varying discount factors, and the probability of collusion and future
value increase simultaneously. Firms can sustain the collusion strategy if they are sufficiently
patient. Meanwhile, firms can efficiently sustain collusion in quantity-choices settings if the
individual discount factor is above the critical threshold.
Based on the past behavioural experiments of Cournot duopoly interactions, the vast majority
of studies found the average between Nash and collusive outcomes for duopoly experiments
(Huck et al., 1999). In the literature examining factors that facilitate or hinder collusion, three
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basic measures for collusion have emerged. In most cases, people are mostly concerned about
the possibility of joint profit maximisation, and the ability to collude tacitly is measured by the
length of horizons (finitely) and the critical discount factors (indefinitely). Collusion would be
more difficult to sustain if the length of horizon factors for joint profit maximisation is lower
(finitely), and the critical discount factors for joint profit maximisation is higher (i.e., the range
of discount factors for collusive sustainability is smaller).
3 Group Identity Incorporates with Cournot Interactions
How can we explain the collusive behaviours in the Cournot interactions? Theories can be
split into two main branches, that is, the complete self-interested players and not strictly self-
interested players. The first types of theory, including Kreps et al., pointed out that the coop-
eration created for the motivation of maximizing self-profits is based on the small belief that
their opponent is a cooperative player. Other types of theory mainly assume that players are
not strictly self-interested, but benefit from cooperation in manner. Of course, in terms of self-
interest, the collusive agreement is unsustainable since players would not like to collude. Thus,
I am particularly interested in the collusion with players who are not strictly self-interested.
Many empirical and experimental problems are incomprehensible without taking social pref-
erences into account.14 A considerable number of people show group identity, leading to het-
erogeneity with respect to group identity (Y. Chen & Li, 2009; Li & Liu, 2017). The cooperation
occurs in fixed pairs of matching repeated actions, and the other-regarding cases induced by
group identification. However, economic theory contributes little to understanding the factors
of group identity and poses few effects on reaching an agreement. This study bridges these
two research areas on group identity, and participants’ actions and strategies in the Cournot
interactions, through demonstrating the effects of group identity on collusion and strategies in
different Cournot interaction devices. The potential strengths of group identity in determin-
ing the collusion in quantity setting games are explored in this study, which is still a relatively
immature research area. In summary, through previous studies, we are able to investigate the
impact of group identity and horizon parameters on collusion, as well as the interaction with
experience. However, the understanding of behaviour combining these parameters is still not
cleared in the Cournot interactions.
14e.g., Outcomes of competition markets, laws governing cooperation and collective actions, material incentives,
optimal allocations, and social norms shaping
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Part II
THEORY and EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
Introduction
When it comes to industrial organization, the most prominent contribution of game theory is
in the oligopolistic market interaction. It is a vivid example of strategic interaction among the
players in the market. Although these brief models have constantly been tested by economists
(Hoggatt, 1959; Sauermann & Selten, 1959), and their passion for economic experiments re-
mains insatiable. How public group assignment information impact duopoly market interac-
tions? To answer that question, we conduct a new series of experiments studying oligopolies
with same group match, different group match, or no group match in a unified frame. For
starters, let us consider a market in which the two players sell identical products and compete
against one another. The firms in this experiment feature simplified organization, with one-
person and one decision unit. Their inverse demand function is subject only to the current
quantities of human behaviour. Clearly, the purpose of our experiments is to study human
behaviour, thereby deciphering the oligopolistic markets with group identity. A payoff table
refers to the matrix of the possible amounts a player can earn under the restraint of market
parameters and the output of the other player. Their behaviour can be explained, and the mar-
ket outcome can be predicted by calculating the benefits of changes in their variables. In these
experiments, the participants were not allowed to communicate so that the chance of explicit
collusion could be eliminated by construction. That is to say, the cartel was built tacitly. To ana-
lyze how group identity affects the “collusion of Cournot interactions”, our experiments were
broadly divided into two sections, including an artificial group identity, and three different
Duopoly Cournot interactions.
4 Theoretical Work
We adopt an evolutionary approach to investigate whether preference may evolve in human
behaviour during the process of group assignment. Herein, the degree of group contingent
other-regarding preference is expressed by a parameter which describes how much individ-
ual care for others. These economic behaviours in cooperation are consistent with standard
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economic theory. The theory holds that utility is above self-interest. A comparison of the inter-
actions between players primed ingroup favouritism and that among players primed outgroup
derogation reveals that ingroup players can achieve higher monetary profits than players from
two different groups. Therefore, the group contingent preference parameters are composed of
the following sections; where we just considering firms in the markets and ignoring the con-
sumers’ welfare: (1) pure other-regarding and altruism: the player hopes to maximize his or
her rival’s private monetary profits and minimize his or her own monetary profits; (2) other-
regarding and maximization social welfare: in this special case the purpose of the player is
to maximize joint profits by cooperating with others; (3) pure self-monetary-interest and in-
difference towards other: in this case the player cares only about his or her private monetary
profits; (4) pure self-monetary-interest and advantage difference to others: the player not only
considers his or her private maximization profit, but has a strong hand to play; (5) competitive
antisocial: the player aims to minimize the monetary profits of all involved players.
We develop collusion solutions to the one-shot, finitely repeated, and indefinitely repeated
Cournot duopoly interaction games, so as to identify how the group identity influences the
quantity choices of the players. We consider a symmetric Cournot duopoly model with group
identity in which each firm is entitled to a (common) concern about the profit earned by other
firms. The models we discuss that collusion might be sustained as a non-collusive equilibrium
among rival firms, what I want to stress is that cartel cannot. The signs (positive and negative)
and values of fractions depend on group assignments. We cannot help asking whether the
outcome of monopoly can be supported by collusion. An equilibrium out of a set of strategies
can be achieved if each player implements the strategy which best suits other players’ strate-
gies. In this way, the combination of these strategies can help maximize the group contingent
other-regarding preferences of the players. Notably, the economists are interested in the so-
cial preference of equilibrium as well, especially the evolution of players’ strategies. These
non-selfish observations are in agreement with the standard economic theory which postu-
lates utility functions amongst members. Consequently, the group contingent other-regarding
is positive for the groupmembers, yet less positive and even harmful to the players outside the
group. These facts made it necessary to compare the utility of players with different group con-
tingent other-regarding preference parameters. To better understand the experimental results,
the theoretical models which provide the framework are presented in Appendix C.
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The study of collusion in duopoly market is entirely based on the following individual model,
in which the inverse price demand function is linear, and the reaction functions are downward
sloping (Huck et al., 2001).15 The general form of the profit function for a f irmi in a 2-person
Cournot-competition game is expressedwith the following equation, and each firm’smonetary
profits are dependent on the joint actions of (qi, qj)
pi(qi, qj) ⌘ qi(Z  v(qi + qj))  cqi, pj(qi, qj) ⌘ qj(Z  v(qi + qj))  cqj, (3)
where Z, v and c are real, non-negative constant, We set Z = 24, v = 1, and qi   0 in the
units produced by firmi. To address the question and to achieve simplification, the study of
collusion was entirely based on an individual model, and a common constant marginal cost of
production has been set for each firm. This constant, without further loss of generality, is taken
set as zero.
As a benchmark, a symmetric optimum is defined by quantity interaction (bqi, bqj) that maximize
the firms’ joint profit, i.e.
(bqi, bqj) 2 argmax
qi ,qj
= [pi(qi, qj) + pj(qi, qj)] (4)
Therefore,
bqi = bqj = Z2  2( v) , and pi(bqi, bqj) = pj(bqi, bqj) = Z24(1  ( v)) (5)
The results of non-cooperative interactions (eqi, eqj) can be expressed as:
eqi 2 argmax
qi
pi(qi, eqj), eqj 2 argmax
qj
pi(eqi, qj). (6)
therefore, the best-response functions are
eqi = Z  vqj2 , eqj = Z  vqi2 (7)
15For repeated games, the downward-sloping demand function implies that if the aggregate output is more
significant than the joint profit maximization output, the individual output downwards adjustment tends to have
a higher extent of cooperation, and vice versa. If one firm deviates the collusion but the other does not, then an
upward quantity adjustment can be interpreted as an action of punishment.
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The equilibrium actions and profits can be expressed as:
eqi = eqj = Z2  ( v) , pi(eqi, eqj) = pj(eqi, eqj) = Z2(2  ( v))2 (8)
In our setting, pi(eqi, eqj) < pi(bqi, bqj), and eqi = eqj > bqi = bqj. The utility of complete self-
interest f irmi satisfies the condition of ui(qi, qj) = pi(qi, qj),pj (see Figure 2). The collusions
in Cournot interactions analyzed in the paper should be assessed on three grounds. The first
is about whether the collusive strategy is adaptive and whether the firms are able to collude.
The second is the likelihood of a collusive strategy to reach an agreement. The third is about
the sustainability of the collusion strategy, and how the collusion can remain effective for long.
4.1 One-shot Interactions: Nash Equilibrium
After group identity is primed, the group identity theory assumes that individuals directly
care about the material profits of others. A parametric model of the group contingent other-
regarding that determines the marginal rate of substitution between individuals and rivals’
profits is introduced in this paper. Based on this model, it is demonstrated that the group con-
tingent other-regarding preference depends on the group assignment. This model is the sim-
plest game model, in which all players make the best choice without knowing other players’
choices, so the profits of each player are simply determined by the combination of strategies
selected by the players. In such one-shot interaction model, firms only meet once, starting
with the effects of group identity on quantity choices, i.e., kindness and hostility without reci-
procity. Market demand is obtained by the inverse demand function as p = 24  Q, where
Q = qgi + q
g
j , g 2 {N, I,O}. ‘N’ represents that the two firms are completely independent,
without the concept of the group (Nogroup). ‘I’ means that the two firms are from the same
named group (Ingroup), while ‘O’ implies that the two firms are from the different named
groups (Outgroup). With the existence of the group identity, the firms’ economic behaviour
under the best response function will inevitably develop with the group identity. Here, it is
assumed that the rationality of firms’ pursuit of maximum utility is the significant features of
“group identity” rather than self-interest maximization.
ui = wgpj + (1 wg)pi = wg
h⇣
24  qgi   qgj
⌘
qgj
i
+ (1 wg)
h⇣
24  qgi   qgj
⌘
qgi
i
,
wg 2 [ 1, 1]
(9)
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In the equation 9, where wg is the group contingent other-regarding parameter, which repre-
sents the concern that f irmi expresses for the other firm’s profits.16 Based on the estimation
of wg from Y. Chen and Li (2009), it is expected that w I > wN = 0 > wO. Taking the group
effect into account, the parameter of weight on the opponent changes the firm’s optimal re-
sponse, rather than the Nash Equilibrium of strategic substitute quantity competitions. There-
fore, based on the equilibrium, each firm’s monetary profits depend on the group contingent
parameters of all firms in the market. Each firm pursues maximising subjective utility:
q⇤(g)i 2 argmax
qgi
ui(q
g
i , q
⇤(g)
j ), q
⇤(g)
j 2 argmax
qgj
ui(q
⇤(g)
i , q
g
j ) (10)
Under the first-order conditions of utility maximization, the equilibrium of the game between
two firms with symmetric wg is given as follows.
q⇤(g)i (w
g) = q⇤(g)i = q
⇤(g)
j =
24(1 wg)
3  2wg (11)
If the wg 2 (0, 0.5), the larger wg is, the lower the outcome is to the optimum(bqi, bqj) than the
Cournot Nash equilibrium (eqi, eqj). It is assumed that all participants in a given session have
the same wg, where, the market-clearing price is
p⇤(g) = 24  q⇤(g)i   q⇤(g)j =
24
3  2wg . (12)
16Basu (2006); Y. Chen and Li (2009); McLeish and Oxoby (2007) used this similar group contingent social pref-
erence model, in which the individual maximizes the weighted sum of material profits of his/her own and the
others, with weighting dependent on the opponent’s group category.
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Figure 2: The pure-strategy Nash Equilibria of the Cournot interactions
The red dots shaded part: w < 0. The red dashes shaded part: 0 < w < 0.5. Red square: Collusive quantity
choices. Blue triangle: Standard Cournot Nash Equilibrium quantity choices. Green star: Competitive quantity
choices.
Figure 2 illustrates the dynamic movement of the best response with the wg determined by
the group assignment and enhancement. In this example, there is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between specific equilibria and specific group contingent other-regarding parameters.
We describe preference by the equation 9, and the weights wg represents the concern that f irmi
expresses for other firms’ monetary profits. The positive other-regarding preference firms pos-
sess 0 < wg  1, posing an indirect impact on the firm’s monetary profits to increase the
opponent’s monetary profits based on the parameter wg. In Figure 2, the equilibrium is de-
termined as the intersection of the firms’ best response function.17 Here, we take f irmi as an
17Based on the Meta-analysis of social dilemma, the effect size of the relationship between cooperation and other
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example (red lines). With the value of “wg” increasing (the sign is positive), the best response
line of the f irmi rotates counter-clockwise with a center, which is reflected as the red long-dots
line. The intersection of the two firms’ Cournot Nash Equilibrium quantity decisions (blue
triangle point) moves to the black circle intersection. The response curve is much flatter than
predicted by standard theory. The intersections of the two symmetric response lines always
fall on the 45-degree line, and each has its corresponding wg characteristics. A comparison of
the different preferences between two firms with identical group contingent other-regarding
parameters is expressed as follows.
eqi = eqj > q⇤(g)i = q⇤(g)j > bqi = bqj. (13)
When wg = 1/2, the firms’ equilibrium actions fall at the optimum point of collusion. In
the context of the one-shot Cournot oligopoly, if wg 2 [0, 0.5], as the value of wg among ri-
vals increases, the equilibrium in the market becomes less competitive, that is, the aggregate
output falls toward the monopoly level. Thus, increasing wg among rivals would result in a
more profitable non-cooperative equilibrium. Similarly, another conjecture is that increasing
wg would lead to a greater similarity of profits, which in turn would facilitate collusion among
rivals.18 Under the one-shot Cournot interaction, as the degree of group contingent other-
regarding preference increases, the equilibrium in the market becomes less competitive while
the market quantities tend to be the tacit collusion level. Thus, increasing group contingent
other-regarding among rivals results in a more profitable non-collusive equilibrium.
For repeated games: a simultaneous stage game is repeated during the experimental periods,
and the outcome of each stage game is revealed before the next stage game is played. If the
game has a finite number of players who implement finite strategies, there exists at least one
regarding is 0.30(Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009).
18For example, if a randomly particular average weighted value wg causes the change of the two firms’ best
response line, it interacts at a new equilibrium point on the 45-degree line.
• Optimal other-regarding parameter points: wg = 0.5; Pure other-regarding parameter points: wg > 0.5;
Impure other-regarding parameter points: 0 < wg < 0.5; Negative other-regarding parameter points (spite-
ful): wg < 0. There is little evidence of pure other-regarding models in empirically (Clotfelter, 1985) and in
experiments (Andreoni, 1993).
• bq(wg = 0.5) < qi(w•) < eq(wg = 0)
• ep(wg = 0) < p(w•) < bp(wg = 0.5)
• ep(wg = 0) < p(w•) < bp(wg = 0.5)
Where price with positive w• is bigger than ep(wg = 0), and q(w•) = q(w•) = 24(1 w•)3 2w• are smaller than eq(wg =
0) = 243 ; then p(w
•) are larger than ep(wg = 0) = 64. We suppose that the quantity q function is differentiable,
which we want to optimize by choosing wg.
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Nash Equilibrium (NE). NE may contain mixed strategies, and we will discuss this question
later. The tricky issue here is how to make the right decision in the set of multi-equilibrium.
In the non-cooperative sub-game perfect equilibrium of repeated games, firms could achieve
higher monetary profits than the Cournot Nash monetary profits in the one-shot game. The
perfect collusion is a situation in which the firms manage to maximize their joint utility, which
is greater the sum of Nash utility of the stage games. We present the alternative derivation of
Nash equilibrium in the finitely repeated games and the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium
in the indefinitely repeated games to identify the role of group identity role in other-regarding
preferences.
The standard approach to study collusion in repeated games assumes that firms would use
grim trigger strategies to punish any deviation from collusion. When the rival firm sticks to
collusion, the firm is tempted to cheat by playing its one-period best response. Under this
circumstance, a deviation utility of uDi (R
g
i (bqj)) (> ui(bqi)) is yield, where ui(bqi) denotes firm
i’s per period utility in the collusive outcome. In modelling the possibilities of collusion, we
use the standard model in which the firms follow trigger strategies that employ reversion to
the static non-cooperative equilibrium if any firm deviates from monopoly. Yet the deviation
from monopoly would trigger punishment, and f irmi would earn the profit of the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium in all future periods. This can be denoted in this equation: up(g)i (u
p(g)
i =
u⇤(g)i ), and u
p(I)
i > u
p(N)
i > u
p(O)
i . Group identity can affect the difference between collusion
utility and the utility after the first deviation. The positive group identity leads to decreased
ui(bqi)   ui(qp(g)) and vice versa. wg displays two effects. Firstly, it reduces the gain from
cheating on a collusive agreement. Secondly, it softens the punishment for cheating andmakes
collusion less sustainable. These two effects work in opposite directions.19 (see Appendix C)
4.2 Finitely Repeated Interactions: Perfect Nash Equilibrium
If the firms know the final period in advance, the backward induction incentives that firms
will not collude in the penultimate period, which implies that they will play the Cournot Nash
of the stage game in the final period. By that analogy, the only subgame-perfect Cournot Nash
is the unique dominant-strategy q⇤(g) in each period (q⇤(I) < q⇤(N) < q⇤(O)).
There may be an equilibrium in which the players collude with one another at the early peri-
19ui(bqi) designates the utility for collusion, uDi (Rgi (bqj)) the temptation to collude, up(g)i (up(g)i = u⇤(g)i ) the
punishment for mutual Nash equilibrium choices.
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ods to obtain utilities from the (collusion, collusion) outcome. Collusion appears at the early
periods if the long-run cost exceeds the long-run deviation gains. After the first deviation, the
players’ equilibrium strategy went back to the Cournot equilibrium. In our model with group
contingent other-regarding preference in a finitely repeated interactions version of Cournot
game, we compare the path of the game with that of the predictions of the equilibrium of
Kreps et al. To understand that comparison, we present an equilibrium path for the interac-
tions in which the players with other-regarding concerns respond to their opponent. The best
response to f irmj’s collusion strategy in term of short-run deviation gains can be expressed as:
Rgi (bqj) = 24(1 wg)  bqj2(1 wg) (14)
The function R(.) of the group contingent other-regarding parameters defines a symmetric
evolutionary game.20 However, the deviation would trigger the punishment, and f irmi would
earn the profit of Cournot-Nash equilibrium in all future periods. This situation can be de-
noted as: pp(g)i (p
p(g)
i = p
⇤(g)
i ), and p
p(I)
i > p
p(N)
i > p
p(O)
i . The disparate group identity
would affect the difference between collusion utility and the utility after the first deviation.
The positive group identity leads to decreased pi(eqj)  pi(qp(g)i ), and vice versa. The two ef-
fects of wg are that it reduces the gain from cheating on a collusive agreement and it softens
the punishment following the cheating. Obviously, these two effects work in opposite direc-
tions. The gains from quantity choices were adjusted upward. Rgi (bqj) are lower for the pairs
in the ingroup matching, compared with other scenarios. The profits pp are higher in the in-
group matching even when the collusion agreements were broken down, compared with that
in outgroup or nogroup matching.
Firms are able to sustain collusionwhen the utility from collusion is no less than the utility from
deviation. A commonly known last period is that the collusion behaviour could be determined
by threshold strategies.21 Firms follow trigger strategies that employ reversion to the static
non-cooperative equilibrium forever if either firm deviates from monopoly. The sum utility of
20Assuming that the rival firm sticks to collusion, the firm is tempted to cheat by playing its one-period best re-
sponse, yielding a deviation utility of pi(R
g
i (bqj)) > pi(bqi). pi(bqi) denotes firm i’s per period utility in the collusive
outcome considered.
21Strategies that conditionally colluded until a threshold period before switching to the always Cournot Nash
equilibrium with group contingent other-regarding preference. Despite threshold strategies’ initial differences, the
evolution of behavior is consistent with the unraveling logic of backward induction (Embrey, Fre´chette, & Yuksel,
2015).
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T periods could be represented as:
Ui =
T
Â
t=1
ui,t (15)
Thus, the collusive equilibrium (the no deviation utility overall repeated game in T   1 ) is:
ui(bqi) + ui(bqi) + · · ·+ ui(bqi) + ui(q⇤(g)) (16)
If at the tth period, the total current utility is no different between deviations and collusion
(there is always punishment for deviation), this period is known as the threshold deviation
period, tc (tc < T). Thenceforth, the competition between the two firms enters the punishment
stage. The utility of firms goes to the up at tc + 1 period, until the end of the game. The
collusion equilibrium requirement is:
ui(bqi) + ui(bqi) + · · ·+ ui(bqi) + ui(q⇤(g)i )  
ui(bqi) + ui(bqi) + · · ·+ ui(bqi) + ui(Rgi (bqj)) + ui(qp(g)i ) + · · · ui(qp(g)i ) (17)
which means:
tc  T   ui(R
g
i (bqj))  ui(q⇤(g)i )
ui(bqi)  ui(qp(g)i ) (18)
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4.3 Indefinitely Repeated Interactions: Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium
Economists consider the theories are useful, since a large number of equilibria are mathemat-
ically possible in indefinitely repeated games. A crucial assumption of the collusion in theory
is that the interactions will continue indefinitely. In the indefinitely repeated games, each su-
pergame consists of an indefinite repetition of the same stage game with the same cohort.
t=0,1,2,... indexed the periods in the supergame. All firms have the same discount future util-
ity with the factor 0 < dgi < 1. No theory could provide sharp predictions since there may be
multiple equilibriums. We consider whether each firm is playing the Sub-game Perfect Nash
Equilibrium in the indefinitely repeated games. Regarding the monopoly quantities in each
22This observation, though it is evident in the given context, has an intriguing implication, that Shapiro (1989)
(page 365) suggested the principle of supergame theory: “Any underlying market condition that makes very
competitive behaviour possible and credible can, by lowering pp(g)i , actually promote collusion.” In the ab-
stract, up(I)i > u
p(N)
i > u
p(O)
i is the rank of punishment phases profits in the three treatments, it is obvious that
tc(I) < tc(N) < tc(O). (see Figure C22)
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period, once this “tacit collusion” is broken, both firms would be equal to one-shot Nash equi-
libriumwith group contingent other-regarding preference after choosing their quantity. If both
firms choose quantity level bq at each period, the present discounted value of each firm’s utility
can be expressed as bU = bu/(1  dg). A firm’s best deviation against the opponent who will
choose q⇤ in all sequent cycles. The discounted utility resulting from this optimal deviation is
UD = ui(R
g
i (bqj), bqi,wgi ) + dc(g)1 dc(g) ui(q⇤,wgi ) Thus, each f irmi is more inclined to adopt the col-
lusive strategy if the utility from collusion is not less than that from defection, which consists
of one cyclical benefit from defection plus the discounted utility of inducing Nash reversion
forever, that is,
1
1  dc(g) ui((bqi),wgi )   ui(Rgi (bqj), bqi,wgi ) + dc(g)1  dc(g) ui(q⇤,wgi ) (19)
where bqi ⌘ (bqi, bqj) is the vector of collusive quantity choices resulting from the joint profit max-
imization. It can be said that the group identity facilitates collusion if the collusion quantity
profile can be sustained at a lower critical discount factor when firms are altruistic than when
they are no group assignment. If the opposite happens, group identity makes collusion harder.
By solving dc(g), we obtain the critical discount factor above which collusion can be sustained
by firms:
d
g
i   d
c(g)
=
ui(R
g
i (bqj))  ui(bqi)
ui(R
g
i (bqj))  ui(q⇤(g)) (20)
where ui(q⇤(g)) = ui(qp(g)). In otherwords, the increase of the group contingent other-regarding
may actually affect the collusion sustainability by changing the critical discount factor. Fig-
ure C23 shows that dc(g) decreases until approximately wg = 0.5, and then increases after
wg = 0.5. The higher levels of group contingent other-regarding with the increasing group
contingent other-regarding preference may actually decrease the likelihood that collusion can
be sustained. As discussed above, increasing group contingent other-regarding can weaken
the effect of the punishment phase. However, this also reduces the utility gains from collu-
sion deviation. The tradeoff between the two effects determines whether group contingent
other-regarding makes tactic collusion more or less likely.
4.4 Summary
In summary, the main results of the theory with group identifications are as follows. First,
when firms are paired within the same group, collusion outcomes can appear in a one-shot
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game. Second, collusion becomes easier as the group contingent other-regarding preference
increases. Third, when firms meet repeatedly, collusive outcomes can be sustained in Sub-
game Perfect Nash Equilibrium, especially, when firms are from the different groups in the
finitely repeated games and when firms are from the same group in the indefinitely repeated
games. Fourth, many collusive outcomes can be sustained in equilibrium, and different pun-
ishment strategies vary from group assignments. Fifth, group assignments produce different
quantity choice adjustment norms. Sixth, when firms can fully understand the decisions of a
certain period and history, there may be collusion, but it is less likely to be collusion compared
to the uncertain period and fixed pairing.
5 Experimental Design
Our experiments have three main features. The artificial group identity could be primed and
enhanced by painting study tasks (Li & Liu, 2017). Second, we consider the group effect on the
player’s quantity choices. Third, we vary the Cournot competitions of the repetition devices to
examine whether group identity features are different. A Supplementary Appendix B contains
the full experimental design, instructions, payoff table, and some screen-shots.
To summarise, we conducted a 3*3 experimental design, (ingroup assignment, outgroup as-
signment, or nogroup assignment)*(one-shot or finitely repeated, indefinitely repeated); the
nine treatments and the order of events are summarised in Appendix D. The experiments
were programmed in O-tree. Each experiment was conducted using cohorts of players re-
cruited from the undergraduate, or above degree at the University of Wuhan. We collected
data at the university, covering 360 students in the age range from 18 to 25 years. In the experi-
ments, 120 players participated and 3 sessions in each Cournot interactions (Oneshot, Finitely,
Indefinitely). In other words, 40 players recruited in each session. For the group sessions, 20
players were randomly assigned to a Luojiashan group and a Donghu group. Players were
seated at separate computer terminals and given a copy of the instructions. Since these in-
structions were also read aloud, we assume that the information contained in them is common
knowledge. In each condition of both the one-shot games and the repeated games, the players’
payoffs in each period were represented on them by the matrix on the screen.
In our experimental conditions for one-shot interactions, players participated in 70 Cournot
competition stage games each against anonymous opponents changing from period to pe-
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riod. The participants just have their own history quantity and profits, but have no idea about
current opponent history quantity and profits. For ten periods of repeated interactions, it
is common knowledge that players played seven fixed pair ten-period Cournot competition
with different partners, with perfect monitoring of the current opponent’s actions in each su-
pergame.23 In terms of the indefinitely repeated games, each player played seven random stop
supergames with 0.9 continuation probability, and without repeating a pair, the opponents’ ac-
tions can be perfectly observed by current participants. The number of periods in a supergame
is randomly determined with discount factor (d). We used between-subject design, partici-
pants were always paired with another person from the same group in the ingroup treatment,
and were always paired with someone from the other group in the outgroup treatment.
Table 1: Experimental design
Group Problem Number Number of Number of Number of
Treatments Assignment Solving Questions Participants Super-games Periods
(sessions)
Nogroup None Self 2 40 - (1) 70
One-shot Ingroup Random Chat 2 40 - (2) 70
Outgroup Random Chat 2 40 - (1) 70
Nogroup None Self 2 40 7 (1) 70
Finitely Ingroup Random Chat 2 40 7 (2) 70
Outgroup Random Chat 2 40 7 (1) 70
Nogroup None Self 2 40 7 (1) 72
Indefinitely Ingroup Random Chat 2 40 7 (2) 72
Outgroup Random Chat 2 40 7 (1) 72
Table 1 presents our experimental design. This table summarises the features of experimental
sessions, including treatments, group assignments, how a treatment to solve problems, the
number of players in each treatment, the number of suspergames, and the total periods in the
whole Cournot games.
5.1 Part One-Manipulation of Categories
As participants arrived at the laboratory, each randomly drawn an ID card or an ID envelope.
ID cards are printed with experiment number for non-group sessions. A piece of paper is
printed with group a name and experiment number in the ID envelope for group sessions.
The players with ID envelop were told that the experiment required two groups of players;
they were asked to identify themselves by these ID envelopes; their personal identity would be
23we preferred a commonly known finite horizon for both one-shot interactions and ten periods of finitely re-
peated interactions.
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completely unknown to the experimenter. Theywere reminded not to show their ID characters
to the other participants, nor to the experimenter.
5.1.1 Step One (Randomly Group Assignment)
Just ingroup and outgroup treatments contain the group assignment step, where we adopted
the artificial group assignment method. From this side, the group manipulation references the
design of the Random Between treatment by R. Chen and Chen (2011). The strength of group
identity implemented by nearly minimal group paradigm (players are randomly assigned to
groups; players do not interact before; group membership is anonymous) based on the ran-
dom choice of an envelope with a specific group card inside. Two artificial groups are called
Luojiashan group and Donghu group, those two attractions of the most representative, likely
the primary colours of the university in the UK.
5.1.2 Step Two (Team Building Task)
The second step is a collective problem-solving task using an online chat program. All par-
ticipants have to be an independent learner and study three pairs of paintings by Kandinsky
and Klee for three minutes in the front of the lab screen. Then every participant judges each
of the two new paintings made by the artists in eight minutes, the same assigned group mem-
bers could express ideas through the online chat program (Only participants assigned to the
named groups could experience the online chat). Each correct answer is worth 50 experiment
points. There existence the first questionnaire for the group assigned players, including three
questions, i.e., their own group name and concerning their belongingness to own group and
the other group respectively.
There are three types of group identity primed for the treatment variables. In one treatment,
the participants did not experience group classification. In the one treatment participants after
group classification, and then played Cournot games with the other participants who are from
the same group. The third treatment participants experienced group classification, in which,
who played Cournot games with the other participants who are from the different group. The
players only read the instructions for part two after the first part has ended (see Appendix B).
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5.2 Part Two-Cournot Interactions
We have operationalized a version of the Cournot oligopoly models of output choice for exper-
iments. The experiments involved both sellers make a simultaneous quantity choice to how
much boxes they wish to sell, and the market then determines the prices. The outputs are
the six potential integer value in experiments, and a market price is determined by an inverse
demand function. Players’ profits depend on these output choices. In each subsequent pe-
riod, players chose the output quantity and got paid the profit before the beginning of the next
period.
5.2.1 One-shot Interactions
The stage games are strategic substitutes, and re-derived from linear symmetric duopoly games,
normal-form games in which both players have six quantity choices to choose from. Each
player participated in a sequence of one-shot games against different anonymous opponents.
The participants were told, in any of the experiments, how many market periods there would
be. There were 70 market periods, and the players were randomly re-matching into new pair-
ings in each period. For group treatments, players knew the identity of the player with whom
he/she was currently paired. Furthermore, each player knew the history quantity decisions of
paired players. In these games, we employed a matching design in which reputation effects
were not feasible (The reputation effects from repeated play against a fixed opponent could
not arise.).
5.2.2 Ten Periods Repeated Interactions
To explore the effects of repeated play on collusion, 40 players, in two separate cohorts, each
played seven 10-fold repetitions of Cournot interactions. Each subject played the same op-
ponent 10 times as either a row or column player. Players were then anonymously matched
with new opponents and play continued for 10 more periods. Moreover, so on, till seventh
rematches finished. Nogroup players randomly paired seven times, and they could not meet
twice. Players of ingroup treatment randomly paired seven times with ingroup members; the
same pair happened once. Players of outgroup treatment would pair seven different outgroup
members. In each supergame, the current current supergame pair’s history quantity decisions
and history profits are the common public information for paired two players. However, when
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players were re-matched, they were not told anything about the history of play of their new
opponent in the previous supergames.
5.2.3 Indefinitely Periods Repeated Interactions
The indefinite horizon supergame was constructed as follows. Following play of the stage
game, a random draw was made from a uniform distribution over the range [1,100]. The draw
was made by the computer program that was used to experiment. If the draw was less than
or equal to 90, players were matched according to the given protocol, and the stage game was
repeated. If the random draw exceeded 90, the supergame was ended. Thus, the probability, p,
that a supergame continues is 0.90 and the expected number of future rounds to be played from
the perspective of any period reached is always 11 p or 10. This is equivalent to an indefinite
horizon where the discount factor attached to future payoffs is 0.90 per period. Each sub-
ject played the same opponent randomly determined times as either a row or column player.
Players were then anonymously matched with new opponents and play continued for ran-
domly determined periods. Moreover, so on, till seventh rematches finished. Nogroup players
randomly paired seven times, and they could not meet twice. Players of ingroup treatment
randomly paired seven times with ingroup members, the same pair happened once. Players
of outgroup treatment would pair seven different outgroup members. In each supergame, the
current pair’s previous quantity decisions and previous profits are the common information
for current paired two players. However, when players were rematched, they were not told
anything about the history of play of their new opponent. The length of each indefinitely re-
peated game (supergame) should average 10 periods, our goal of 70 periods per session was
satisfied by playing an average of 7 indefinitely repeated games per session. Of course, due to
the random end of each indefinitely repeated game, there is some variation in the periods.24
5.3 Payoffs
The profits were presented in a payoff matrix (Figure 3), the participant’s profits in eachmarket
for any combination of the participant’s quantity choice and quantity choice by the opponent
in that market. The demand systems and quantity choices sets are chosen to that the resulting
payoff matrices are as close as possible: we have identical diagonal elements, which including
24The lengths of the finitely repeated game were chosen to coincide with the expected lengths of the indefinitely
repeated ones.
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collusion, Nash, identical temptation and sucker payoffs, as well as altruistic outcomes and
perfect competition outcomes. The game has Nash equilibrium qi = qj = 8 and an optimal
collusion outcome, the symmetric Joint payoff maximum (JPM) qi = qj = 6. With no loss
of theoretical generality, the table normalizes the “collusion” payoff at 81 and the “sucker”
payoff at 54. The sucker temptation profile (6, 9) and (9, 6) also yield a lower payoff sum than
the collusion profile (6, 6). Thus, the dilemma: the equilibrium is inefficient. The player i is
the research subject, Table 2 shows the feature details of the Cournot interactions. The slop
of -1, which means that the product is perfect substitute. The players’ own quantity choices
and profits in the previous are basic information to player i. The additional information in the
repeated games, the current paired player j’s history quantity choice and profits. And, ‘T’ is
the total periods in each supergame interactions, d is the probability of game continuity at this
period. w is the parameter of the group identity.
Figure 3: Payoff matrix
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Table 2: Parameters of the Cournot interactions
Cournot Quantity choices Profits Information Other-regarding
Nash JPM Defect Nash JPM Defect Slope Baseline Addition
One-shot
8 6 9 64 72 81 -1 qi,history w 2 [ 1, 1]
pi,history
Finitely
8 6 9 64 72 81 -1 qi,history qj,history
pi,history pj,history w 2 [ 1, 1]
T=10
Indefinitely
8 6 9 64 72 81 -1 qi,history qj,history
pi,history pj,history w 2 [ 1, 1]
d = 0.9
5.4 Procedures
All sessions were programmed and conducted using the O-Tree (D. L. Chen, Schonger, &Wick-
ens, 2016) experimental software at the laboratory ofWuhanUniversity, a university of approx-
imately 85800 students. Participants were randomly recruited through Wechat software, who
were allocated to computer terminals programmed in O-tree in the laboratory such that they
could not infer with whom they would interact. In each session, there were 40 participants,
and every participant is allowed to take part in only one session. Before the beginning of a
session, instructions were read aloud to all participants. Participants were also given a writ-
ten copy of the instructions with the payoff tables. The experiment began after all players
make sure the experimental details are understood correctly. All substantive questions about
the instructions were answered out loud to ensure common knowledge. Participants com-
pleted this procedure within 90 minutes. The individual total monetary return equals to the
sum of self-cumulative earnings in all periods, the correct answers to the paintings, and the
15 yuan show up fee. The exchange rate was 100 points for 1.5 yuan. The average earnings
were over 60 yuan per person in different nine experiments. Experimental instructions are
included in Appendix B. Participants simultaneously and independently choose a quantity
qi for the production of homogeneous boxes. A table with payoffs and quantity choices from
all previous periods was displayed whenever the payoff matrix was displayed except at the
wait pages. A post-experiment survey was conducted to collect information on demographics
and participants’ experiences with the tasks during the experiment. For the group treatments,
the questions in the questionnaire of step 2 of Part one will be asked again at the end of the
experiments.
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Our study involves the development and application of a tool: a simplemeasure of group iden-
tity designed to summarize the sense of belongingness that exist to any groups. We examined
the effectiveness of inducing artificial group identity in the two experimental questionnaires.
In the experimental design, players were not only classified into two different groups, and
then communication was allowedwithin the group to share information on paintings guessing
in the group treatments. Following the group membership assignment discussion, members
were asked privately to given their own personal recommendation for paintings’ questions,
which might or might not differ from the group discussion. Once groups are identified, then
the strength of their identities can be measured as the mean of the degree of the identification
of individual members with the group, adjusted for the degree of variation. Players were asked
to give several evaluative ratings (on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 10 (very much)) if in/outgroup
members), before and after the Cournot competitions. “What is your group name?” “The
sense of belongingness to the Donghu group?” “The sense of belongingness to the Luojiashan
group?”
6 Hypothesis
The experiment design and the unique set of subjects enable use to develop behaviour hy-
potheses on how the group identity might affect quantity choices, collusion and punishment
behaviour in the Cournot interactions environment. If individuals do not experience group as-
signment, they will always choose Cournot Nash quantity (eq = 8) in the one-shot interactions
and finitely repeated interactions, because this is a dominant strategy (Fouraker & Siegel, 1963;
Holt, 1993; Huck et al., 2004). Especially, the punishment will not induce collusion in the one-
shot interactions. Similarly, for the punishment phases in the repeated interactions, a selfish
individual would never choose costly punishment choices (q > 8). Let us briefly summarize
our predictions. First, the interaction between other-regarding preference and group identi-
fication is expected in quantity choices. If the goal transformation hypothesis is correct, then
the behaviour of individualism should be affected by the group assignment that is different
(nogroup versus ingroup versus outgroup). Second, the interaction between other-regarding
preference and group identification is expected in collusion and JPM. When a group succeeds,
the group identity plays different degree roles in the three different repeated Cournot interac-
tions. Finally, the interaction between identification, collusion, and the other-regarding prefer-
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ence in the one-shot games (unconditional preference) and in the repeated games (conditional
preference) are intriguing.
6.1 Hypotheses I
How do individuals’ quantity choices vary depending on whether group membership has
been assigned or not? Does the group contingent other-regarding preference determine the
Equilibrium quantity choices? The determinant of the group identity impacts on the Nash
equilibrium in three different Cournot interaction devices.
Hypothesis 1. All else being equal, the quantity choices of ingroup players are lower than nogroup
players’ and outgroup players’ in the one-shot Cournot interactions.
Hypothesis 2. All else being equal, the quantity choices of ingroup players are lower than nogroup
players’ and outgroup players’ in the ten-periods finitely repeated Cournot interactions.
Hypothesis 3. All else being equal, the quantity choices of ingroup players are lower than nogroup
players’ and outgroup players’ in the indefinitely repeated Cournot interactions.
6.2 Hypotheses II
How frequently are quantity choices optimal? Does the group identity determine the likeli-
hood of individual collusion and JPM? Group identity varies the one-period deviation temp-
tations, the utility gains from collusion deviation in ingroup matchings are lower than out-
group matchings and nogroup matchings. The ingroup matching participants are more likely
to choose collusion quantity choices (qi = 6), compared with the other two matchings.
Hypothesis 4. The group identity changes an individual’s (pair’s) chances of reaching collusion in the
finitely repeated interactions. Pr(bqi I = 6) > Pr(bqiN = 6) > Pr(bqiO = 6), and Pr(bqi I = bqj I = 6) >
Pr(bqiN = bqjN = 6) > Pr(bqiO = bqjO = 6)
Hypothesis 5. The group identity changes an individual’s (pair’s) chances of reaching collusion for the
indefinitely repeated interactions. Pr(bqi I = 6) > Pr(bqiN = 6) > Pr(bqiO = 6), and Pr(bqi I = bqj I =
6) > Pr(bqiN = bqjN = 6) > Pr(bqiO = bqjO = 6)
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6.3 Hypotheses III
Once joint profit maximization achieved, does the group identity determine the deviation de-
gree and punishment degree?25 Bernhard, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2006) find individuals were
more willing to punish those who had harmedmembers of their own group. Similarly, Y. Chen
and Li (2009) and Kollock (1998) find that individuals are more willing to punish outgroup
members in response to actions considered unfair.
Hypothesis 6. The quantity choices upward adjustments of ingroup matchings are lower than the
outgroup matchings and nogroup matchings.26
Hypothesis 7. The reaction to a deviation from the collusive path, q⇤(I) < q⇤(N) < q⇤(O).27
6.4 Hypotheses IV
Does the group identity determine the duration of collusion and JPM? The threat that competi-
tion (punishment phases) and gains from deviation determine the actually stabilizes collusion.
(Kreps et al., 1982).
Hypothesis 8. Severe threats of penalties lead that collusion quantity choice will be more sustained in
the outgroup matching than in other two matchings. Ingroup matching decreases the duration of JPM,
tc(I), compared to outgroup tc(O), or nogroup matching tc(N) in the finitely repeated interactions.
The different group identity also changes the critical discount rate at which collusion can be
sustained (dc(I), dc(N), dc(O)). For example, the high critical discount factor decreases the range
of firms’ discount factors, and then lower the collusion sustainability.
Hypothesis 9. The group identity varies the range of the critical discount rate at which collusion can
be sustained. For example, if wgi 2 [ 1, 0.5], for the high levels of group contingent other-regarding
of the firms, it is easier to sustain collusion. However, the opposite happens if firms’ group contingent
other regarding are above the 0.5.
25The determinants of group identity impact on the punishment policy and punishment degree. Defection in
public good or prisoner’s dilemma games creates strong negative emotions. These negative emotions are partic-
ularly strong toward group members who contribute less than average (Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Fehr & Ga¨chter,
2002b; Ga¨chter, Herrmann, & Tho¨ni, 2004)
26The gains from quantity choices were adjusted upwards (Rgi (bqj) (see Figure C19)) are lower for the pairs who
are in the ingroup matchings, compared with nogroup matchings.
27 The material profits pp in punishment phases are higher in the ingroup matchings when the collusion agree-
ments were broken down, compared to outgroup or nogroup matching. Furthermore, a more salient group contin-
gent other-regarding increases pi(qp(g)), the ingroup matching players will be more likely to forgive the defectors.
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6.5 Hypotheses V
Does the group identity determine the strategies and impact on the quantity choice adjust-
ment paths? The possibility of punishment appears to be a powerful tool for sustaining social
capital (Fehr & Ga¨chter, 2002b). Group identity introduces a condition that ensures that the
concerns on the opponent’s payoff increase if the opponent chooses a nicer strategy. Players
are marginally more likely to choose tit-for-tat with the ingroup matchings than with the out-
group matchings (Li & Liu, 2017). McLeish and Oxoby (2007) find that individuals punished
members of their own group in response to the violation of tacit norms. Similarly, Stroebe,
Lodewijkx, and Spears (2005) document that, under certain conditions, the ingroup members
created ingroup interactions higher rates of cooperation and more negative punishment be-
tween ingroup members has seven been proposed by the theoretical literature: Be´nabou and
Tirole (2006) and Akerlof and Kranton (2005) propose that the violation of ingroup norms by
ingroup members can been seen as threat to the identity of the group, as such, individuals are
motivated to buoy up the value of the group identity by punishing the offender.
Hypothesis 10. If own material profits increased between two previous periods, but the opponent’s
material profits did not; the ingroup matchings will be more likely to cut down the quantity to cooperate
at the current period, caused by the quantity choice adjustment norms enhanced by the group identity.
6.6 Hypotheses VI
Does the group identity determine identical effects in three different repeated devices?
Hypothesis 11. Adding repeated competition within groups cause even stronger ingroup favouritism,
but also a qualitative change in punishment. qIi (One  shot) > qIi (Finitely) > qIi (Inde f initely)
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Part III
RESULTS
Introduction
In this chapter, the impact of group identity on players’ quantity choices in Cournot interac-
tions on collusion is investigated. Herein, a fundamental question that must be dealt with
at the outset is whether group identity primed would alter their behaviour? Will the explicit
awareness of mutual interdependence alter their behaviour? The chapter reports the results
of the experiment which was designed to determine whether group assignment subjects can
learn to play Cournot duopoly strategies and whether their out-off equilibrium play is consis-
tent with the predictions of models.
There are several ways to test the impact of primed group identity. For example, to determine
whether there is a difference in the number of duopolies who reach the collusive outcome in
the three different Cournot interaction devices, and to find whether the lengths of periods are
different to reach a collusive outcome are effective methods. Moreover, the difference in the
types of equilibrium behaviour among three cases is another indicator.
The main result of this chapter is that the players’ behaviour depends on group membership
and on the Cournot repeated devices. The initial level of group identification determines
whether group members are likely to set themselves apart from the rest of their group. In
that case, the intra-group and inter-group evaluations would be different. The experimental
results are summarized as follows: the aggregate treatment effects of group identity on outputs
were presented. Afterwards, the effects of group identity on individual collusion selection and
joint payoff maximization were analyzed. Group identity plays two opposite effects on collu-
sion. In these three different repetition interactions of Cournot competitions, different roles are
played by the group identity based on individual quantity choices. Section 7 presents the re-
sults of one-shot games with group identity considered. Section 8 reports the results of finitely
repeated games influenced by group identity. Section 9 discusses the analysis results of in-
definitely repeated games. In section 10, the conclusion is reached, and further discussion is
performed.
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Several standard features are applicable throughout our analysis and discussion. Firstly, the
standard errors in the regressions are clustered at the session level as the control for the po-
tential dependency of decisions across individual within a session. Second, a 5% statistical
significance level is set as the threshold (unless stated otherwise) to establish statistical signifi-
cance.
Manipulation Check (Group Identity Analysis)
The strong primed group identity is the premise for result analysis. In this experiment, the sub-
jects were divided into two groups, and communication was only allowed within the group.
Once the groups were identified, the strength of their identities can be measured by the mean
of the identification of individual members with the group, adjusted for variation. Subjects
were asked to give several evaluative ratings, on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (very much).
Moreover, the same questions were asked twice, one after the painting-question task was com-
pleted and the second at the end of the Cournot interaction. The two questions are: (1) “The
sense of belongingness to Luojiashan group?” (2) “The sense of belongingness to the Donghu
group?”
The Table 3 shows the self-reported measures of the sense of belongingness to xgroup (owngroup,
othergroup).
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Table 3: Self-reported the sense of belongingness to own/othergroup
Rating t-tests
Obs. Own group Other group Before vs After Own vs Other
Before After Before After Own Other Before After
One-shot
Ingroup 40 5.78 5.65 2.08 2.10 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
[5.70,5.85] [ 5.57,5.74] [ 2.00,2.15] [2.03, 2.17]
Outgroup 40 7.30 7.20 3.06 2.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
[7.21,7.38] [7.11,7.28] [2.95,3.17] [2.63,2.83]
Finitely
Ingroup 40 7.63 6.23 1.85 1.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
[7.56,7.69] [6.15,6.30] [1.78,1.92] [1.64,1.76]
Outgroup 40 6.63 6.45 1.68 2.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
[6.54,6.71] [6.37,6.53] [1.62,1.73] [2.13,2.27]
Indefinitely
Ingroup 40 7.13 6.58 2.43 2.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
[7.05,7.20] [ 6.51,6.64] [2.34,2.51] [2.34,2.51]
Outgroup 40 7.20 6.80 2.50 2.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
[7.14,7.26] [6.74,6.87] [2.41,2.59] [2.27,2.43]
Notes: I report the average the sense of belongingness by treatments in three different interacted repeated devices.
The number of the participants in each treatment is noted in the second column (the observations).
From the third column to the sixth column, I report the average of the ratings to own group and the other
group,which include the sense of belongingness to xgroup before and after Cournot interactions.
Two-sided p-values of the t-test are reported in the last four columns: The differences of the sense of belongingness
to own/other group between before and after Cournot interactions.
Standard deviations in the parentheses; 95% confidence intervals in the square brackets.
The preferences of individuals facing the same quantity choices at different period are same.28
The first column contains the group treatments and the different devices of the repeated Cournot
interactions. Across the treatments, the mean ratings of the sense of belongingness to own
group before and after Cournot interactions are listed in the column (3). The ratings of the
sense of belongingness to the other group before and after Cournot interactions are illustrated
in the column (4). The players display the naturally positive valued distinctiveness for their
own group with which can be identified from the other group (Ingroup favouritism). The left
numbers of column (3) and (4) are the ratings of the sense of belongingness before Cournot
interactions, and the numbers in the right are the ratings of the sense of belongingness after
Cournot interactions. The mean ratings of own group are significantly higher than those of the
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other group beyond the 0.000 level, regardless of the timing of Cournot interactions. The table
also shows that the mean rating differences of own-group and the other-group are significant
before and after Cournot interactions at 0.02 level. The group identity has been primed suc-
cessfully, showing a significant bias in favour of ingroupmembers. The sense of group identity
is entirely lower after Cournot interactions than that before the quantity interactions, implying
the social identity vanishes with interactions.2930
The results in this study show that quantity choice is dependent on group identity and Cournot
repeated devices (one-shot, finitely repeated, and indefinitely repeated). When the player
makes quantity decision in the one-shot, the difference of individual quantity choices is in-
significant. Group effect is present in the repeated interactions no matter the outcome is finite
or indefinite. Differences were found in these two cases.
7 Study I: One-shot Interactions
First of all, we examined the effects of group identity on individual quantity choice distribu-
tions of one-shot interactions. The pairs were re-matched randomly before a period (there are
no conjectures on coplayer play from the last period).31 One participant made quantity choice
decisions in one of three pair-matchings (nogroup matching, ingroup matching and outgroup
matching). In the nongroup matching (Nogroup treatment), no group identities were induced
among players, so that we could measure the quantity choices in our Cournot interactions in
the absence of group identity effect. The impact of (homogeneous and heterogeneous) group
identities was then analysed by comparing quantity choices in the ingroupmatchings (Ingroup
treatment) and outgroup matchings (Outgroup treatment). No solid evidence was found to
show that group identity could provide the incentive to the higher degree of collusion in the
29The analysis of communication during the group identity formation stage indicates that asking and receiving
help during this stage does not affect the quantity choice decisions significantly in all nine treatments during the
game. The correlation between chat program help in the group identity assignment and the sense of belongingness
to own group implies that general reciprocity is a driving factor for the difference between the identity and the no
identity treatments.
30In addition, the difference in the sense of the belongingness to own (the other) group among three Cournot
interactions are not significant (p > 0.1).
31We pool all players quantity choices by treatment, and calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient. Nogroup
treatment: Pearson correlation was 0.004; t-test is 0.834 (The correlation coefficent is not significantly different
from zero. We thus do not find strong evidence in favor of best-response play for nogroup matchings. ). Ingroup
treatment: Pearson correlation was 0.050; t-test is 0.009. Outgroup treatment: Pearson correlation was 0.073; t-test
is 0.001. The results for In/Outgroup duopolies are with the Pearson correlation coefficient being positive. The
t-test comparision suggests that the coefficient is statistically different from zero. In other words, the strategic
substitutability relation does not hold, and instead output choice corresponds to strategic complementarity for
ingroup and outgroup matchings. The ingroup matchings and outgroup matchings are trying to achieve collusion
by adjusting their quantity choices in the same direction, even if the collusion is difficult to sustain successfully.
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ingroup matchings, compared with that in the nogroup matchings and outgroup matchings in
the one-shot Cournot interactions.
Figure 4: One-shot interactions: Quantity choices distributions over different treatment
H0: There are no quantity choices distribution differences between nogroup matching and ingroup matching;
there are no quantity choices distribution differences between nogroup matching and outgroup matching; there
are no quantity choices distribution differences between ingroup matching and outgroup matching.
As showed in Figure 4, the histograms of quantity choices in each treatment are illustrated.
Each player made quantity choice decisions over six possible choices (0, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12) dur-
ing a total of 70 periods. For example, in the nogroup matching, the implications of 6.14%
( 1722800 ) indicate that there are 172 collusive observations (qi = 6) out of the total observations
(2800) in the one-shot interactions. As seen in the graph, the quantity choices are almost iden-
tical in all three matchings. For all treatments, the choice of non-cooperation (qi = 8) is the
most dominant one. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used to analyse the quantity choice of
distributions. The null hypothesis is that there is no difference on distributions among three
different treatments: nogroup 6=ingroup (p<0.001, two-sided); nogroup 6=outgroup (p<0.001,
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two-sided); ingroup 6=outgroup (p<0.001, two-sided). Although, the test results reject the null
hypotheses, and the pairwise comparative results are significantly different. The shapes of
quantity choice distributions among three group treatments are very similarly, those marginal
differences can be ignored.
7.1 The Impact of Group Identity on Quantity Choices
In an effort to further analyse the group identity effects on the individual decisions, the mean
quantity choices by the three different treatments are listed in Table 4.
Result 1. Group identity affects the distribution of quantity choices in the one-shot game, but not
briefly. Most players choose the standard Nash equilibrium quantity choice in all three different match-
ings. The test results illustrate that players with group assignment have slightly, but light significantly
less average quantity choices than those without group assignment in duopoly interactions.
Table 4: One-shot interactions: Individual average quantity choice by treatment
Periods Obs. No In Out p-values (t-test) p-values (ranksum)
MeanMeanMean No No In No No In
vs vs vs vs vs vs
(SD) (SD) (SD) In Out Out In Out Out
All 8400 8.31 8.06 8.09 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00
Periods (1.50) (1.01) (1.40)
1-35 4200 8.28 8.12 8.33 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
Periods (1.61) (1.16) (1.42)
36-70 4181 8.33 8.01 7.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60
Periods (1.37) (0.84) (0.97)
I report the average quantity choices by individuals.
The number of observations in each situation is noted in the second column.
This table also provides the t-test and Mann-Whitney U test.
Unless otherwise indicated, all p-values are based on the two-side test applied to group averages.
All statistical test reported in the paper is applied to 40 independent players per treatment.
Due to the network failures, some players could not choice quantity in the limited time (45 seconds) after 63rd period.
Was the effect of discrimination on group identity positive or negative? Table 4 and Figure 5
provide econometric and graphics results which summarize the statistic details of average
quantity choices of individual players for all periods combined (1-70), and for the separation
in the first half (1-35), and the second half (36-70) of the experiment. The third, fourth and fifth
columns list the mean value and its standard deviation of the individual quantity choices for
nogroup treatment, ingroup treatment and the outgroup treatment; respectively. The differ-
ences in average individual quantity choices for different treatments were tested using two-
sided t-test and non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test (please refer to the last six columns).
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The null hypotheses were overall rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis that the in-
dividual quantity choices are significantly different between ingroup treatment and outgroup
treatment. In all cases, the average quantity choices is close to the Nash equilibrium quantity
(qi = 8), and the trend became stabilized gradually.
Figure 5: One-shot interactions: The average of quantity choices by treatment
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The Cournot Nash Equilibrium level of quantity choice is at 8. The Collusion level of quantity choice is at 6.
In the nogroup matching condition, the average of quantity choices was 8.31, and the quantity
choices were fairly stable across all periods, averaging 8.28 in the first half periods of experi-
ment and 8.33 in the last half periods. The players had significantly lower value in the ingroup
matching, averaging 8.12 in the first half of the experiment and 8.01 in the last half. Across all
periods, the quantity choices were 0.25 higher in Nogroup than those in Ingroup (8.31 versus
8.06), and the difference is statistically significant (p<0.01). Therefore, the two players shared a
common group identity, and they were inclined to cut quantity choices relative to the nogroup
matching. In regard to the players’ quantity choices in the outgroup matchings, the averages
across all periods were lower than players’ quantity choices in the nogroup matching (two-
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sided t-test: p<0.01; two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests: p<0.01). No significant difference
was found between the average quantity choices in the ingroup matchings and those in the
outgroup matchings across all periods (8.06 versus 8.09 and p<0.01).
7.2 Regression Analysis of Quantity Choices
As shown in Table 5, in the one-shot Cournot interactions, where the quantity decisions chosen
across periods are independent. The players in the different treatments chose different quan-
tity levels. A simple OLS regression model was used to analyse how group identity influences
individual quantity choices and how this impact evolves over periods, with robust standard
errors estimated with clustering at the session. The dependent variable for those three regres-
sions is the individual quantity, while the independent variables for regression include dummy
variables which describe whether the player participated in an ingroup or an outgroup session.
The case of nogroup was omitted. Two other independent variables in both regressions were
the interaction terms between matching groups and a dummy variable for the periods in each
session. Ingroup (Outgroup) is a dummy variable that takes the value i for players of ingroup
(outgroup) matchings or 0 otherwise scenario. Periods⇤Ingroup and Periods⇤Outgroup are
the interactions of periods and treatments. Columns (2) and (3) control for the periods’ trend.
In the Table 5, the coefficient for the ingroup treatment dummies (p=0.242 for (1) and (2), and
p=0.674 for (3)). As for the outgroup dummies (p=0.108 for (1), and p=0.106 for (2), and p=
0.207 for (3)) are not significant. The significant negative coefficients for the Periods⇤Ingroup
and Periods⇤Outgroup interaction (p<0.05) reveal that the players’ reduction quantity choices
more than those of no group assignment players. In the One-shot Cournot interactions, the
players in different sessions had slightly different quantity choices throughout the experiment.
While the players in the ingroup treatment showed a slightly lower level of quantity choices
than players in the nogroup treatment.32
32R. Chen and Chen (2011) did not find outgroup derogation in minimum effort games, while Deaux (1993)
observed the negative behavior towards outsiders.
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Table 5: One-shot interactions: Treatment effects on the individual quantity choices
(1) (2) (3)
Constants 8.305*** 8.429*** 8.256***
(0.00) (0.09) (0.00)
Ingroup -0.242* -0.242* -0.063
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
Outgroup -0.160*** -0.161*** 0.182***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Periods -0.003 0.001***
(0.00) (0.00)
Periods⇤Ingroup -0.005***
(0.00)
Periods⇤Outgroup -0.010***
(0.00)
Observations 8381 8381 8381
r2 0.006 0.009 0.013
r2 Adjusted 0.006 0.009 0.013
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
In the one-shot interactions, the effects of the treatments were negligible, especially for the
individual collusion strategies. As seen in the Figure 6a and Figure 6b, the low percentage of
individual collusion strategy and market JPM chosen among players and pairs are apparent.
Result 2. The successful primed Group identity could not modify the individuals’ dominant quan-
tity choice decisions across all group treatments through group contingent other-regarding preferences
hypotheses.
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Figure 6: One-shot interactions: Rate of choice of collusion over periods by treatment
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(a) One-shot interactions: qi = 6
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(b) One-shot interactions: qi = qj = 6
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In summary, in the repeated games which allowed for re-matching, collusion tended to vanish
with prolonged periods, and most quantity choices shifted back to the Cournot level. Our
results suggest that no special treatment is needed in our one-shot experiment to induce the
distinction between the ingroup and the outgroup collusion.
8 Study II: Finitely Repeated Interactions
What is commonly observed in the experiments involving finitely repeated Cournot interac-
tions is that players do not always play the dominant Cournot Nash strategies Huck, Nor-
mann, and Oechssler (2002); Huck et al. (2004). Instead, they seek to achieve a certain extent
of collusion. In the one-shot games, we find that the number of collusive play increases when
players interact for a finite number of plays, yet the pattern of individual play is not consistent
with the prediction of Kreps et al.33 Further, the dynamic pattern of collusion predicted by the
theory does not agree with the observed aggregate pattern of play, because the collusion rates
do not decline as quickly as predicted in the theory. For the multi-periods repeated games,
the analysis consist of the following aspects, the average quantity choices, the percentage of
individual collusion quantity choices (qi,t = 6), the percentage of market joint payoff maxi-
mization (qi,t = qj,t = 6), the punishment explanations, the impacts of other group identity on
the quantity choices (e.g., inequality aversion, reciprocity, and so on).
In a market with fixed matching, we observe that the ingroup favouritism tend to increase
overtime slightly, and outgroup derogation decreases overtime slightly. This could be reflected
in the decreased quantities overtime, and it could be attributed to the increased number of suc-
cessfully colluding pairs. This observation is crucial for the understanding why experiments
suggest contradictory patterns with respect to backward induction.34 We find that the level
of cooperation in the final round of the finitely repeated games is similar to that in one-shot
games.
33Ferreira. J and Kujal. P who find that the quantity choices of experienced duopolies are more closer to the
monopolistic outcome than quantity choices of inexperienced duopolies. Our treatments are very similar with the
inexperienced duopolies treatments.
34The lengths of the finitely repeated games are chosen to coincide with the expected periods of the indefinitely
repeated ones.
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8.1 The Impact of Group Identity on Quantity Choices
Figure 7: Finitely repeated interactions: Average quantity choices over supergames and peri-
ods
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The Cournot Nash Equilibrium level of quantity choice is at 8. The Collusion level of quantity choice is at 6.
Result 3. There exists the obvious ingroup favouritism. The ingroup effects increase over experiments.
The following relationship between the three treatments satisfies: qIi < q
N
i < q
O
i . The ingroup (out-
group) matching promotes declined (increased) quantity choices. Group assignment leads participants
to cut down their output and obtain higher payoffs.
We observe ten-periods of Cournot interactions under the condition of three different group
identities. As illustrated in Figure 7, the horizontal axis is the number of supergames and the
number of the periods in each supergame, while the vertical axis is the quantity choices. The
navy (dot), the red (solid) and the green (dash) connecting the lines represent the time series of
the average quantity choices over all periods in the nogroup treatment, ingroup treatment and
outgroup treatment; respectively. The decreasing trend over the whole finite repeated games is
obvious. Beyond the downward trend in individual quantities, the crucial differences among
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the three treatments appeared an apparent “end game effect” in different intercepts and slopes.
After the second supergame, the differences among the three treatments enlarged. From an
overall perspective, individual quantity choices are lower in the ingroup than in the nogroup
and outgroup treatments. The end period of each supergame is no exception.
Similarly, in Table 6, the differences in average individual quantity choices and non-parametric
tests across different group matching conditions are greater with more detailed distribution
information. The whole periods in all seven supergames include the first half supergames
(1-4), the second half supergames (5-7), and the 10th periods of all seven supergames, the all
seven supergames without the 10th periods. The second column includes observations, and
the following three columns show the average of quantity choices and standard deviation in
the nogroup treatment, ingroup treatment and outgroup treatment; respectively. The p-values
of the pair t-tests and Mann-Whitney U test between the treatments are listed in the sixth
and seventh columns. Besides, the differences in average quantity choice among different
treatments are significant at a 5% level. It appears that the average quantities selected by the
individuals are lower than those of the same group. For example, averaging across all peri-
ods, the quantity choices are 0.25 units higher in nogroup matchings than those in the ingroup
matchings (7.66 vs 7.41 units), and the difference is statistically significant (p<0.001). There-
fore, when the players share one common group identity, they are prone to cut down quantity
choices. The ingroup matchings and outgroup matchings allow us to examine whether this
effect exists in heterogeneous groups. The difference is also statistically significant at a 10%
level (ingroup matchings vs outgroup matchings: p<0.001; outgroup matchings vs nogroup
matchings: p<0.100). Although group identity could not completely eliminate the “endgame
effect”, the average quantities in all three matching treatments are greater than Nash Equilib-
rium quantity (qi=8), and q¯Ii <
¯qNi and q¯
I
i < q¯
O
i cannot be rejected at the 5% level.
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Table 6: Finitely repeated interactions: Individual quantity choices by treatment
Obs. No In Out p-values (test) p-values (ranksum)
MeanMeanMean No No In No No In
vs vs vs vs vs vs
(SD) (SD) (SD) In Out Out In Out Out
All periods 8400 7.66 7.41 7.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00
(1/7) (1.66) (1.83) (1.81)
Supergames 4800 7.82 7.65 8.04 0.011 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.00
(1/4) (1.77) (2.04) (1.94)
Supergames 3600 7.46 7.09 7.49 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.00
(5/7) (1.47) (1.47) (1.55)
10th periods 820 8.56 8.2 8.73 0.02 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.51 0.00
(1.69) (1.75) (1.84)
No 10th peri-
ods
7560 7.57 7.32 7.70 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00
(1.63) (1.81) (1.77)
We report the average quantity choices by individuals.
The number of the observations in each situation is noted in the second column.
This table also provides the t-test and Mann-Whitney U test.
8.2 Regression Analysis of Quantity Choices
It is assumed that quantity choices correspond to different levels of wg. Ordinary least squares
regression was used to investigate the treatment effects on individual quantity choices, and
how this impact evolves over supergames. We estimated that the dependent variable is the
current individual quantity choice in the OLS models. As shown in Table 7, the first col-
umn contains the independent variables, whereas the ingroup and the outgroup treatment
dummies with the nogroup treatment are omitted. The following columns contain the inter-
active variable between supergames and group assignment dummies (Supergame⇤Ingroup,
Supergame⇤Outgroup). Therefore, we conducted further analysis on the 10thperiod (end game
effect) dummy variable, interactive variable and group assignment dummies (10thperiod⇤Ingroup,
10thperiod⇤Outgroup), which were included as additional models. As shown in column (1),
the individual quantity choices in the outgroup matchings are significantly higher than those
in the nogroup matchings (0.139, p<0.001). Besides, the average individual quantity choices
are significantly lower in the ingroup matching than those in the nogroup matchings (0.255,
p<0.05). Column (2) - (5), illustrate that the coefficients of Supergame⇤Ingroup are -0.052
(p=0.012). Therefore, it is obvious that ingroup pairwise significantly reduces individual quan-
tity choices over supergame, in comparison with nogroup treatment. The results of group
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treatments versus nogroup comparisons in the 10th periods of supergames are shown in Col-
umn (4) and (5). The coefficients of the 10thperiod⇤Ingroup and 10thperiod⇤outgroup illustrate
that the ingroup matchings could relieve the “end-game effect”, whereas the outgroup match-
ings might consolidate the “end-game effects”.
Table 7: Finitely repeated interactions OLS regressions: Treatment effects on individual quan-
tity choices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 7.664*** 8.149*** 8.045*** 7.948*** 7.946***
(0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ingroup -0.255** -0.255** -0.0490 -0.0490 -0.037
(0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
Outgroup 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.244*** 0.244*** 0.240***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0.00
Supergame -0.121*** -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.095***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Supergame⇤Ingroup -0.052* -0.052* -0.052*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Supergame⇤Outgroup -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
10thperiod 0.968*** 0.992***
(0.04) (0.00)
10thperiod⇤Ingroup -0.114***
(0.02)
10thperiod⇤Outgroup 0.040***
(0.00)
Observations 8400 8400 8400 8400 8400
r2 0.008 0.027 0.028 0.055 0.054
r2Adjusted 0.008 0.027 0.027 0.054 0.054
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
8.3 The Impact of Group Identity on Collusion and JPM
Result 4. Compared with nogroup matchings, ingroup matching participants are more likely to choose
collusive behaviour and easier to achieve JPM.
Figure 8 reports the rate of successful individual and collective market collusion, indicating
that ingroup favouritism promotes the percentage of collusive strategies. The connected lines
shown in Figure 8a concur with the notion of Table 8. Moreover, the collusive strategies are
more sustainable in outgroup treatments.
55
Figure 8: Finitely repeated interactions: Rate of choice of collusion over supergames and peri-
ods by treatment
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(a) Finitely repeated interactions: qi = 6
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(b) Finitely repeated interactions: qi = qj = 656
Logit: The Probability of Individual to Collusive Behavior (qi = 6) The results in Figure 8
are in line with those of Logit models used to investigate the treatment effects on the probabil-
ity of individual to choose collusion (see Table 8). In this table, we analyse how group identity
influences individual collusion and how this impact evolves over supergames. The dependent
variable is the dummy variable for collusion, an indicator on a scale from 0 to 1. 1 indicates that
individual i chooses the collusive quantity, and zero indicates otherwise. In this model, the first
column consists of the independent discrete variables, including the ingroup and the outgroup
treatment dummies. The nogroup treatment was dismissed. The indicator variable Ingroup
equaling to 1 indicates that the individual is paired with another individual in the same group
(ingroup) and 0 implies that the collusive player comes from another group (outgroup). The
indicator variable (10thperiod) equals to 1 for the 10th periods of supergames, and 0 otherwise.
In some specifications, control variable Supergame is added as an index of a Supergame trend
to increase the precision of the estimation. Moreover, the interactive variable between su-
pergames and group assignment dummies (Supergame⇤Ingroup, Supergame⇤Outgroup) are
contained. Further analysis on 10thperiod (end game effect) dummy variable, interactive vari-
able and group assignment dummies (10thperiod⇤Ingroup, 10thperiod⇤Outgroup) are added
in the additional models. The coefficients are probability derivatives. Column (1) indicates that
the participants show a slight tendency to choose the collusion strategy in the ingroup match-
ings. An ingroup matching increases participants’ likelihood of collusion by 10.4%. In column
(2) and (4), the coefficients of Supergame are always positive, suggesting that the participants
are leaning to collude over repeated supergames. For example, in column (2), a supergame
increases the participants’ likelihood of collusion by 14.7% (p<0.010). As shown in Column
(3), the coefficient of Supergame⇤Ingroup is 0.113, which is slightly higher than the coefficient
of Supergame is 0.109. Therefore, ingroupmatching significantly accelerates the collusion over
supergame compared with that of the nogroup treatment.35
35 We confirmed in logit models of the following form:
collusioni = b+ b0 Ingroup+ b1Outgroup+ b2Supergame+
b3Supergame ⇤ Ingroup+ b4Supergame ⇤Outgroup+
b5(Period = 10) + b6(Period = 10) ⇤ Ingroup+ b7(Period = 10) ⇤Outgroup
(21)
where the collusion is an indicator variable equal to 1 if it is the individual i collusion, and 0 otherwise.
57
Table 8: Logit finitely repeated interactions: The probability individual to Collude (qi = 6) (Percentage
change in the log odds )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constants -0.779*** -1.384*** -1.223*** -1.130*** -1.124
(0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Ingroup 0.104* 0.106* -0.372*** -0.380*** -0.380***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Outgroup 0.003 0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.06) (0.06) (0.13) (0.14)
Supergame 0.147*** 0.109*** 0.111*** 0.112***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Supergame⇤Ingroup 0.113*** 0.116*** 0.116***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Supergame⇤Outgroup 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
10thperiod -1.385*** -1.539***
(0.11) (0.20)
10thperiod⇤Ingroup 0.116
(0.28)
10thperiod⇤Outgroup 0.329
(0.27)
Observations 8400 8400 8400 8400 8400
log likelihood function -5279.26 -5201.17 -5191.34 -5085.93 -5085.16
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04
Efron’s R2: 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05
Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2: 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.06
AIC 1.258 1.239 1.237 1.213 1.213
BIC -65316.670 -65463.815 -65465.385 -65667.187 -65650.637
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
Likelihood-ratio test (Prob > chi2): (1) versus (2), 0.00; (2) versus (3), 0.00; (3) versus (4), 0.00; (4) versus (5), 0.47; (4) is the best
est estimate.
BIC: Bayesian information criterion.
Logit: The Probability of JPM (qi,t = qj,t = 6) The definition of JPM is that all firms in the
same markets choose collusion (qi,t = qj,t = 6) simultaneously. Logit model was used to in-
vestigate the treatment effects on the probability of JPM. Table 9 presents the results of Logit
specifications that determine markets’ likelihood to JPM. These columns present the results
of logit specifications of the treatment and the supergame trends. In the column (3) and (4),
we further interact with each of the covariates with the group assignment dummies to exam-
ine group-contingent effects. As shown in column (1) and (2), in the average markets, the
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odds of ingroup matchings are significantly higher to reach JPM. Ingroup matching increases
the likelihood of the JPM by 11.7% (p<0.065) [12% (p<0.062)], as illustrated in column in the
column (1) [(2)]. As suggested in column (3) and (4), the explanatory variables exhibit the
group-contingent effects. Supergame interacted with ingroup dummy enters a marginal effect
of 12.2% (p< 0.008), indicating a marginally stronger response to the supergame of JPM in the
ingroup treatment than that of the nogroup treatment. However, no group contingent effect
was found during the last period.
Table 9: Logit finitely repeated interactions: The probability of JPM (qi,t = qj,t = 6) (Percentage change in
the log odds )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constants -1.270*** -2.147*** -1.977*** -1.873*** -1.871***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Ingroup 0.117* 0.121* -0.404** -0.417** -0.420**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17)
Outgroup 0.037 0.038 0.049 0.049 0.047
(0.06) (0.07) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Supergame 0.207*** 0.169*** 0.173*** 0.173***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Supergame⇤Ingroup 0.117*** 0.122*** 0.121***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Supergame⇤Outgroup -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00)
10thperiod -2.475*** -2.702***
(0.21) (0.00)
10thperiod⇤Ingroup 0.363
(0.69)
10thperiod⇤Outgroup 0.262***
(0.00)
Observations 8400 8400 8400 8400 8400
log likelihood function -4512.939 -4512.939 -4512.939 -4512.939 -4512.939
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.027 0.029 0.063 0.063
Efron’sR2: 0.00 0.028 0.030 0.059 0.059
Cragg-Uhler (Nagelkerke) R2: 0.001 0.044 0.047 0.099 0.099
AIC 1.075 1.046 1.044 1.008 1.009
BIC -66852.865 -67088.056 -67086.940 -67381.735 -67364.157
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
Likelihood-ratio test (Prob > chi2): (1) versus (2), 0.00; (2) versus (3), 0.00; (3) versus (4), 0.00; (4) versus (5), 0.78; (4) is the best
estimate.
BIC: Bayesian information criterion.
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8.4 Collusion Duration
Based onmany experiments, collusion goes against the prediction of rational play, which is still
observed in finitely repeated interactions. The group identity facilitates the collusion under
the dynamic quantity interaction if players consider collusive quantity choices to be kind and
punishment quantity choices to be unkind. The deviation happens because the future losses
deviating from the collusion of the ingroup (nogroup) matching players are higher than that of
outgroup matching ones while the short-run deviation gain of an outgroup matching player is
less than that of an ingroup (nogroup) one.
Result 5. The collusive outcomes are more persistent in the outgroup than those in the ingroup and
nogroup treatments.
According to the statistic supports of Table 10, it shows treatments on the basis of a compari-
son with the specified duration periods of JPM. Dur1 refers to the supergames beginning with
the JPM’s aggregate output (Markets reached JPM in the first period). Dur2 implies that the
pairs continue the JPM after the first period of the current supergame. Dur3 shows the pairs
keep the JPM for all first three periods of the current supergame. Dur9 stands for the contin-
uous JPM quantity choice selected in the previous nine periods of the current supergame. By
that analogy, the JPM choice always continues to the penultimate period. The rows present
the observations of the JPM duration over 140 ten-periods finitely repeated markets in each
treatment. From a pure observation perspective, it is evident that the outgroup matching is
beneficial to ensure the sustainability of the JMP choice.36
36The first deviation of the mean periods is an index of the collusion sustainability. The first deviation of the
mean periods on the joint duopoly market for the nogroup treatment, ingroup treatment and outgroup treatment
are respectively 0.14, 0.15 and 0.21.
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Table 10: Finitely repeated interactions: The observations of JPM duration
Duration Nogroup Ingroup Outgroup
Dur1 6 9 17
Dur2 6 7 17
Dur3 6 7 16
Dur4 6 7 16
Dur5 6 7 16
Dur6 6 7 15
Dur7 6 7 15
Dur8 5 7 15
Dur9 5 6 15
Dur10 0 2 2
Regarding the sustainability of the market collusion, the outgroup matching pairs are always
good at retaining collusive strategies. Our explanation on this counter-intuitive result is that
the combinations with theories of the topsy turvy game. Therefore, for the group identity
influence whether firms are able to collude, the ingroup favouritism has a positive effect on
the possibility of reaching an agreement. (see Figure 8) However, it has an adverse impact on
the sustainability of the existing collusion. (see Table 10)
9 Study III: Indefinitely Repeated Interactions
This section unveils the critical influence of group identity on the indefinitely repeated Cournot
interactions with a continuous rule in the lab, which is a challenging domain in game theory
where collusion is found very difficult to maintain in the long term. The contribution in this
paper mainly helps understand the fundamental question of whether and how group identity
affects individual quantity choices and strategies in a long-term strategic environment.
9.1 The Impact of Group Identity on Quantity Choices
Result 6. In the indefinitely repeated interactions: the average quantity choices are significantly lower
in the group assignment treatments compared to the nogroup treatment. That is, ingroup matching
leads to a significant decrease in quantity choices, and outgroup matching also leads to a substantial
reduction in quantity choices.
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Figure 9 and Table 11, respectively provide graphical and econometric support. Among them,
Figure 9 depicts the evolution of average individual quantity choices per period and per treat-
ment in seven different supergames, showing a downward trend of average quantity choices
over the seven supergames. Table 11 shows the average quantity choices of individuals by
treatments. The third, fourth and fifth columns respectively show the average quantity choices
and standard deviations in three treatments. For a more accurate display, the average quantity
choice results of the whole period and supergames, the 1/4 of supergames and the 5/7 of su-
pergames are respectively presented. The two-sided p-values of t-test and Mann-Whitney U
test are reported in the last six columns. Based on Table 11, individual quantity choice in the
ingroup treatment is generally lower than that in the nogroup matchings, while the outgroup
individuals do well as ingroup individuals. The average of quantity choices in the ingroup
treatment is 0.84 lower than in the nogroup treatment (7.54 in ingroup vs 8.38 in nogroup,
p<0.001) in all periods and the all supergames.3738
37The figure of the ‘Average quantity choices over each periods’ shows the negative impact of group identity on
quantity choices is heterogeneous in supergames.
38The mean outcome quantity was 7.6± 2.04(SD) in the Cournot games of Huck et al. (2001). The properties
of the aggregate market outcomes are mainly divided into three regions: cooperation region, Nash region, and
competition region. If the aggregate market outcomes are lower than 16, the market will be at the cooperation
region. And, if the aggregate market outcomes are at 16, the market will be marked as the Nash region. Otherwise
(the aggregate market outcomes are higher than 16), the market will be located in competition region. The equation
is r = (Qactual–QNash)/(QJPM–QNash). If the aggregate market quantities are the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, r =
0, while r = 1 at the JPM benchback. If the positive values of r indicate cooperative behaviour, 0 < r < 1. However,
if the r < 0, the quantity choices are more competitive than the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The cooperation index
of nogroup treatment is -0.19, clearly lower than Huck et al. (2001); Potters and Suetens (2009).
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Figure 9: Indefinitely repeated interactions: Average quantity choices over supergames and
periods
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The Cournot Nash Equilibrium level of quantity choice is at 8. The Collusion level of quantity choice is at 6.
Table 11: Indefinitely repeated interactions: Individual average quantity choices by treatment
and supergames
Obs. No In Out p-values (t-test) p-values (ranksum)
MeanMeanMean No No In No No In
vs vs vs vs vs vs
(SD) (SD) (SD) In Out Out In Out Out
Supergames 8640 8.38 7.54 7.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1/7) (1.86) (1.82) (1.67)
Supergames 4280 8.52 7.68 7.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
(1/4) (1.90) (1.74) (1.65)
Supergames 4240 8.04 7.27 7.35 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.04
(5/7) (1.81) (1.92) (1.66)
The number of the observations in each situation is noted in the second columns.
Two-sided (Mann-Whitney U test) p-values of t-test are reported in the last six columns.
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9.2 Regression Analysis of Quantity Choices
The regression analysis is used to examine further quantity choices, which allows for the con-
trol of visible differences between individuals. Table 12 shows a simple OLS regression to anal-
yse how group identity influences individuals’ quantity choices and how this impact evolves
over supergames. In all models, we regress quantity choices on constant and dummy vari-
ables, indicating whether an individual is in the ingroup treatment, and outgroup treatment
(thus, individuals in the nogroup treatment constitute the reference group). The dependent
variable is the individual quantity choices in the current period. Moreover, columns are based
on all periods of the repeated games. In the models (2) and (3), we control the supergame
effects through the variable “Supergame”. Standard errors are clustered at the session level.
The results are very absolute, and there are significant differences between the outgroup and
the nogroup treatments, and between the ingroup treatment and the nogroup treatment in
any specification. Column (1) of Table 12 shows that average quantity choices are signifi-
cantly lower in the in/outgroup than the nogroup treatment (-0.743/-0.545; p=0.000/p=0.002).
The coefficients of the variables “Supergame” in model (2) and (3) are negative, suggesting
an opposite relationship between quantity choices and supergames of play. This reveals that
individual’s quantity choices decrease over supergames. In the model (3) that includes the
supergame trend, the coefficient of Supergame⇤Outgroup is -0.053 (p<0.01) compared to the
coefficient of Supergame -0.124 (p<0.01).
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Table 12: Indefinitely repeated interactions OLS regression: Treatment effect on individual
quantity choices
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 8.278*** 8.889*** 8.806***
(0.00) (0.07) (0.00)
Ingroup -0.743*** -0.805*** -0.774***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.12)
Outgroup -0.545*** -0.661*** -0.461***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Supergame -0.143*** -0.124***
(0.02) (0.00)
Supergame⇤Ingroup -0.006
(0.02)
Supergame⇤Outgroup -0.053***
(0.00)
Observations 8640 8640 8640
r2 0.030 0.053 0.054
r2 Adjusted 0.030 0.053 0.053
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
9.3 The Impact of Group Identity on Collusion and JPM
Result 7. The collusion of players is significantly higher in the ingroup compared with the other two
treatments. And, ingroup matching promotes collusive learning procedures.
Figure 10a and Figure 10b provide graphical and econometric supports for Table 13 and Ta-
ble 14 regressions. The percentage of collusion strategy for 40 individual players and 20 mar-
kets in different supergames and different treatments is shown in Figure 10. Participants in the
ingroup treatment are more likely to choose collusion strategy during all periods, and the mar-
kets in the outgroup treatment and ingroup treatment are more likely to reach an agreement at
the JPM. The paired market collusion in this figure is consistent with the individual collusion,
which shows a remarkably consistent collusion result, that is, whether for individual or market
is more likely to arrive collusion in the ingroup treatment than in the nogroup treatment.
65
Figure 10: Indefinitely repeated interactions: Rate of choice of collusion over supergames and
periods by treatment
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(a) Indefinitely repeated interactions: qi = 6
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(b) Indefinitely repeated interactions: qi = qj = 666
Logit: The Probability of Individual to Collusive Behavior (qi = 6) The dependent vari-
able is the likelihood of individual collusion behaviour. The independent variables for all
regressions include dummy variables that describe whether the individual participates in an
ingroup or an outgroup session, with the nogroup treatment as the omitted treatment. Other
independent variables included the experimental supergame time tend, and the interaction
terms between the matching scheme and dummy variables for the Supergames. The coeffi-
cients of Ingroup are respectively 0.676, 0.811 and 0.555 for three different Logit regressions,
which are significantly positive compared with the nogroup treatment. Therefore, the play-
ers in the ingroup treatment are more likely to adopt the collusion behaviour. As for the
players in outgroup treatment (Outgroup=0.151 in the column (1) and p=0.000, 0.357 in the
column (2) and p=0.000), there is also a propensity for collusion behaviours, but the coeffi-
cients are relatively small. Ingroup matching significantly accelerates the collusion learning
over supergames (p=0.000 in the column (2) and p=0.000 in the column (3)). The strength of
the group identity effect mainly depends on interaction. The interaction between Supergames
and groups indicates that the collusion differential in outgroup interaction is about 3% larger
when compared with nogroup treatment interactions.
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Table 13: Logit indefinitely repeated interactions: The probability individual to Collude (qi =
6) (Percentage change in the log odds )
(1) (2) (3)
Constant -1.570*** -2.705*** -2.539***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.14)
Ingroup 0.676*** 0.811*** 0.555***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.17)
Outgroup 0.151** 0.357*** 0.188
(0.07) (0.07) (0.18)
Supergame 0.249*** 0.214***
(0.01) (0.03)
Supergame⇤Ingroup 0.056
(0.03)
Supergame⇤Outgroup 0.035
(0.04)
Observations 8640 8640 8640
log likelihood
function
-4542.59 -4542.592 -4542.592
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.050 0.051
Efron’s R2: 0.015 0.054 0.054
Cragg-
Uhler(Nagelkerke)
R2:
0.023 0.079 0.080
AIC 1.037 1.000 1.000
BIC -69330.968 -69649.979 -69634.410
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
Likelihood-ratio test, (Prob > chi2): (1) versus (2), 0.00; (2) versus (3), 0.278; (2) is the best estimate.
BIC: Bayesian information criterion.
Logit: The Probability of JPM (qi,t = qj,t = 6) Table 14 presents the results of Logit specifica-
tions for factors that determine markets’ likelihood to reach JPM. If both players choose q = 6,
JPM is an indicator variable equal to 1, otherwise 0. The indicator variable Ingroup is 1 if the in-
dividual is paired with another individual from the same group, while 0 if the other individual
is from another group. The coefficients are probability derivatives. The table shows the results
of logit specifications for the treatments and supergames. In column (3), I further interact with
each covariate with the group dummy variables to examine group-contingent effects. Based on
the results from column (1), on average, the market is significantly more likely to reach JPM in
the ingroup treatment and the outgroup treatment. The ingroup matching increases the mar-
kets’ likelihood to reach JPM by 70% (p<0.001), while the outgroup matching also increases
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the markets’ likelihood to reach JPM by 19% (p<0.018). The column (2) implies that the next
supergame increases the markets’ likelihood to reach JPM by 34.7% (p<0.001). In column (3),
supergame interactes with the ingroup [outgroup] dummy enters with the marginal effect of
-0.088 (p<0.05) [-0.087 (p<0.07)], which suggests that the negative effect of supergame on JPM
is stronger in the group assignment treatments.
Table 14: Logit indefinitely repeated interactions: The probability of JPM (qi,t = qj,t = 6) (Per-
centage change in the log odds )
(1) (2) (3)
Constant -2.108*** -3.753*** -4.114***
(0.06) (0.11) (0.21)
Ingroup 0.704*** 0.888*** 1.337***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.24)
Outgroup 0.193*** 0.474*** 0.914***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.25)
Supergame 0.347*** 0.415***
(0.02) (0.04)
Supergame⇤Ingroup -0.088*
(0.05)
Supergame⇤Outgroup -0.087*
(0.05)
Observations 8640 8640 8640
log likelihood
function
-3571.445 -3571.445 -3571.445
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.077 0.078
Efron’s R2: 0.012 0.061 0.062
Cragg-
Uhler(Nagelkerke)
R2:
0.020 0.110 0.111
AIC 0.816 0.764 0.764
BIC -71242.559 -71685.898 -71672.196
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
Likelihood-ratio test, (Prob > chi2): (1)versus(2), 0.00; (2)versus(3), 0.11; (2) is the best estimate.
BIC: Bayesian information criterion.
9.4 Collusion Duration
Result 8. There is no significant treatment effect on the sustainability of the JPM.
Specifically, the sustainability of the JPM will be measured by the number of the market that
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continues collusion after the cartel is explicitly formed.39 Table 15 shows the differences in JPM
sustainability in three different group treatments in each supergame, which is the messiness of
the JPM. There are 7 supergames in each treatment session with different periods (the number
of periods in each supergame and treatment is different; e.g., there are eight (seven) [twelve]
periods in the first supergame in the nogroup treatment (ingroup treatment) [outgroup treat-
ment]). The third row presents the number of supergames in three different treatments. The
numbers of the first column represent the periods of each supergame. The block ‘N’ marks
the end of a supergame at current period. Table 15 contains the number of JPM markets out
of 20 markets, which have sustained collusion since the beginning of supergame in each dif-
ferent treatment. For example, for the nogroup treatment, in the first supergame, there is no
market start with collusion, and there is no chance to continue the collusion. For the ingroup
treatment, in the seventh supergame with the nine periods, there are three markets out of 20
markets agree at JPM at the beginning to the second, third, ......periods, until to the end of the
supergame. For the outgroup treatment, in the sixth supergame with nine periods, there is
only one market out of 20 markets reach the JPM at the first period of the supergame, and the
JPM does not break until the seventh period. No more than 15% of the pairs begin with JPM,
which does not meet expectations in all treatments and all supergames. In fact, many of the
markets in all treatments show deviations from the perfect JPM, meaning that they are not able
to form a stable JPM. Despite the pairs in ingroup treatments do better in collusion than other
treatments, this result has adopted an unconvincing argument to prove our Hypothesis.
39The more markets keep the JPM agreement, the cartels are more stable.
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Table 15: Indefinitely repeated interactions: The observations of JPM duration
Nogroup(NG) Ingroup(IG) Outgroup(OG)
Supergame No. Supergame No. Supergame No.
Periods 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 3 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
3 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 3 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
4 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 3 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
5 0 1 0 0 0 N 1 1 0 0 2 N 1 3 0 0 0 1 N 1 1
6 0 1 0 0 0 N 1 1 0 0 2 N 1 3 0 0 0 1 N 1 1
7 0 1 0 0 0 N 1 1 0 0 2 N 1 3 0 0 0 1 N 0 1
8 0 1 N 0 0 N 1 N 0 0 2 N 1 3 0 0 0 1 N 0 1
9 N 1 N 0 0 N 1 N 0 0 N N 1 3 0 0 0 1 N 0 N
10 N N N 0 0 N 1 N 0 0 N N 1 N 0 0 0 N N N N
11 N N N 0 0 N 1 N 0 0 N N 1 N 0 0 0 N N N N
12 N N N 0 0 N 1 N 0 0 N N 1 N 0 0 0 N N N N
13 N N N N 0 N 1 N 0 0 N N N N N 0 0 N N N N
14 N N N N 0 N 1 N 0 0 N N N N N 0 0 N N N N
15 N N N N 0 N N N N 0 N N N N N N 0 N N N N
16 N N N N 0 N N N N 0 N N N N N N 0 N N N N
17 N N N N 0 N N N N 0 N N N N N N 0 N N N N
18 N N N N 0 N N N N 0 N N N N N N 0 N N N N
There are 20 markets in each treatment and each supergame.
‘Supergame’ No. is the order of seven supergames.
In this experiment, the ingroup favouritism and outgroup favouritism can be observed, while
the ingroup favouritism is more significant than outgroup favouritism. It can be found that
the social group identity may be dormant in one individual, and this group identity may be
triggered by the repeated devices of Cournot interactions. In all repeated games, the ingroup
matching individual’s “enlightened self-interest” is to cooperate in the hope of eliciting other-
regarding preferences.
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10 Norms Associated with Group Identity in Repeated (Finitely and
Indefinitely) Cournot Duopoly Interactions
Social norms and social identity are two essential aspects of many fields of human activities.
At the basis of the utility incorporating identity (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000), we use different
group matching frames describe the social norms, and then introduce the Cournot competi-
tion sample scenario. Does the group identity affect the enforcement of the collusions in the
Cournot repeated interactions? We use the simulation methodology to answer this question by
estimating individuals’ quantity choice adjustment norms based on group treatments from our
experimental data. Simulation results show that the implementation of norms relies heavily
upon the group matching and repeated devices.
Mounting experiments provide evidence that group identity could determine the group con-
tingent other-regarding in many one-shot and short-term games. Our experimental evidence
from one-shot illustrates that collusive quantity decisions are not related to group identity.
But, from our repeated experimental results suggest that collusive decisions are related to
group identity. We think that group identity plays a more role in repeated games than in one-
shot games, and collusive behaviour in repeated games may not result from group contingent
other-regarding motives. Based on our Cournot experimental design, the reaction functions
are downward-sloping Huck et al. (2001). This implies that if the quantity choice decisions
are larger than the JPM choices, then cutting own quantity choices increase collusion and in-
creasing quantity choices decreases collusion. Participants are not only interested in the best
response strategies, they also keep an eye on appropriate quantity choice adjustment process.
Most of the participants adjust their quantity choices, which determined by rival and their own
profits and quantity choices. If the opponent has chosen quantity choice over than collusive
choice, the player would increase own quantity choice. This can directly cause downward pay-
offs of both players, and this was related to an increase in the group assignment. This section
discusses that the size of the adjustment in the quantity choices would be affected by group
identity during decision making.
To study the relevance of group identity in motivation, we were especially interested in group
identity correlated with the adjustment decisions that the players made in their quantity choice
adjustments when observed the relative payoff changes comparisons. The collusion in re-
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peated games arises from the combinations between group assignment and players experience
when observing each others’ quantity adjustments and relative profit changes comparisons.
We did further simulation study on the processes behind the decisions, instead of the only
separately behaviour.
The norm of condition cooperation is a proximate behind the famous tit for tat strategy.40
Given the opponent’s quantity choices in the Cournot interactions, the increase of the own
quantity choices will lead to the costly informal sanctions. Social norms refer to the univer-
sality of behaviours in a relevant group, such as the number of individuals who already have
been assigned to the same group. The enforcement patterns of norms are qualitatively differ-
ent among treatments. Within the specific group, members have the perception of the specific
norms that define the expected behaviour of identity groups while the gain utility depends on
the consistency of the norms that apply to their own group. The membership in groups may
affect the willingness of members to engage in the enforcement of the pro-social behaviour
norms. Higher rates of cooperation and more negative punishment between ingroup mem-
bers. In both finitely repeated and indefinitely repeated duopoly devices, we model firms’
quantity choice to explain the role of group identity on the firms’ decisions in the adjustment
process. Though the simulation analysis we find: (1) how groupmembers learn to estimate the
optimal quantity choices over periods as a function of group identity and (2) which aggregate
market quantity choices are optimal for the complexity group matching.
The norms will be defined at first, and a simple framework of material profit changes will be
presented to understand their potential influence on quantity changes. We then demonstrate
how one can identify the norms that make up one source of quantity choice adjustments. The
framework ofmaterial profit changes shows how the norms are elicited from one set of individ-
uals by means of the experimental data yield as well as predictions on simulation behaviours.
It is also noted that this study is the first to introduce the Cournot-based elicitation method to
identify norms.
40Norms are the joint-recognized agreements regarding appropriate or inappropriate behaviour within a specific
social group (Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1991; Elster, 1989; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Lindbeck, Nyberg, & Weibull,
1999). Studies illustrate that what other players are going to do as well as their historical actions could build the
norm-compliance.
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10.1 The Algorithm: Quantity Choices Adjustment Norms
In the Cournot interaction experiments, people collude much more than that predicted by
the standard economic theory assuming rational and selfish individuals. The appropriateness
norms guide players adjusting their quantity choice ask themselves, “What does the player
like me do in a certain situation?” There are three determinant factors to solve this problem:
classification of the kind of relative profit change comparison situation, the group matching of
the player, ad the application of norms in guiding quantity adjustments. Our examination on
the importance of conditional collusion is based on a novel experimental design described in
detail in the following paragraphs.
10.1.1 Quantity Choice Adjustments to Relative Profit Changed Comparisons and Group
Matchings
Table 16: Relative profits changed comparisons categories
Categories Comparisons of material profits’ changes
Both gain: Dpi,t 1 > 0 & Dpj,t 1 > 0
Own gain, other not gain: Dpi,t 1 > 0 & Dpj,t 1  0
Dpi,t 1=0 & Dpj,t 1 <0
Other’s gain, self not gain: Dpi,t 1  0 & Dpj,t 1 > 0
Dpi,t 1 < 0 & Dpj,t 1=0
No change: Dpi,t 1=0 & Dpj,t 1=0
Both lose: Dpi,t 1 < 0 & Dpj,t 1 < 0
Two discrete determining factors control the players’ quantity changes. One is the group as-
signement (Nogroup, Ingroup, Outgroup) and the other is the material profits changes (Both
gain, Both lose, Own gain, Other’s gain, Both no changes); forming a 3*5 categories matrix. The
Table 16 summarises the five different comparisons of profits changed in the previous two pe-
riods. Figure 11 and Figure 12 show quantity adjustments of nogroup, ingroup and outgroup
for each category about material profits changes, in fact, most of player adjust their quantity
choice in the same norm as their rivals.
The popular strategy about the norm is tit for tat, that is the name of the quantity choice adjust-
ment rule that moves its opponent has done previously. By studying how the material profits
change in a period, the production quantity is adjusted upwards on Period t if the opponent
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has gained profits between Periods t-2 and t-1, but the player himself has not. The production
quantity is adjusted downwards on the Period t in the other cases when only the player him-
self gains and when both of them lose. It is the key to understanding in which situations the
punishment may be a pro-social act to foster collusion and when it may turn into efficiency
to reduce antisocial punishment. The players will be encouraged to coordinate under specific
norms (the norms were accepted by those belonging to a specific identity group).
Figure 11: Finitely repeated interactions: Average and 95% confidence intervals of quantity
choice adjustment over five material profits’ changes and by treatment
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Figure 12: Indefinitely repeated interactions: Average and 95% confidence intervals of quantity
choice adjustment over five material profits’ changes and by treatment
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Quantity change by different treatments in the indefinitely repeated games over five different categories of
material profits changes. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals: Average and 95% confidence interval.
The observations of the bars from left to right are (250, 200, 272); (405, 430, 338); (205, 430, 338); (926, 1008, 1010)
and (254, 172, 282) in the finitely repeated games.
The observations of the bars from left to right are (468, 250, 292); (364, 423, 452); (364, 423, 452); (732, 984, 888)
and (392, 249 236) in the indefinitely repeated games.
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Table 17: Change in individual quantity Dqi,t with respect to the lagged change in joint profits
(Dpi,t 1, Dpj,t 1 )
(1) (2)
Finitely Indefinitely
Constant 0.124⇤⇤ 0.038
(0.059) (0.074)
Ingroup 0.007 0.028
(0.080) (0.098)
Outgroup 0.029 -0.007
(0.080) (0.100)
Both Gain 0.229⇤ 0.156
(0.125) (0.119)
Ingroup⇤Both Gain -0.232 -0.162
(0.185) (0.185)
Outgroup⇤Both Gain 0.028 -0.054
(0.173) (0.180)
Both Lose -1.086⇤⇤⇤ -0.778⇤⇤⇤
(0.124) (0.126)
Ingroup⇤Both Lose -0.060 -0.355⇤
(0.191) (0.191)
Outgroup⇤Both Lose 0.004 -0.012
(0.171) (0.193)
Other’s Gain 0.542⇤⇤⇤ 1.044⇤⇤⇤
(0.105) (0.129)
Ingroup⇤Other’s Gain 0.452⇤⇤⇤ 0.523⇤⇤⇤
(0.145) (0.174)
Outgroup⇤Other’s Gain 0.048 -0.226
(0.152) (0.173)
Own Gain -0.557⇤⇤⇤ -0.689⇤⇤⇤
(0.105) (0.129)
Ingroup⇤Own Gain -0.675⇤⇤⇤ -0.663⇤⇤⇤
(0.145) (0.174)
Outgroup⇤Own Gain -0.120 0.025
(0.152) (0.173)
10thPeriod 0.806⇤⇤⇤
(0.065)
Observations 6720 6960
Standard errors in parentheses⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 17 presents how the group treatments and material profits changes categories influence
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the quantity changes in the finitely repeated games and indefinitely repeated games. The ref-
erence category is nogroup treatment, and the profit of both players has no change. There is
no significant treatment effect on Dqi,t. However, there are significant interaction effects be-
tween the group assignment and material profits change category. Especially for the ingroup
treatment players, the production quantity is adjusted upwards on Period t if the opponent
has gained between Periods t-1 and Period t-2 but the player himself/herself had not; the
adjustment is more significant in the ingroup matching. The production quantity is adjusted
downward on Period t if only the player himself/herself gained and the adjustment decrease
is more significant in the ingroup matching. Column (1) is the regression for the finitely re-
peated games, and column (2) model is the OLS of the indefinitely repeated games. In Column
(1), the sample mean in the data is set as Dqi,t, in nogroup treatment, all players whose profits
have no change equal to 0.124 (p>0.05). The coefficient of Ingroup is 0.007 (p= 0.904), which
means that if both of their profits do not change between Period t-1 and Period t-2, the two
ingroup matching players will slightly increase by DqIi,t. Moreover, the ingroup matching and
outgroup matching players are not different compared with nogroup treatment players if they
all have no change in the first two periods. Compared with the case of no change in material
profits, there is no significant change of quantity in the profit growth of both players’, and
the group treatments effects can also be ignored. However, in the nogroup treatment, if both
players experience a loss of profits between Period t-1 and Period t-2, the DqNi,t will decrease by
1.086 (p<0.001) from 0.124 to -0.946. In the case of Both Lose, the group treatment effects are
not statistically significant. In the nogroup treatment, compared with the case of both play-
ers’ profits having no change, if the rival’s profit increased while the playing self does not, the
players’ quantity will increase by 0.542 (p<0.001). The coefficient of Ingroup⇤Other’s Gain is
0.452 (p<0.001), which implies that for ingroup matching players, if the opponent has gained
between Period t-1 and Period t-2, while the player self has not gained, the estimated mean
DqIi,t is 1.125 (calculation: 0.124+0.007+0.542+0.452). In the case of the Other’s gain, there is no
significant difference between nogroup matchings and outgroup matchings. The coefficient
of “Own gain” implies that the player will decrease his/her quantity by 0.433 (0.675-0.124;
p<0.001) at the following period if his/herself profit increases while the rival’s profit does
not increase in the nogroup treatment in the finitely repeated games. Nevertheless, for the
ingroup assignment players, the difference of quantity changes increases by 0.675 (p<0.001).
In the face of such a case, the difference between nogroup treatment and outgroup matching
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is negligible. In the Column (2), in the indefinitely repeated games, the signs of the coefficients
are completely consistent with those of Column (1), and there is only a small difference be-
tween the settings of changes. The analysis of decisions illustrates that the one-sided gains
in the material profits between two periods motive the players upward quantity adjustments,
while downward adjustments if Both Lose. In other words, the group membership increases
willingness to enforce a norm of collusion. The players are more likely to reward an ingroup
member’s decreased quantity andmore likely to punish an ingroupmember’s increased quan-
tity.
Table 18 summarises the norms in the three different treatments and two repeated Cournot
interactions. The player will adjust herself/himself to the change of her/his quantity to cope
with changes in the material profits in the previous periods (the corresponding numbers in
the brackets are the probability).41 For example, if both players’ profit have no change at the
previous two periods, the two players have a 10% chance of increasing quantity by one unit
and keeping the quantity level at the following period at 90%. In the three different treatments,
the most apparent differences are cases of one player’s profit increases, while the others do not.
In the case of the “Own gain, other not gain”, the ingroup matchings will decrease quantity
by two at 25% or decrease by one at 75%. However, for the nogroup matchings and outgroup
matchings, they will decrease quantity by one at 60%, or stay the quantity settings at 40%.
Table 18: Simulation norms: Dqgi for finitely and indefinitely interactions by treatment
Categories Finitely Indefinitely
Ingroup Nogroup Outgroup Ingroup Nogroup Outgroup
Both gain: 0 (100%) 0 (100%) 0 (100%) 0 (100%) 0 (100%) 0 (100%)
Own gain, -1 (75%) -1 (60%) -1 (60%) -1 (65%) -1 (67%) -1 (67%)
other not gain: -2 (25%) 0 (40%) 0 (40%) -2 (35%) 0 (33%) 0 (33%)
Other’s gain, 1 (100%) 1 (50%) 1 (50%) 1 (40%) 1 (100%) 1 (100%)
self not gain: 0 (50%) 0 (50%) 2 (60%)
No change: 0 (90%) 0 (90%) 0 (90%) 0 (100%) 0 (100%) 0 (100%)
1 (10%) 1 (10%) 1 (10%)
Both lose: -1 (90%) -1 (90%) -1 (90%) -1 (90%) -1 (78%) -1 (78%)
-2 (10%) -2 (10%) -2 (10%) -2 (10%) 0 (22%) 0 (22%)
41We use a 5% statistical significance level as a threshold (unless stated otherwise) to establish the significance of
an effect.
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10.1.2 Simulations
We conduct simulations using individual-level quantity choice adjustment norm estimates to
determine if the norm with group identity interprets the characteristics of the experiments.
Next, we use the simulations with more observations to present how collusion would evolve
in group identity.
Group identity presents a proximate motivation for observed behaviour. However, is this the
ultimate evolutionary explanation for differences of norms produced by group identity? Ex-
perimental data are processed through Stata software to simulate the entire choice decision
process. We perform simulations to assess the extent to which the normmodel fits the data ob-
tained in the experimental sessions. These simulations consist of 10,000 sessions by treatment
(30,000 in the finitely repeated games and 30,000 in the indefinitely repeated games) through
the norm model previously estimated, and add the subjects who assigned to groups or did
not assign to groups. The composition of each session is obtained by randomly taking a pair
of subjects from the subjects that participated in the corresponding treatment at the first two
periods in each seven supergames.
The specification of desirable behaviour and the sanction rules in a community can be re-
garded as norms, and we analyse how such norms work to support efficient outcomes in fre-
quent transactions. The players are following the adaptive quantity choice adjustments rely
on own quantity choice in past period to infer about future quantity choices. Table 17 shows
an extracting rules algorithm based on class feature matrix. The varies magnitude of quantity
choice adjustment depends on the probability distributions of Dqgi , group matchings, and rel-
ative profit change comparisons. As a summary, here we review the forecast and adjustment
steps for a given entropy values:
• The input variables are the quantity choices in the first two periods: qgi,1, q
g
j,1, q
g
i,2, q
g
j,2.
• Based on the observation of qgi,1, q
g
j,1, q
g
i,2, q
g
j,2 and Dpi,2,Dpj,2; and the norms. It estimates
how much to produce: bqgit = qgi,t 1 + Dqgi
The choices at the following periods will obey the simplified algorithm.
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Figure 13: Finitely repeated interactions’ simulation: Quantity choice changes over individual
and by treatment
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Figure 14: Indefinitely repeated interactions’ simulation: Quantity choice changes over indi-
vidual and by treatment:
Figure 13 and Figure 14 show the way average quantity choices in 10,000 simulations with dif-
ferent group identities in the finitely repeated games, and in the indefinitely repeated games.
The three connected lines are displayed in quantity choice to facilitate the comparisons of
group matching quantitative effects among the evolution of behaviour in the nogroup match-
ing, ingroup matching and outgroup matching. According to the results of this experiment
with 240 Chinese participants, it can be confirmed that players of the Cournot interaction
games would collude more with ingroup members than outgroup members and nogroup
members in the simultaneous game. Here, computer simulations are used to show that collu-
sion can arise when players who are sufficiently similar to themselves in the ingroup matching
decrease their own quantity in the finitely interactions. Their behavioural responses may be
determined by the default norm associated with particular group assignments. Somewhat
surprisingly, it turns out that norms yield a collusive outcome, and they are able to sustain
“collusion” outcomes under enhanced norms (ingroup matchings in the finitely repeated in-
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teractions). When we look back Table 17, we do not find the effect of group identity in two
cases: Both Gain and Both Lose, but effects are reflected in the Other’s Gain and Own Gain
cases. For different group matching categories (nogroup matchings, ingroup matchings and
outgroup matchings), if the coefficients of Own Gain are larger than those of Other’s Gain, the
matchings are able to sustain “collusion” outcomes. In contrast, if the coefficients of Own Gain
are lower than those of Other’s Gain, the outcomes are more inclined to the Cournot Nash
equilibrium. These could explain why the quantity choices processes are very similar among
three different treatment in the indefinitely repeated interactions. In sum, different kinds of
group matchings determine the size of quantity choice adjustments facing five different com-
parisons of profit changes in the previous two periods. The quantity choice process norm
established has important reference value to developing the complex models that consider
group matchings, the coefficients of difference comparison categories comprehensively.
Part IV
CONCLUSION and DISCUSSION
Contributions The aim of this research is to examine whether group identity could effect
change in individuals’ quantity choices through other-regarding preferences, and its underly-
ing repetition devices. To that end, lab experiments were conducted to bridge the gap between
this study and literature based on individual-level and market-level analysis of group contin-
gent other-regarding preferences. My findings are in line with recent Cournot interactions and
show essential organization implications.42 Solid evidence was obtained to substantiate the
hypothesis that group identity shapes individual quantity setting decisions. It is observed in
the new experiments as the main contribution that these primary effects of group identity are
at work based on the Cournot interactions. The fact that group norms, group identity can lead
to a more collusive equilibrium has been demonstrated in the context of the Cournot games.
This research demonstrates the effect of social identity cues from several perspectives. Firstly,
to the best of our knowledge, it is the first study which documents Cournot interactions based
42In the quantity setting oligopolies, the successful collusion is difficult, and the Nash Cournot equilibrium dom-
inant the main position under randommatching Holt (1985); Huck et al. (2001, 2004). However, the collusion could
be more likely under fixed matching.
83
on group identity primed. In this sense, group identity can be seen as a sort of lubricant for
competitive economic transactions, especially in the event of imperfect markets and incom-
plete contracts. Secondly, we conclude that group identity discrimination can be caused by
statistical discrimination, the participants have relatively accurate expectations about the op-
ponent’s identity and their quantity choices in pairs who are from the same identity group are
reduced. Thirdly, our findings shed light on the controversial issues of outgroup favouritism.
Our experiments are distinctive from other studies in three essential ways. First, numerous
earlier studies focused on a few potential choices in the prisoner’s dilemma games, yet our ex-
periments extend the potential choices (Goodwin & Fiske, 2001; Wit & Wilke, 1992; Yamagishi
& Kiyonari, 2000; Yamagishi et al., 2013). Second, group identity is induced in the industrial
organization theory to test its effects on non-cooperative environments. Third, the players can
play the part of the punisher, and the varying levels of punishment were prescribed based on
the different group matchings (nogroup matching, ingroup matching, and outgroup match-
ing), including the no punishment, the non-cost (gentle) punishment, and cost (severer) pun-
ishment.43 Some contributions are made to facilitate further study of this model.
Conclusion The experiment is designed to provide a clarified comparison of quantity set-
tings in three different Cournot interaction devices and group identity, including ingroup
matchings, nogroupmatchings and other with outgroupmatchings. Collusive play in Cournot
interactions is investigated to evaluate the validity of leading theories of observed collusion:
group contingent other-regarding preferences. Collusion can be viewed from two aspects: the
likelihood and the sustainability of collusion.
As mentioned in the introduction part, this paper takes the initiative towards a better under-
standing of group identity and its influence on non-selfish preferences. The intergroup bias is
motivated by utility based on members of different group differential (Abbink & Harris, 2012;
Y. Chen & Li, 2009). Our observations about the ingroup favouritism out of the group identity
are consistent with the previous discussion to some extent. In the dynamic interactions the in-
group favouritism leads to more cooperative outcomes. Regarding the effect of group identity,
it is found that the effect of group identity on collusion is greater in repeated game than one-
shot games when all the other conditions are of the same. The high probability of collusion in
43The previous works concentrated on the two-stage experiments with punishments, and the punisher is the
third party.
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the ingroup treatment is caused by the factor of group identity among the ingroup members.
In contrast, research shows that if the fixed pairs finitely repeatedly interact, the outgroup fixed
matchings prove better in sustaining the market collusion than ingroup matchings.
Given the existence of intergroup discrimination behaviours in Cournot interactions, the other-
regarding preferences are inconsistent with play in one-shot Cournot interactions. It is con-
cluded that other-regarding preferences alone are not sufficient to justify our observation. In
other words, the group contingent other-regarding preferences models are consistent with
the repeated Cournot interactions in part. Firms in duopolies with group identity primed
more times manage to collude, than in duopolies without group assignment. As Akerlof and
Kranton (2000, 2005) suggested: the individuals put themselves in the specific group iden-
tity groups, and then they assign their social identity. That is to say, social norms systemati-
cally shape such discrimination. Quantity choices would be a good indicator of group iden-
tity which determines quantities with ingroup matchings to secure the group identity of the
members. Players adopt similar decisions under finitely repeated games and indefinitely re-
peated games devices. Nevertheless, the players are influenced by the ingroup matchings to
a great extent than other matchings (nogroup and outgroup). It is found that in all group
matchings output adjustment can be explained to some extent by inspecting the individual
quantity choice decisions pertaining to norms. The players were more likely to punish norm
violations from ingroup as opposed to outgroup members in spite of the ingroup bias. This
situation could be explained by the fact that the enforcement of cooperative norm violations
is an evolved mechanism which requires within-group cooperation. The simulation results
show that adaptive quantity choice adjustment norms, which are enhanced by group identity,
may accelerate to collusion in the repeated Cournot interactions. According to the proposed
hypothesis, people prefer to cooperate with ingroup members because they expect reciprocal
responses from ingroup members, but not from outgroup members.
Moreover, it is determined that people tend to collude less with outsiders as the result of in-
teractions, and conflict can appear due to punishment behaviour. Thus, the good collusive
performances in the outgroup treatments should be explained by the determinant punishment
factor of group identity. The harsher punishment is helpful to sustain the collusion. In regard
to outgroup favouritism, we inspected individual behaviour in all treatments with a group
assignment, and found that the impact of collusion becomes larger and surpasses the effects
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of the myopic best response. We also find that experience places an critical role in quantity
setting Cournot interactions, and the role of experience varies depending upon the group as-
signments and repeated interaction devices. The level of collusion increases with experience
and converges to higher levels in the group assignment treatments in the repeated interaction
devices. Take together, our results suggest that while an equilibrium action may be a neces-
sary condition for the arising of collusion among those with the same group identity, it is not
sufficient. It is also suggested that no single social preference norm is sufficient to elucidate
these behaviours. According to our simulation results, the norms (subsection 10.1) may well
explain in part the effect of group identity on collusion.
The relationship between intergroup bias and collusion relationship can be summarized as (1)
ingroup matchings tend to set lower quantity choices; (2) differentially enforced norms are
dependent on the group membership of their interaction opponents. In terms of the effect
of Cournot interaction devices, higher aggregate quantities and notably lower incidence of
collusion were confirmed in the one-shot interactions than in repeated interaction devices.
Finally, it is proved that nogroup matching markets are always at Cournot Nash quantity, and
that when group membership is assigned, the performance of the market is more collusive
than Cournot Nash Equilibrium.
Even in the ingroup matching duopoly with one-shot interactions, the players generally were
not inclined to keep such collusion. This result implies that although ingroup matching re-
sult in insignificantly lower aggregate quantities during the first half of interactions, it is not
enough to sustain such collusion. The capability to coordinate mutual trust and the credibility
of the promise are the two conditions to sustain the collusion (Balliet, 2010). Group mem-
bership assignment is more effective than nogroup membership assignment concerning the
fostering of collectivism, which positively impacts collusion. In addition, group membership
assignment allows the players to stick to social norms and to form expectations, thereby mak-
ing the mutual promise credible. The results have been summarized in regard to the tacit col-
lusive behaviour that has implications for applied questions, such as the optimal design of the
industrial organization. We find that group identification can facilitate collusion in the mar-
ket where competition happens between fixed matchings, given that the successful tempted
establishment of norms can be executed in similar strategies such as tit for tat.
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ExistingWork and Limitations This study is not without limitations. Following Y. Chen and
Li (2009),44 the group identity was induced by two steps: (1) the players were randomly allo-
cated into different groups, and (2) theywere asked to finish the “group identity enhancement”
task by discussing the painting questions within their groupmembers. Such group assignment
may create more cooperation than in the Cournot interactions if they have cooperated in the
painting tasks. In light of this, two additional treatments can be added if the randomly allo-
cated players in the group could not have effective communication with other group members
when they were trying to solve the painting questions.
Another limitation of this research is that there is no guarantee for the behaviour impacted
by group identity and preference in Cournot interactions to be answered accurately. In the
repeated interactions, the playersmay form their beliefs about the opponent’s quantity choices.
For example, Nyarko and Schotter (2002) stated that the beliefs of players differ dramatically
in Cournot interactions. Therefore, the influence of group identity on behaviour is revealed by
changes in beliefs of what the opponent will do. I may obtain evidence to show the impact
of group identity on behaviour in Cournot interactions.45 Meanwhile, by using this improved
experimental design, the changes and the asymmetric response of players, and the changes of
the averaged weight of players playing on their opponent’s material profits can be observed
in a direct manner.
A large body of experimental researches focuses on analysing the relationship between mar-
ket structure and performances. Some of these works are applicable to merger policy in a
broad sense. First, while experimental research can lead to an insightful opinion about hu-
man behaviour, it is still unclear how these results can be applied outside of the laboratory.
Conversely, in the real industrial organization, the cost of ways to measure market share dif-
fers considerably. The number of established firms and potential entrants is limited in this
study. F. Dolbear et al. (1969) showed that subjects using small matrix tend to reach the joint
maximum, although such cooperation is unstable.
Further Studies All the further studies should be conducted on the basis of the above draw-
backs. One cannot help wondering is the effect of minimal groups, just a quantitatively dif-
44They found the primed group identities have little impacts on behaviour, however, the group identities increase
the self-reported attachment.
45Y. Chen and Li (2009) found that the “group identity enhancement” increased the players’ self-report attach-
ment to their own group members, yet the effects on behaviour are marginal. This suggests that such beliefs could
not fully reflect the actual group identity.
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ferent weaker version of what is observed in the real groups or the minimal groups behave
quantitatively different from real groups? Will the randomised assignment of individuals,
regardless of ethnic or national discrimination, provides stronger group manipulation than
artificial groups in laboratory experiments which are devoid of social content?46
Our results show that the group identity of organization plays is of great help to the forming
of collusion behaviour. Therefore, the optimal size of an organization and the demographic
differences which could prim efficient group identity should be analysed. It should also be
determined whether the group identity characteristic differences give rise to strong group ties.
It is a complicated issue to determine whether the various behaviours caused by group iden-
tity can be explained by the preference-based models or belief-based models (Y. Chen & Li,
2009; Guala et al., 2013; McLeish & Oxoby, 2011). In further experiments, the dictator game
might be employed to measure the behaviour produced by preference-based model. In ad-
dition, a possible direction which measures group identity experimental games may also be
used to evaluate players’ beliefs about other players’ actions through the trust game senders’
behaviour. Finally, the group identity effects should be examined in the event of a player in-
teracts with two or more players from different groups (mixing the intragroup and intergroup
interactions). Intergroup discrimination might intensify the external competition, leading to a
higher degree of collusion Tajfel and Turner (1979). Since the paper focuses on the general as-
pects of game theory and industrial organization, some specific industries are not discussed. It
should be emphasised that the applicability of game theory to industry organization is another
matter of evaluation.
Implications Firms are often divided into sections or groups. Group bias is easy to spot in
real life at work because it has more space for development. The social identity theory of
group identification is new in the literature of organizational behaviour. Most of the previous
researches on the effects of group identity rely on the ultimate measurement of firm perfor-
mance, yet we pay more attention to efficiency among oligopolies in this paper. Herein, we
introduced the definition of group identity and group bias based on its concept and theory,
and we can perceive the causes for group bias, the various manifestations of group bias, and
motivations of group bias. All those notions help to understand the internal mechanism of
intergroup bias and to use group bias in a flexible fashion. Our results shed light on the associ-
46Comparing bias between social/geographical groups and artificial groups (Goette, Huffman, &Meier, 2012; Li
et al., 2011), while Abbink and Harris (2012) compared artificial groups with political groups.
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ation between identity and cooperation. Coordinated behaviour within a specific group could
arise even if they have no intention to collude. For the organizations in a single industry, group
identity could stimulate cooperation among its members, subsequently promoting the benefits
of the organization. Nevertheless, the extent of group bias should be under proper control so
as to avoid negative derivatives from intergroup derogations. All these could turn positive
interactions into a negative one, undermining the effectiveness and coordinative development
of members. Social identity or competition alone does not improve the market performance of
a firm.
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Part V
APPENDIX
A Group Identity Effects on Different Games
Prisoner’s Dilemma Experimenters found that, without interaction between groups, indi-
viduals are more prone to cooperate altruistically in a prisoner’s dilemma game with ingroup
as opposed to outgroup members (Goette et al., 2010). Similar results occurred highly in five
PD games. The players are more likely to choose cooperation. Laboratory tests showed in
PD games that participants were 50% more likely to choose cooperation; these results are not
consistent with the standard theoretical hypotheses. Bernhard, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2006);
Charness et al. (2007); Goette, Huffman, Meier, and Sutter (2012) from the group identity point
of view further explained the relations between social preference and cooperative behaviours.
In generally, dictators give 15% - 25% endowment to the receivers. Bernhard, Fehr, and Fis-
chbacher (2006); Camerer and Fehr (2004) explained the observed behaviours by the concept of
the group identity. Although the dictators have the chance to occupy the whole interests, they
also would like to give partial interests to others (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994).
Ingroup favouritism is a strong push in altruistic norm enforcement and sharing decisions
(Zizzo, 2012). The response in the ultimatum games always rejects the allocation schemes.
Gu¨th, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982); Morita and Serva´tka (2013) discovered that the
rejection probability of receivers increasing with the larger allocation difference, even if the
allocations are bigger than zero. There are trust behaviours and return behaviours in the trust
games. The real naturally-existing group identity also causes the ingroup favouritism in the
trust experiments (Falk & Zehnder, 2007), i.e, people trust strangers from their own district
significantly more than strangers from other districts. Previous studies have repeatedly made
clear that the strong group identity impacts on the social preference in the Trust Games (Berg,
Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Ploner, Soraperra, et al., 2004). The investors tend to give trust and
investment to agents, and the agents always will reward investors with partial benefits (Berg
et al., 1995). In the trust games, the outgroup derogation effects are more significant than in-
group favouritism (Fang & Loury, 2005). Landa (1994), the first study to examine the effects
of group identity in gift exchange games. Fehr et al. (1997), who discovered that in return
for higher salaries provided by employers, the employees are more likely to work hard. In
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the aggressive stance of the hosts produces a shift toward the unique
Nash Equilibrium outcome where both players defect, and the result is a reduction of average
payoff.
Public Goods Game Cooperative behaviour in a repeated public goods game, which is suf-
ficient to overcome self-interest, cooperation in public goods games caused by the ingroup
favouritism, evidenced by Charness, Cobo-Reyes, and Jime´nez (2014); Y. Chen and Li (2009);
Eckel and Grossman (2005). The salience of group membership induces the players to coor-
dinate on the outcome with positive payoffs depending on the location, and the result is an
increase of average payoff compared to the no audience environment. There are investments
behaviours in public game (Marwell & Ames, 1979) (the public game with punishment mech-
anisms (Fehr & Ga¨chter, 2002b)). But a new study expert shows just the opposite, “free-ride”
phenomenon could not overcome just through pure group identity. The consequence of this
increased aggressive behaviour on social outcomes depends on the games. In the Battle of the
Sexes, although Charness et al. (2007) found that the groups being formed by the pure random
assignment are not sufficient to affect participants’ behaviour.
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B Experiment Instructions and Interface
B.1 Instructions
We present the experimental instructions for the nogroup treatments. Instructions for the ingroup and
outgroup treatments also included the words/sentences in italics and square brackets below.
B.1.1 Instructions (One-shot Games)
Welcome Welcome to today’s experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully as
they are directly relevant to howmuchmoney you will earn today. Please do not communicate
with other people during the experiment. Please kindly switch your mobile phone off or put it
on silent mode. Students causing a disturbance will be asked to leave the room. You will enter
all of your decisions in today’s experiment using only the computer mouse and keyboard. If
you have any questions at any point during today’s session, please raise your hand, and one
of the monitors will come to help.
Task You are about to participate in a decision-making process in which you will play games
with other players in this room. What you earn depends on your decisions, partly on the deci-
sions of others, and partly on chance. As you came in you drew an index card [a white envelope]
with a number on it [with a number on it and a card in it]. This number, randomly assigned, is
your ID number used in this experiment to ensure the anonymity of your decisions [your group
name printed on the card]. Please do not show your ID number [card] to anyone else. Please
turn off cellular phones now. We ask that you do not talk to each other during the experiment.
If you have a question, please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you. This ex-
periment consists of two parts and 40 players. Your earnings in each part are given in points.
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid in private and in cash based on the following
exchange rate 1.5 Yuan = 100 points Your total earnings will be the sum of your earnings in
each part plus a 15 Yuan participation fee. We will now start at Part 1. The instructions for Part
2 will be given after Part 1 ends.
Part 1
We will now start at Part 1. [Please open the white envelope and discreetly pull out the contents. It
contains either a Luojiashan card or a Donghu card. The character represents the group that you are
assigned to. The 40 players in this experiment are randomly assigned to one of two groups of 20 people.
If you drew a Luojiashan card, you would be in the Luojiashan group. If you drew a Donghu card, you
would be in the Donghu group. The group assignment will remain the same throughout the experiment.
Please return the index card to the envelope now. Do not show them to others. Please raise your hand if
you have any questions about this step.] In Part 1 everyone will be shown three pairs of paintings
by two artists, Kandinsky and Klee. You will have three minutes to study these paintings. And
then, at the end of the three minutes, two additional paintings printed on the A4 paper. Then
every player judges each of the two new paintings made by the artists in eight minutes [You
may communicate with others in your group through a chat program while answering the questions.
But in the course of chatting, please do not deliver the personally identifiable information (e.g. gender,
race, and major), major. Please avoid obscene or offensive language. Apart from these, you could discuss
any topics you want, and your contexts are public to all group members.] You will be given up to 8
minutes to answer both questions. Submit your answers below when you are ready. [Note you
are not required to give the same answers as your group members.] Each correct answer is worth 100
experiment points. You will find out about your earnings in Part 1 at the end of the experi-
ment. [Please tell us how you belonged feel to your group and the other group at this moment. Enter a
number from 1 (“not belonged at all”) to 10 (“very closely belonged”) that most accurately reflects your
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feelings. (These answers will not affect your earnings.) The sense of belongingness to your group The
sense of belongingness to the other group
Part 2 (One-shot)
In part 2, you will make quantity decisions in periods. You will be randomly paired with an-
other player in this room [in your group/in the other group] (called your opponent) for sequences
of periods. In interactions, you will choose quantity 70 times, your history choices, history op-
ponents’ choice, market prices and experimental players’ points will be shown on the decision
screen. Subjects are either assigned to a random pairing at the beginning of a new period. A
player does not know at which periods he has previously played against (or will in the future
play against). Before each new period, each player was anonymously matched with one of
the 30 [19] players with whom s/he had not previously played a period not know who your
opponent is and vice-versa. Once a period ends, you will be randomly paired with another
player [in your group/in the other group] (i.e., another opponent) for a new period. [A player in
the Luojiashan group will only be paired with another player in the Luojiashan/Donghu group. A player
from the Donghu group will only be paired with another player in the Donghu/Luojiashan group.]
*Quizzes before the experiment
1 During the part two of experiments, how many matches to execute to make quantity
choices?
2 According to the payoff table, if you sell six boxes, and the other player sells 12 boxes,
what’s your profit? And what is the other’s profit?
*Quantity choices and Payoffs
The choices and payoffs in each period are shown below:
Figure B1: Payoff matrix
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You and your opponent each can choose among six quantity choices, 0, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 12. The
first entry in each cell represents your payoff and the second entry your opponent’s payoff.
Your payoffs are bolded for your convenience. In each period, before knowing each other’s
decision, you and your opponent will simultaneously choose quantity choice by clicking on
the radio button of choice. If you and your opponent both choose 0, each of you get 0 points in
this period. If you choose 0 and your opponent chooses 6, you get 0 points, and your opponent
gets 108 points in this period. If you choose 6 and your opponent chooses 0, you get 108 points,
and your opponent gets 0 points in this period. If you and your opponent both choose 6, each
of you get 72 points in this period. Therefore, your earnings depend on your decision and your
opponent’s decision in each period.
*Earnings in Part 2
Your earnings in each period are the sum of your earnings in the decision-making task. Your
total earnings in Part 2 are your cumulative earnings in all periods. Recall that 100 points
equal to 1.5 yuan. In each period before you provide your quantity choose an action, your
decisions, your opponent’s decisions and your earnings in each of the previous periods will
appear in a history window. Before we start, let’s review some important points. 1. You will
be randomly paired with an opponent [in your group/in the other group]. The number of periods
in a supergame is randomly determined. 2. A new period will start in which case you will be
randomly paired with a different opponent [in your group/in the other group]. 3. In each period,
you and your opponent each choose an action simultaneously before knowing each other’s
choice. If you have a question, please raise your hand.
Post-Experimental Survey
(1)[ Which group do you belong to?] (2) What is your age? (3)What is your gender? (4) Before
today, how many times have you participated in any economics or psychology experimental
studies? (5) On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate how familiar you with those paintings. 1 is
not at all. (6) [Please choose a number between 1-10 to indicate the level of attachment/belonging you
feel towards Team East Lake. 1 means not at all, 10 means very much.] (7) [On a scale from 1 to
10, please rate how much you think communicating with your group members helped solve questions,
with 1 meaning “not much at all”.] (8) [Please choose a number between 1-10 to indicate the level of
attachment/belonging you feel towards Team Loujiashan Mountain. 1 means not at all, 10 means very
much.] (9) What is your major (10) In the box selling decision task, how would you describe
your strategy? (11) Please share with us any other aspects of your decisions in the experiment
that were not captured in the questions above.
B.1.2 Instructions (Finitely Repeated Games)
Welcome Welcome to today’s experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully as
they are directly relevant to howmuchmoney you will earn today. Please do not communicate
with other people during the experiment. Please kindly switch your mobile phone off or put it
on silent mode. Students causing a disturbance will be asked to leave the room. You will enter
all of your decisions in today’s experiment using only the computer mouse and keyboard. If
you have any questions at any point during today’s session, please raise your hand and one of
the monitors will come to help.
Task You are about to participate in a decision-making process in which you will play games
with other players in this room. What you earn depends on your decisions, partly on the deci-
sions of others, and partly on chance. As you came in you drew an index card [a white envelope]
with a number on it [with a number on it and a card in it]. This number, randomly assigned, is
your ID number used in this experiment to ensure the anonymity of your decisions [your group
name printed on the card]. Please do not show your ID number [card] to anyone else. Please
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turn off cellular phones now. We ask that you do not talk to each other during the experiment.
If you have a question, please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you. This ex-
periment consists of two parts and 40 players. Your earnings in each part are given in points.
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid in private and in cash based on the following
exchange rate 1.5 Yuan = 100 points Your total earnings will be the sum of your earnings in
each part plus a 15 Yuan participation fee. We will now start at Part 1. The instructions for Part
2 will be given after Part 1 ends.
Part 1
We will now start at Part 1. [Please open the white envelope and discreetly pull out the contents. It
contains either a Luojiashan card or a Donghu card. The character represents the group that you are
assigned to. The 40 players in this experiment are randomly assigned to one of two groups of 20 people.
If you drew a Luojiashan card, you would be in the Luojiashan group. If you drew a Donghu card, you
would be in the Donghu group. The group assignment will remain the same throughout the experiment.
Please return the index card to the envelope now. Do not show them to others. Please raise your hand if
you have any questions about this step.] In Part 1 everyone will be shown three pairs of paintings
by two artists, Kandinsky and Klee. You will have three minutes to study these paintings. And
then, at the end of the three minutes, two additional paintings printed on the A4 paper. Then
every player judges each of the two new paintings made by the artists in eight minutes [You
may communicate with others in your group through a chat program while answering the questions.
But in the course of chatting, please do not deliver the personally identifiable information (e.g. gender,
race, and major), major. Please avoid obscene or offensive language. Apart from these, you could discuss
any topics you want, and your contexts are public to all group members.] You will be given up to 8
minutes to answer both questions. Submit your answers below when you are ready. [Note you
are not required to give the same answers as your group members.] Each correct answer is worth 100
experiment points. You will find out about your earnings in Part 1 at the end of the experi-
ment. [Please tell us how belonged you feel to your group and the other group at this moment. Enter a
number from 1 (“not belonged at all”) to 10 (“very closely belonged”) that most accurately reflects your
feelings. (These answers will not affect your earnings.) The sense of belongingness to your group The
sense of belongingness to the other group]
Part 2 (Finitely repeated)
In part 2, you will make decisions in periods and supergames. In interactions, you will choose
the quantity in 7 supergames, each sequence of 10 periods is referred to as a supergame. Your
history choices, the current supergame opponent’s history choices, market prices and exper-
imental players’ points will be showed on the decision screen. You will be randomly paired
with another player in this room [in your group/in the other group] (called your opponent) for
sequences of periods in supergames. You and your opponent do not know each other. Subjects
are either assigned to a fixed pairing at the beginning of a supergame. Once a supergame ends,
youwill be randomly pairedwith another player [in your group/in the other group]. In sessions in
which a fixed pairing protocol is used, the fixed pairings changed from one supergame to the
next; before the first period of each new supergame, each player was anonymously matched
with one of the 39 [19] players with whom s/he had not previously played a supergame. In
addition, every time the computer rematched the subject, the words ’New Partner’ flashed on
the computer screen. (i.e., another opponent) for a new supergame. [A player in the Luojiashan
group will only be paired with another player in the Luojiashan/Donghu group. A player from the
Donghu group will only be paired with another player in the Donghu/Luojiashan group.]
*Quizzes before the experiment.
1 During the part two of experiments, how many players will be paired with you to make
quantity choices?
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2 According to the payoff table, if you sell six boxes, and the other player sells 12 boxes,
what’s your profit? And what is the other’s profit?
*Quantity choices and Payoffs
The choices and payoffs in each period are shown below:
Figure B2: Payoff matrix
You and your opponent each can choose among six quantity choices, 0,6,7,8,9, and 12. The
first entry in each cell represents your payoff and the second entry your opponent’s payoff.
Your payoffs are bolded for your convenience. In each period, before knowing each other’s
decision, you and your opponent will simultaneously choose quantity choice by clicking on
the radio button of choice. If you and your opponent both choose 0, each of you get 0 points in
this period. If you choose 0 and your opponent chooses 6, you get 0 points, and your opponent
gets 108 points in this period. If you choose 6 and your opponent chooses 0, you get 108 points,
and your opponent gets 0 points in this period. If you and your opponent both choose 6, each
of you get 72 points in this period. Therefore, your earnings depend on your decision and your
opponent’s decision in each period.
*Earnings in Part 2
Your earnings in each period are the sum of your earnings in the decision-making task. Your
total earnings in Part 2 are your cumulative earnings in all periods. Recall that 100 points
equal to 1.5 yuan. In each period before you provide your quantity choose an action, your
decisions, your opponent’s decisions and your earnings in each of the previous periods will
appear in a history window. Before we start, let’s review some important points. 1. You will
be randomly paired with an opponent [in your group/in the other group]. The number of periods
in a supergame is randomly determined. 2. A new period will start in which case you will be
randomly paired with a different opponent [in your group/in the other group]. 3. In each period,
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you and your opponent each choose an action simultaneously before knowing each other’s
choice. If you have a question, please raise your hand.
Post-Experimental Survey
(1)[ Which group do you belong to?] (2) What is your age? (3)What is your gender? (4) Before
today, how many times have you participated in any economics or psychology experimental
studies? (5) On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate how familiar you with those paintings. 1 is
not at all. (6) [Please choose a number between 1-10 to indicate the level of attachment/belonging you
feel towards Team East Lake. 1 means not at all, 10 means very much.] (7) [On a scale from 1 to
10, please rate how much you think communicating with your group members helped solve questions,
with 1 meaning “not much at all”.] (8) [Please choose a number between 1-10 to indicate the level of
attachment/belonging you feel towards Team Loujiashan Mountain. 1 means not at all, 10 means very
much.] (9) What is your major (10) In the box selling decision task, how would you describe
your strategy? (11) Please share with us any other aspects of your decisions in the experiment
that were not captured in the questions above.
B.1.3 Instructions (Indefinitely Repeated Games)
Welcome Welcome to today’s experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully as
they are directly relevant to howmuchmoney you will earn today. Please do not communicate
with other people during the experiment. Please kindly switch your mobile phone off or put it
on silent mode. Students causing a disturbance will be asked to leave the room. You will enter
all of your decisions in today’s experiment using only the computer mouse and keyboard. If
you have any questions at any point during today’s session, please raise your hand and one of
the monitors will come to help.
Task You are about to participate in a decision-making process in which you will play games
with other players in this room. What you earn depends on your decisions, partly on the deci-
sions of others, and partly on chance. As you came in you drew an index card [a white envelope]
with a number on it [with a number on it and a card in it]. This number, randomly assigned, is
your ID number used in this experiment to ensure the anonymity of your decisions [your group
name printed on the card]. Please do not show your ID number [card] to anyone else. Please
turn off cellular phones now. We ask that you do not talk to each other during the experiment.
If you have a question, please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you. This ex-
periment consists of two parts and 40 players. Your earnings in each part are given in points.
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid in private and in cash based on the following
exchange rate 1.5 Yuan = 100 points Your total earnings will be the sum of your earnings in
each part plus a 15 Yuan participation fee. We will now start at Part 1. The instructions for Part
2 will be given after Part 1 ends.
Part 1
We will now start at Part 1. [Please open the white envelope and discreetly pull out the contents. It
contains either a Luojiashan card or a Donghu card. The character represents the group that you are
assigned to. The 40 players in this experiment are randomly assigned to one of two groups of 20 people.
If you drew a Luojiashan card, you would be in the Luojiashan group. If you drew a Donghu card, you
would be in the Donghu group. The group assignment will remain the same throughout the experiment.
Please return the index card to the envelope now. Do not show them to others. Please raise your hand if
you have any questions about this step.] In Part 1 everyone will be shown three pairs of paintings
by two artists, Kandinsky and Klee. You will have three minutes to study these paintings. And
then, at the end of the three minutes, two additional paintings printed on the A4 paper. Then
every player judges each of the two new paintings made by the artists in eight minutes [You
may communicate with others in your group through a chat program while answering the questions.
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But in the course of chatting, please do not deliver the personally identifiable information (e.g. gender,
race, and major), major. Please avoid obscene or offensive language. Apart from these, you could discuss
any topics you want, and your contexts are public to all group members.] You will be given up to 8
minutes to answer both questions. Submit your answers below when you are ready. [Note you
are not required to give the same answers as your group members.] Each correct answer is worth 100
experiment points. You will find out about your earnings in Part 1 at the end of the experi-
ment. [Please tell us how you belonged feel to your group and the other group at this moment. Enter a
number from 1 (“not belonged at all”) to 10 (“very closely belonged”) that most accurately reflects your
feelings. (These answers will not affect your earnings.) The sense of belongingness to your group The
sense of belongingness to the other group]
Part 2 (Indefinitely repeated)
In part 2, you will make decisions in periods and supergames. In interactions, you will choose
the quantity in 7 supergames, each sequence of randomly determined periods is referred to as
a supergame. Your history choices, the current supergame opponent’s history choices, market
prices and experimental players’ points will be showed on the decision screen. You will be
randomly paired with another player in this room [in your group/in the other group] (called your
opponent) for sequences of periods. Subjects are either assigned to a fixed pairing at the begin-
ning of a supergame. In sessions in which a fixed pairing protocol is used, the fixed pairings
changed from one supergame to the next; before the first period of each new supergame, each
player was anonymously matched with one of the 39 [19] players with whom s/he had not
previously played a supergame. At the end of every stage period, the play would continue for
another period with a probability of 90% and a 10% chance that the supergame will end. If the
supergame continues, the opponent will not change. If the supergame end, a new supergame
will start and a new opponent will be paired. In addition, every time the computer rematched
the subject, the words ‘New Partner’ flashed on the computer screen. Furthermore, every time
the beginning of the next period, the words ‘the player would continue for another period with
a probability of 90%’ flashed on the computer screen. You will not know who your opponent
is and vice-versa. Each sequence of periods is referred to as a super-game. Once a supergame
ends, you will be randomly paired with another player [in your group/in the other group] (i.e.,
another opponent) for a new supergame. [A player in the Luojiashan group will only be paired with
another player in the Luojiashan/Donghu group. A player from the Donghu group will only be paired
with another player in the Donghu/Luojiashan group.]
*Quizzes before the experiment
1 During the part two of experiments, how many players will be paired with you to make
quantity choices? Are the periods in each supergame fixed? What is the probability of
game continuity?
2 According to the payoff table, if you sell six boxes, and the other player sells 12 boxes,
what’s your profit? And what is the other’s profit?
*Quantity choices and Payoffs
The choices and payoffs in each period are shown below:
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Figure B3: Payoff matrix
You and your opponent each can choose among six quantity choices, 0,6,7,8,9, and 12. The
first entry in each cell represents your payoff and the second entry your opponent’s payoff.
Your payoffs are bolded for your convenience. In each period, before knowing each other’s
decision, you and your opponent will simultaneously choose quantity choice by clicking on
the radio button of choice. If you and your opponent both choose 0, each of you get 0 points in
this period. If you choose 0 and your opponent chooses 6, you get 0 points, and your opponent
gets 108 points in this period. If you choose 6 and your opponent chooses 0, you get 108 points,
and your opponent gets 0 points in this period. If you and your opponent both choose 6, each
of you get 72 points in this period. Therefore, your earnings depend on your decision and your
opponent’s decision in each period.
*Earnings in Part 2
Your earnings in each period are the sum of your earnings in the decision-making task. Your
total earnings in Part 2 are your cumulative earnings in all periods. Recall that 100 points
equal to 1.5 yuan. In each period before you provide your quantity choose an action, your
decisions, your opponent’s decisions and your earnings in each of the previous periods will
appear in a history window. Before we start, let’s review some important points. 1. You will
be randomly paired with an opponent [in your group/in the other group]. The number of periods
in a supergame is randomly determined. 2. A new period will start in which case you will be
randomly paired with a different opponent [in your group/in the other group]. 3. In each period,
you and your opponent each choose an action simultaneously before knowing each other’s
choice. If you have a question, please raise your hand.
Post-Experimental Survey
(1)[ Which group do you belong to?] (2) What is your age? (3)What is your gender? (4) Before
today, how many times have you participated in any economics or psychology experimental
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studies? (5) On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate how familiar you with those paintings. 1 is
not at all. (6) [Please choose a number between 1-10 to indicate the level of attachment/belonging you
feel towards Team East Lake. 1 means not at all, 10 means very much.] (7) [On a scale from 1 to
10, please rate how much you think communicating with your group members helped solve questions,
with 1 meaning “not much at all”.] (8) [Please choose a number between 1-10 to indicate the level of
attachment/belonging you feel towards Team Loujiashan Mountain. 1 means not at all, 10 means very
much.] (9) What is your major (10) In the box selling decision task, how would you describe
your strategy? (11) Please share with us any other aspects of your decisions in the experiment
that were not captured in the questions above.
B.2 Interface
B.2.1 Interface: Part One
Figure B4: Part one: Paintings study
                    ᜏ๞֢ߝོᩝ
                      כᗔ·ظڥ                      ኎ᥜ᯾·଼ӟේच   
     Paintings study
Klee Kandinsky
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Figure B5: Part one: Paintings self-study (Beginning page)
ਫḵ୏তᶭᶎ
ᅩڋӥӞᶭ҅୏তᒼ᷌
There are six paintings on the screen, the left three made by Klee, the right three made by Kandinsky.
Please compare two new paintings, and answer who made those paintings (one artist or two different artists 
might make them). Your answers do need to consistent with discussion results.
Please press ‘Next page’, once you understood the instruction of part one.
Next page
Start to answer painting questions
Part one: Instruction
Experiment beginning page 
Figure B6: Part one: Two additional paintings comparisons
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Figure B7: Part one: Within group discussion
Figure B8: Part one: Problem-solving
ရኮᰄᩝᒼ᷌᮱ړ
وํӷ᭲᷌
Please answer painting questions
Remaining time: 0.34
Question 1
Total two painting questions
Next page
Who made the first painting?
klee
Kandinsky
102
Figure B9: Part one: Individual payoff
ᒫӞ᮱ړ҅ရኮᰄᩝ
ᒫӞ᮱ړᕮ๳ᶭᶎ
Part one: Paintings study
Part one end
Part one experiment tokens
The questions account to 2; you got 0 correct answers.
Your payoff is 0 experiment tokens
Your answer correct or not Your answer
Your answerQuestion
Painting 1
Painting 2
Next page
Figure B10: Part one: Questionnaire (Group assigned treatments)
ᒫӞ᮱ړᳯܫ᧣ັ
Next page
Part one questionnaire
Questionnaire questions
Please answer questions
What is your group name?
Please choose a number between 1-10 to indicate the level of attachment/belonging you 
feel towards Team Donghu Lake (The answer will not influence your payoff).
Please choose a number between 1-10 to indicate the level of attachment/belonging you 
feel towards Team Donghu Lake (The answer will not influence your payoff).
Notes: The part one questionnaire just answered by the group assignment players.
103
B.2.2 Interface: Part Two
Figure B11: Part two: The beginning of the part two
כ೮ᶭᶎ
Next page
Part one end  (Please do not touch computer)
Leave this page
Please leave at this page, now we will read the 
second part instruction.
Please do not press ‘Next Page’ until we give your order.
Figure B12: Part two: Instruction of part two
ᒫԫ᮱ړ୏তᶭᶎ
Next page
The second part
The second part instruction
In the experimental second part, you have to take seven 
supergames. At the end of every stage period, the play would 
continue for another period with a probability of 90%.
You could get profit through selling boxes, and every participant 
has six potential choices (0, 6, 7, 8, 9,12). 
The price of boxes is same and depends on the market output; 
the higher output means the lower price.
price = 24-the total output
Profit = (24-the total output)*your output
At each period, you and your match choose output at the same 
time.
The profit matrix is the following:
During the whole decision procedure, you could get information 
about, the profit function, the profit matrix, the history output and 
profits of you and current match who is from your group.
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Figure B13: Part two: Decision task
ᒫԫ᮱ړ؉Ծᰁ٬ᒽᶭᶎ
Next page
Part two output choice 
decisions page
The remaining time: 0.25
Please make your output decision: 
0
6
7
8
9
12
Figure B14: Part two: Decision task
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Figure B15: Part two: The beginning of the next period
ྯ᫪٬ᒽԏݸ…
Next page
After each period…
This supergame will be 
continuity with a certain 
probability: 0.9.
If next page writes: ``make 
decisions’’, this supergame 
keeps going.
If next page writes: ``Your 
experiment tokens’’, this 
supergame over.
Please press ``Next Page’’
Figure B16: Part two: The waiting page
ᒵஇᶭᶎ Waiting page
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Figure B17: Part two: Questionnaire
ᳯܫ᧣ັ
Next page
Questionnaire
Please answer following questions:
1, what is your group name?
2, How old are you?
3, What is your gender?
4, Before today, how many times have you participated 
in any economics or psychology experimental studies?
5, On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate how familiar you 
with those paintings. 1 is not at all.
6, Please choose a number between 1-10 to indicate 
the level of attachment/belonging you feel towards 
Team East Lake. 1 means not at all, 10 means very 
much.
7, Please choose a number between 1-10 to indicate 
the level of attachment/belonging you feel towards 
Team Luojia Mountain. 1 means not at all, 10 means 
very much. 
8, On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate how much you 
think communicating with your group members helped 
solve questions, with 1 meaning not much at all. 
Figure B18: The total material payoff
ਫḵᕮ๳ Experiment finished
Thank you
 
Your payoff in RMB:
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C Theoretic Models
Since all firms in the experiments are identical, the interaction between a pair of them can be
regarded as a symmetric game. In addition, the paired firms have the same group contingent
other-regarding preference. That is to say, f irmi’s utility in each period is separable in its
monetary profits and the profits of its rivals. Therefore, we have:
ui(p
g
i ,p
g
j ) = p
g
i +w
g(pgj   pgi ),where pi = (Z  qi   qj)qi
thus,
ui = wgp
g
j + (1 wg)pi = wg
h⇣
Z  qgi   qgj
⌘
qj
i
+ (1 wg)
h⇣
Z  qgi   qgj
⌘
qgi
i (A.1)
where term w represents the preference for group contingent other-regarding and the weight
that f irmi places on its rivals’ monetary profits. It is dependent on the group of f irmj:
wg(pi,pj)
8>>>><>>>>:
> 0.5 Pure altruism
> 0 Impure altruism
= 0 Self-interest
< 0 Spiteful (envious)
(A.2)
wg(pi,pj)
8><>:
> 0 if g = I; w I > wN > wO
= 0 if g = N; w I > wN > wO
< 0 if g = O; w I > wN > wO
(A.3)
To be more specific, f irmi places a positive weight on f irmj’s monetary profit when i and j
are in the same group. The weight under this circumstance is higher than that of the other
two combinations. f irmi places no weight on j’s monetary profits when i and j do not share
the same group identity. However, f irmi places a negative weight on firm j’s monetary profit
when j belongs to a different group. In the partial derivative equation of firm i’s a single period
utility, we have
∂ui
∂qgi
= (1 wg)(Z Q)  [(1 wg)qgi +wgqgj ]
= 2(1 wg)(12  1
2(1 wg)q
g
j   qgi )
(A.4)
where wg is a function that measures how differences in monetary profit between f irmj and
f irmi impacts the weight that f irmi puts on f irmj’s monetary profit. Based on the first order
conditions for preference maximization, we can derive the firms’ best response functions:
∂ugi
∂qgi
= 0 for qgi . This equation recognizes the implicit non-negatively constraint on output,
which can be obtained from f irmi’s reaction function. R
g
i specifies each output chosen by
f irmj, and the output represents f irmi’s best response as follows:
Ri(qj)g =
(
0 if 24(1 wg)  qj
24(1 wg) qgi
2(1 wg) if 0  qj  24(1 wg)
(A.5)
In the relevant range, we have ∂pi∂qi > (<)0 for qi < (>)Ri(qj). Therefore, Ri(qj) can identify
f irmi’s (unique) best response to f irmi’s output choice. For wg 2 [ 1, 1] the Cournot equilib-
rium is unique. The symmetric firms can choose the same output q⇤(g)i , and this the solution is
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q⇤(g)i = Ri(q
⇤(g)
j ). Therefore, the output of Cournot equilibrium outputs with partial ownership
w can be expressed as q⇤(g) = 1 wg3 2wg Z. The utility of each firms is
u⇤(g) = (Z  1 w
g
3  2wg Z 
1 wg
3  2wg Z) ⇤
1 wg
3  2wg Z
Z ⇤ Z(1 wg)
(3  2wg)2
(A.6)
The aggregate monopoly output can be calculated by setting qj as 0. This setting yields a total
monopoly output of 242 ; therefore each firm’s equal share of the monopoly output is bqi = 6.
A firm which deviates optimally from the monopoly outcome would choose output qD (see
Figure C19), which can be expressed as
qD = R(bq) = 24(1 wg)  bqj
2(1 wg) =
9  12wg
1 wg (A.7)
Figure C19: Best response to collusive opponent with group identity parameter
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A firm which deviates optimally against a rival selling output bqi will have its output qD and
earn utility uD. These parameters satisfy the equation:
uD = [(1 wg)qD(24  qD   bq) +wgbq](24  qD   bq) == (9  6wg)2
1 wg (A.8)
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Collusive utility
Figure C20: Utility changing with group contingent other-regarding preference parameters
Each f irmi entitled to the group contingent other-regarding to the fraction w in regard to the
profits of its rival. As illustrated in Figure C20, the Cournot Nash utility and the deviation
utility change with different group contingent other-regarding parameters wg 2 [ 1, 1]. Fig-
ure C21 shows the f irmi’s utility gains from collusion to deviation.
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Figure C21: Deviation utility gains
Collusion As the test of group contingent can affect the extent of collusion, whether the firms
can support the monopoly outputs in each period by the implicit threat should be considered.
In other words, if this “collusion” ever breaks down, both firms will forever set their outputs
equal to the static Cournot equilibrium outputs. I ask whether each implementing the follow-
ing strategy can constitute a Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium in the repeated game. As in
other models, this “trigger” strategy will form a Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium if and
only if the firm’s discount factors exceed the critical level.
Finitely Repeated Interactions Figure C22 illustrates the influence of group contingent other-
regarding on the period of threshold deviation.
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Figure C22: Finitely repeated interactions: Threshold deviation period
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Forwg 2 [ 1, 0.5], the threshold deviation period is concentrated between 9th and 10th period.
For wg 2 [0.5, 1], the threshold deviation period decreases with the increased group contingent
other-regarding parameter.
Indefinitely Repeated Interactions If the increased group contingent other-regarding im-
proves this critical discount factor, then collusion is less likely to happen. That is because the
set of parameters can support collusion before the happening of increased group contingent
other-regarding. Firms discount is set at the rate of d 2 (0, 1). The repeated game utility is
given by Ui = Ât=0• ui(qi, qj)dt . The incentive compatibility condition for a group contingent
other-regarding f irmi sustains the selfish collusive outcome by using a grim trigger strategy.
This situation can be expressed as: uDi (Ri(bqj, bqj))+ d1 du⇤(g)i (q⇤i (g), q⇤(g)j )  11 d bui(bqi, bqj). There-
fore, we can obtain
dc(g) =
uDi   bui
uDi   u⇤i
 d (A.9)
When firms have group contingent other-regarding preferences, they tend to follow the self-
ish collusive outcome, which can be sustained if the firms are patient enough. dC⇤(g) is the
critical discount factor above which the selfish collusive outcome can be sustained by group
contingent other regarding firms. In order to determine whether these triggered strategies can
constitute an equilibrium, the utility in the repeated model should be calculated. In general,
the formula for dC is unwieldy; however, we have
dc(g) ⌘
(9 6wg)2
1 wg   72
72  24⇤24(1 wg)(3 2wg)2
(A.10)
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In this function, dc(g) would decrease until wg approaches to 0.5. After that turning point, dc(g)
increases. This shows that, for a higher level of group contingent other-regarding, increased
cross ownership may actually decrease the likelihood of sustained collusion. This result is
shownmore dramatically in Figure C23. Hence, in this case, increased group contingent other-
regarding no doubt facilitates collusion. As noted earlier, increased group contingent other-
regarding softens the punishment phase of the trigger strategy, and reduces the gain from
cheating. For wg 2 [ 1, 0.5], the collusive outcome of single period Cournot interaction can
be sustained at a lower discount factor in the indefinitely repeated Cournot duopoly for group
contingent other-regarding firms, and vice versa. As the group contingent other-regarding
increases in the event of wg < 0.5, uD approaches to bui. This implies that the gains from single-
period deviation decrease, which is shown in Figure C21. Alternatively, u⇤(g)i increases in the
group-contingent other-regarding firms, implying that the punishment for ‘cheating’ becomes
less severe. If w 2 [ 1, 0.5], then dc(I) < dc(N) < dc(O). If w 2 [0.5, 1], then dc(I) > dc(N) > dc(O).
Figure C23: Indefinitely repeated interactions: Critical discount factor dc over group identity
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In sum, increasing group contingent other-regarding softens the punishment phases of the
trigger strategy. At the same time, it also declines the gains from deviations. There are two
reasons to explain the decrease in the gains from deviations. On the one hand, the size of gains
from deviations must be heavily discounted. On the other hand, with higher other-regarding
preference, a more significant share of one’s utility comes from the profits of rivals; which
could lead a more significant (negative) effect on the utility, thereby also reducing the gains
from deviations. Whether increase other-regarding preference makes collusion more or less
likely, which depends on the net results of these two effects.
To illustrate how a subject’s group identity may affect his or her incentives toward collusion in
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this duopoly game, we examine the Frieman Index, an indicator of the potential for collusion
used in previous research. The Friedman Index is calculated as the ratio of the gains from
colluding to the gains from cheating, therefore a greater Friedman Index indicates a higher
likelihood of collusion. The Friedman Index can be defined in terms of the agent’s utility
which allows for the possibility of the same group identity. Function u(p,vg) characterizes
the firm’s utility from income p and the group identity parameter vg. vg is determined by the
extent the belongingness of the firms to their group. Then the Friedman Index can be modified
as u(p
C ;vg) u(pNE;vg)
u(pD ;vg) u(pC ;vg) ; where p
C is the profit from the joint profit from maximized (collusive)
outcome, pNE is the one-shot Nash equilibrium profit, and pD is the profit form a unilateral
defection from joint profit maximization.
Figure C24: Friedman index
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Figure C24 indicates an example of the modified Friedman Index as a function of belonging-
ness to xgroup. To plot the graph, we use the utility function Ui = v
g
i pj + (1  vgi )pi, and the
different profit levels can be evaluated based on the parameters of our experiments. Parame-
ter vgi is the coefficient of the weight on the opponent’s material profit, where positive values
indicate favouritism preferences and negative values represent derogation preferences. The
Friedman Index increases in vgi : allowing tolerance for group identity and a greater likelihood
of collusion. While the standard Friedman Index utilizes the ratio of absolute differences in
payoffs, the modified measure analyzes the changes in utility. The utility function exhibits a
decreased marginal utility of income, and a group favouritism may derive more additional
utility from increased profits which were obtained from colluding relation to Nash profits than
those from defective relation to collusion.47
47Because pD > pC > pNE and the utility function exhibits a decreasing marginal utility of income, group
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E Poster-experimental Survey, Demographics and Summary Statis-
tics of Players
Participants were asked to fill out a simple questionnaire at the end of the experiment for us to
collect some demographic information. The Table E3, Table E4 and Table E5 are some summary
statistics of the participants in the three different treatments for the one-shot games, finitely re-
peated games and indefinitely repeated games; respectively. These tables contain information
about: the subjects in the particular treatment, the familiarity with the two paintings, the gen-
der percentage, how many times you have token economic experiments, the age percentage,
how many subjects answered correct question 1 and question 2, how to assess the help online
chat program to answer question 1 and question 2. Group help: the ratings of the with the
group discussion on painting problem-solving.
Table E3: One-shot interactions: Demographic observations
Treatments Paintings Gender Experiments Age Questions Chat help
Mean SD Female Male Mean SD Mean SD Q 1 Q 2 Mean SD
Nogroup 2.48 2.25 26(21.7%) 14(11.7%) 0.7 0.90 21 2.04 21 28 - -
Ingroup 1.35 0.97 30(25%) 10(8.3%) 0.5 1.10 22 1.90 13 25 5.23 2.33
Outgroup 3 2.63 31(25.8%) 9(7.5%) 0.75 1.20 21 2.00 7 35 6.95 2.35
Total 2.28 2.17 87(72.5%) 33(27.5%) 0.65 1.08 21 2.06 41 88 6.09 2.51
Table E4: Finitely repeated interactions: Demographic observations
Treatments Paintings Gender Experiments Age Questions Chat help
Mean SD Female Male Mean SD Mean SD Q 1 Q 2 Mean SD
Nogroup 1.78 1.70 24(20%) 16(13%) 0.88 1.16 20 1.24 20 28 - -
Ingroup 2.25 1.96 20(16%) 20(16%) 0.55 0.85 20 1.53 7 35 5.98 2.03
Outgroup 2.13 1.63 17(14%) 23(19%) 0.78 1.10 20 2.42 16 24 6.15 2.30
Total 2.05 1.77 61(51%) 59(49%) 0.73 1.04 20 1.82 43 87 6.06 2.17
Table E5: Indefinitely repeated interactions: Demographic observations
Treatments Paintings Gender Experiments Age Questions Chat help
Mean SD Female Male Mean SD Mean SD Q 1 Q 2 Mean SD
Nogroup 2.2 1.75 22(18.3%) 18(15%) 0.775 1.44 21 1.80 14 26 -
Ingroup 2.28 1.89 16(13%) 24(20%) 0.225 0.62 20 2.1 7 36 6.45 2.48
Outgroup 1.9 1.57 28(23%) 12(10%) 0.9 0.97 21 1.74 5 24 5.98 1.92
Total 2.13 1.74 66(55%) 54(45%) 0.56 0.88 21 2.00 26 86 6.21 2.24
All players are not familiar with the two paintings; the indexes of familiarity degree are around
2 (see Paintings columns). Nevertheless, it is helpful to answer the painting questions for
group assignment members, and the indexes of on-line chat helps are around 6 (see Chat
help columns). Overall all experiments, the group contingent other-regarding self-reported
the sense of belongingness increase if players are placing into a group and then they have a
discussion with own group members (R. Chen & Chen, 2011).48
Onc can observe that at least 22 out of 40 players in each treatment are from Economic Business
majors, among which they may be very familiar to the Cournot interactions.
favouritism subject may derive more additional pC > pNE.
48Group discussion often has the effect of inducing shift in individual decisions (Cason, Sheremeta, & Zhang,
2012).
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F Regression with the Sense of Belongingness to Own Group
In this subsection, the sense of belongingness to own group (BOW) as group measures are
induced into the LOS regression models. The dependent variable is the individual quantity
choice. The independent variables are ingroup matching dummy variable, the group mea-
sures, periods, supergames, and the interactions among those variables.
F.0.1 One-Shot Games
Table F6: OLS Regression: Treatment effects on individual quantity choices by treatment with
the sense of the belongingness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constants 8.15 8.30*** 8.46*** 8.48
(0.00) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06)
Ingroup -0.08 -0.11 -0.02 - 0.06
(0.10) (0.12) (0.02) (0.03)
BOW -0.02 -0.02 -0.00***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
BOW⇤Ingroup -0.01 -0.02 -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Periods -0.01* -0.01***
(0.02) (0.00)
Periods⇤Ingroup 0.004**
(0.00)
Observations 5581 5581 5581 5581
r2 0.001 0.004 0.015 0.017
r2 Adjusted 0.001 0.003 0.014 0.016
Standard errors statistics in parentheses⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
In the column(1), the coefficient of the Ingroup dummy variable is negative, which implies that
compared with the outgroup matchings, the participants are more likely to decrease their own
quantity choices. We did not find a direct difference effect between ingroup treatment and the
outgroup treatment. The interaction between ingroup dummy and the group measure plays a
positive role in lowing quantity choice. The coefficient of Period ⇤ Ingroup implies that group
assignment accelerates the speed of increasing quantity choices over periods. The signs of the
coefficient of BOW ⇤ Ingroup are negative but do not significant statistical analysis.
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F.0.2 Finitely Repeated Games
Table F7: OLS Regression: Treatment effects on individual quantity choices by treatment with
the sense of belongingness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constants 7.803 6.985*** 7.380*** 7.917*** 7.968*** 7.872*** 7.880***
(0.00) (0.23) (0.18) (0.23) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Ingroup -0.39⇤⇤ -0.45⇤⇤ 0.16 0.16 0.26 0.26 0.27
(0.07) (0.06) (0.18) (0.18) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
BOW 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09⇤⇤⇤
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BOW⇤Ingroup -0.08⇤⇤ -0.08⇤⇤ -0.08⇤⇤ -0.08⇤⇤ -0.08⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Supergame -0.13⇤⇤ -0.12 -0.12⇤⇤⇤ -0.12⇤⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Supergame -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
⇤Ingroup (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
10thperiod 0.96⇤⇤⇤ 1.03⇤⇤⇤
(0.06) (0.00)
10thperiod -0.15⇤⇤
⇤Ingroup (0.02)
Observations 5600 5600 5600 5600 5600 5600 5600
r2 0.012 0.016 0.018 0.039 0.040 0.064 0.064
r2 Adjusted 0.011 0.015 0.017 0.039 0.039 0.063 0.063
Standard errors statistics in parentheses⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
F.0.3 Indefinitely Repeated games
Table F8: OLS Regression: Treatment Effects on Individual Quantity Choices by Treatment
with the sense of the belongingness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constants 7.73 7.52** 8.12*** 8.20**
(0.00) (0.04) (0.07) (0.00)
Ingroup -0.20** -0.20* -0.24* -0.412
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.15)
BOW 0.03** 0.02** 0.02
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
BOW⇤Ingroup 0.01** 0.01**
(0.00) (0.00)
Supergame -0.15** -0.18***
(0.02) (0.00)
Supergame⇤Ingroup 0.05
(0.02)
Observations 8640 5760 5760 5760
r2 0.030 0.004 0.033 0.033
r2 Adjusted 0.030 0.004 0.032 0.032
Standard errors statistics in parentheses⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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G Measures of Collusion (Harrington Jr et al., 2016)
There is the regularity in quantity choices one could typically definite a collusive equilibrium
(qi = qj = 6). We would like to analysis the collusion by two additional measures: the same
collusive quantity choice (Same) and the longest number of consecutive periods when two
firms set the collusive quantity choice (Duration). The high measures of Same and Duration
imply that two firms are colluding.
Table G9: Collusion measures
Supergames Finitely Indefinitely
Nogroup Ingroup Outgroup Nogroup Ingroup Outgroup
Number of pe-
riod with JPM
(qi = qj = 6)
1 0.95 1.00 1.35 0.25 1.10 0.00
2 1.70 1.20 1.65 0.60 0.40 0.45
3 2.35 1.75 2.00 0.25 7.60 3.00
4 2.25 2.45 2.25 0.55 4.5 1.8
5 2.4 3.5 2.8 2.2 1.8 0.55
6 2.95 3.15 2.7 0.4 6.3 1.9
7 2.75 3.75 3.05 3.55 6.7 1.55
Duration of JPM
(qi = qj = 6)
1 0.91 1.00 1.29 0.20 0.52 0.00
2 1.70 1.20 1.65 0.60 0.2 0.25
3 2.62 1.75 2.00 0.25 3.2 2.80
4 2.00 2.58 2.25 0.55 1.61 1.47
5 2.40 3.33 2.68 1.9 0.53 0.42
6 3.20 2.75 2.70 0.26 3.15 1.83
7 2.62 3.72 3.14 3.55 2.90 1.55
Table G10: Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests
p-values for the test that same and Duration is the same between two treatments
Finitely Indefinitely
Number of period with JPM (qi =
qj = 6)
Nogroup Ingroup 0.030 0.000
Outgroup 0.906 0.000
Ingroup Outgroup 0.034 0.000
Duration of JPM (qi = qj = 6)
Nogroup Ingroup 0.460 0.000
Outgroup 0.950 0.006
Ingroup Outgroup 0.430 0.038
No matter in finitely repeated interactions or indefinitely repeated interactions, the number
of periods in ingroup treatment firms set identical collusive quantity choices are more than in
nogroup treatment and in outgroup treatment (p-values < 0.05). However, the differences be-
tween nogroup treatment and outgroup treatment just happened in the indefinitely repeated
interactions. In terms of the maximal number of consecutive periods, there were no differences
across two treatments in the finitely repeated interactions. But, in the indefinitely repeated in-
teractions, the maximal number of consecutive periods in the ingroup treatment and outgroup
120
treatment are higher than the nogroup treatment (p-values <0.001).
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